Conference on Disarmament
Plenary Meeting, 28 January 2020

Second intervention by Pakistan

Mr. President,

I have requested for the floor to respond to the comments made by the distinguished Ambassador of India. The references to India in Pakistan’s statement were all based on facts on the ground and other recent developments. These facts might be uncomfortable for India, but they are solid irrefutable facts.

The toxic extremist ideology pervasive in India today, along with its offensive doctrines and hegemonic pretensions; its quest for conventional and strategic military dominance; a history of aggression against its neighbours; and the refusal to engage in a dialogue or mediation on dispute resolution, confidence building and risk reduction, present a clear and present danger. Not just to Pakistan, but to regional and international peace and security. India’s recent illegitimate actions in Occupied Jammu & Kashmir, in blatant disregard for UN Security Council resolutions, coupled with its belligerent rhetoric, have compounded the regional security situation.

Contrary to the assertion made, these issue are completely germane to the CD because they carry grave implications for regional and international peace and security. India must act responsibly and work towards preserving rather than imperilling peace in South Asia.

India’s spurious claim that its security compulsions are not confined to any geographical region is belied by the fact that the bulk of India’s offensive capability is deployed against Pakistan. And not only that, the senior political and military leadership of India has openly resorted to irresponsible rhetoric and sabre rattling against Pakistan, which reflects a dangerous hegemonic mindset.

The Indian Ambassador’s statement did not address the many facts presented by my delegation regarding its massive destabilizing arms build-up and aggressive military policies. India itself publicly claimed to have carried out the first deterrence patrol in a nuclear powered submarine, presumably equipped with nuclear weapons, in August 2018. India continues to publicly announce its tests of a wide range of delivery systems for both conventional and nuclear weapons. The test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon was also proudly announced by India itself. Similarly, the statements by Indian leaders regarding changes in its so-called “No First Use” nuclear posture are also part of public record.
These actions are in addition to the development and operationalisation by India of highly aggressive and destabilising military doctrines that envisage conventional attacks on Pakistan below the perceived nuclear threshold.

Mr. President,

India’s illegitimate actions of August 5, 2019 are aimed at further consolidating its illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir. These moves are in clear breach of UN Security Council Resolutions, particularly with regard to the realization of the Kashmiris’ right to self-determination.

The gross and systematic violations of international law and international human rights law by India have reached unprecedented levels, as extensively catalogued in the reports of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other human rights bodies and civil society organizations.

Let me emphasize one fact here. Jammu and Kashmir is neither an integral part of India, nor is it India’s internal matter. In accordance with UN Security Council resolutions, it is an internationally recognised disputed territory. The UN Security Council has met no less than on three occasions during the last five months to address this matter, recognizing the threat posed by India to international peace and security and regional strategic stability in South Asia.

Mr. President,

As for India’s gratuitous claim about its support for FMCT. After amassing tons of unsafeguarded fissile material as a so-called “strategic reserve”, directly aided and abetted by discriminatory waivers from the NSG and nuclear cooperation agreements with many major supplier countries, India can surely do some grandstanding by maintaining a declaratory position in favour of the commencement of FMCT negotiations. For Pakistan, these declarations ring hollow. If India claims to support FMCT, then why does it insist on basing the negotiations on the restrictive Shannon Mandate? Why is it unwilling to include existing stocks in the treaty’s scope, in a manner that would genuinely contribute to global and regional stability as well as to nuclear disarmament – which India also claims to support? It comes as no surprise to Pakistan that India is the strongest opponent of extending the future treaty’s scope in a manner that encompasses existing stocks, in order to perpetuate the prevailing asymmetries in South Asia to India’s permanent strategic advantage.

Also, unlike the other nuclear armed States that favour the commencement of FMCT negotiations, India has neither declared a unilateral moratorium nor ceased the production of fissile material. It
directly benefits from the current situation, that it is disingenuously blaming on Pakistan, by continuing to increase its fissile material stocks. If ceasing national production was a gauge of good-faith towards the start of FMCT negotiations, India fails to fulfil that condition.

Pakistan’s position on the CD’s Programme of Work and on FMCT specifically is guided by our national security interests. The treaty should provide undiminished security for all States, a principle recognized by SSOD-I. It should contribute both to the objectives of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation in all its aspects. The way the treaty is currently envisaged under the Shannon Mandate, it affects Pakistan disproportionally. We, therefore, have been compelled to oppose such negotiations as they would be detrimental to our vital national security interests. Other countries in similar situations take the exact same position in the CD on issues that prejudice their national security. We are, however, open and constructive in our engagement to find a solution that addresses the concerns of all affected countries. In that regard, we have offered many proposals and ideas, both bilaterally as well as in the CD, which have been repeatedly rejected by India. Pakistan reiterates its willingness to go along with a Programme of Work that provides for negotiations on a fissile material treaty that expressly includes existing stocks in its scope.

I thank you, Mr. President