DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT UNDER AGENDA ITEM "COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT"

Compilation prepared by the Secretariat

I. Documents of the Ad Hoc Working Group/Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

Note by the Secretariat: Over the years, the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group/Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament were annexed to its reports to the Committee on Disarmament/Conference on Disarmament. These Annexes had usually more that 30 pages of negotiated text which was, to some extend, repetitive. For this reason, the present compilation does not include all the Annexes (the list of documents indicates which Annexes are not included). Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to include these Annexes that are representative or record the work at the important stages of negotiations, such as early efforts, reports to the special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and the final stage reached by the Ad Hoc Committee.

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<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Subject of the document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CD/78</td>
<td>(1) Decision on the establishment of an Ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament</td>
<td>17 March 1980</td>
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<td>(2) Statement by the Chair</td>
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1 As of 1984 the Committee on Disarmament has been renamed to the Conference on Disarmament; similarly, its Ad Hoc Working Groups has been renamed to Ad Hoc Committees.


CD/160  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: To strengthen peace, deepen détente, and curb the arms race  3 March 1981

CD/166  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees  23 March 1981


CD/245  Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR: Working Paper on the agenda item entitled “Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament”  19 February 1982


CD/283*  1982 Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (submitted also to the SSOD II)  26 April 1982

CD/286  Statement by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on the occasion of the submission of the report of the Group  19 April 1982

CD/415*  1983 Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (without the Annex)  19 August 1983
CD/525  1984 Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (without the Annex)  25 July 1984

CD/634*  1985 Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (without the Annex)  23 August 1985

CD/728  1986 Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (without the Annex)  26 August 1986

CD/783  1987 Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (without the Annex)  20 August 1987

CD/832  1988 Special Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament; (submitted to the SSOD III)  21 April 1988

CD/867  1988 Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (without the Annex)  2 September 1988

CD/955  1989 Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament  24 August 1989

### II. Documents related to the issue of anti-personnel landmines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Subject of the document</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CD/1441</td>
<td>United States of America: Statement by President Clinton for the opening of the 1997 session of the Conference on Disarmament</td>
<td>22 January 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1442</td>
<td>United States of America: Statement by the Press Secretary of the White House and a fact sheet on United States' initiatives on anti-personnel landmines</td>
<td>22 January 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1443</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Proposal - Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on &quot;ban on anti-personnel landmines&quot;</td>
<td>30 January 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1450</td>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran: Proposal on the Programme of Work</td>
<td>20 March 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1451</td>
<td>South Africa: Press Statement by the Minister of Defence concerning the policy of the South African Government on anti-personnel landmines and the message from President Mandela to the 4th International NGO Conference on Landmines held in Maputo from 25 to 28 February 1997</td>
<td>26 March 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1452</td>
<td>Chile, Finland and Poland: Proposal to appoint a Special Coordinator on Anti-Personnel Landmines</td>
<td>27 March 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1455</td>
<td>Hungary and Japan: Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a &quot;ban on anti-personnel landmines&quot;</td>
<td>15 May 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1456</td>
<td>Canada: Views on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda and programme of work</td>
<td>15 May 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1458</td>
<td>Australia: Draft decision to appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the question of anti-personal landmines</td>
<td>22 May 1997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Federal Republic of Germany: Summary of the International Expert Meeting on Possible Verification Measures for a Convention to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines, held in Königswinter, Germany, on 24 and 25 April 1997

Canada: Two publications entitled "Small Arms and Light Weapons: an annotated bibliography" and "Anti-Personnel Landmines Ban: an annotated bibliography"

Group of 21: Proposal on the programme of work

Italy: Statement by the Italian Government on the policy on anti-personnel landmines issued on 13 June 1997

Australia: Draft decision to appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations on a possible mandate on the question of anti-personnel landmines

Belgium: Closing document of the Brussels International Conference for a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines


Republic of Kazakhstan: Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the decision of his Government concerning the prohibition of export, re-export and transit of anti-personnel landmines

Chile and Poland: Anti-personnel landmines

Mexico: Statement on the question of consultations by the Special Coordinator on anti-personnel landmines in the Conference on Disarmament

30 September 1997

CD/1479 Indonesia: Press release concerning the decision by the Government of Indonesia to attend the Anti-Personnel Mines Treaty Signing Conference in Ottawa, Canada on 2-4 December 1997

2 December 1997

CD/1480 Republic of Belarus: Extension of a moratorium on the export of Anti-Personnel Landmines

13 January 1998

CD/1490 United States of America: Statement from the President of the United States on the occasion of the Opening plenary of the 1998 session of the Conference on Disarmament

28 January 1998

CD/1493 Egypt: Resolution EB101.R23 adopted by the Executive Board of the World Health Organization on the issue of “Concerted Public Health Action on Anti-Personnel Mines”

6 February 1998

CD/1495 Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela: Draft decision to re-appoint the Special Coordinator to continue his consultations on a possible mandate on the question of anti-personnel landmines

10 February 1998

CD/1498 South Africa: Media Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa regarding the South African assistance in demining activities in Mozambique

23 February 1998

CD/1514 Egypt: Resolution WHA51.8 adopted by the World Health Assembly on the issue of “Concerted Public Health Action on Anti-Personnel Mines”

26 May 1998

CD/1553 Egypt: Resolution 1998/30 entitled "Injurious effects of anti-personnel landmines" which was adopted on 26 August 1998 by the Commission on Human Rights/Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Fiftieth session. 31 August 1998

CD/1559 Turkey: Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey concerning the extension for another three years of the comprehensive moratorium on all anti-personnel landmine exports and transfers introduced by Turkey in 1996 21 October 1998

CD/1572 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela: Working paper concerning CD action on an APL transfer ban 4 March 1999

CD/1582 Bulgaria and Turkey: Joint statement issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey on the agreement on the non-use of anti-personnel landmines and their removal from or destruction in the areas adjacent to their common border 30 March 1999

CD/1585 Ukraine: Decree issued by the Cabinet of Ministers (Government) of Ukraine on the extension of the moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines 4 May 1999

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<tr>
<th>Document Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>CD/1608</td>
<td>Belarus: Information about the International Workshop on Humanitarian De-mining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, which was held in Minsk on 6 and 7 March 2000</td>
<td>15 March 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1638</td>
<td>Bulgaria: Statement made by the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Defence at a meeting with Military and Defence Attachés</td>
<td>2 February 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1639</td>
<td>Turkey: Joint statement made by the Republic of Turkey and Georgia on the agreement concerning the establishment of a bilateral regime for keeping their common border free from anti-personnel mines and preventing their use for border protection purposes</td>
<td>7 February 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1643</td>
<td>Bulgaria: Declaration of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the joint statement made by the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Turkey and Greece regarding the intention to concurrently start the procedures to become parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction</td>
<td>27 April 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/1668</td>
<td>Turkey: Press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on the indefinite extension of the comprehensive moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel land mines</td>
<td>22 March 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Decision adopted at the 69th plenary meeting held on 17 March 1980
(Originally submitted as Working Paper No.8/Rev.1)

The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group of
the Committee to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament,
envisioned in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the
United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to completing
its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted
to disarmament.

The ad hoc working group will report to the Committee on the progress of its
work at any appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1980 session.

Statement by the Chair

It is understood that, in carrying out its task, the working group shall take
into account, among others, the recommendations adopted by the Disarmament Commission,
all documents compiled or tabulated by the Secretariat for the working group
established in 1978 by the CSD, on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, as
well as all the working papers and proposals on the comprehensive programme of
disarmament which have been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament. It shall
also take into account other proposals and documents that may be submitted to the
Committee on Disarmament during the course of its work by members and non members
of the CSD.

In accordance with rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, representatives of
non member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during the
meetings of the ad hoc Working Group.

C/80-60604
1. In considering item 6 of its agenda, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", the Committee on Disarmament adopted, at its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, the following decision:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on the progress of its work at any appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1980 session."

2. At the 80th plenary meeting on 22 April 1980, the Committee designated Ambassador Olu Adeyi (Nigeria) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

Mr. G. E. Klimov, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, was appointed as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group.


4. In fulfilling its mandate the Ad Hoc Working Group took into account the statement of the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament made at the 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, which reads as follows:

"It is understood that, in carrying out its task, the Working Group shall take into account inter alia, the recommendations adopted by the Disarmament Commission, all documents compiled or tabulated by the Secretariat for the Working Group established in 1976 by the CD on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, as well as all working papers and proposals submitted to the Committee on Disarmament. It shall also take into account other proposals and documents that may be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament during the course of its work by members and non-members of the CD."

5. During the course of its work the following working papers were submitted to the Working Group:

(a) A working paper by Mexico entitled "Draft text for the section of the programme entitled 'Objectives'" (CD/CVD/WP.3).

(b) A working paper by Pakistan on the outline of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (CD/CVD/WP.4).

(c) A working paper by Czechoslovakia entitled "Draft text of the section of the programme headed 'Objectives'" (CD/CVD/WP.5).
(a) A working paper by Mexico entitled "Draft text for the section of the programme entitled 'Principles and guidelines'" (CD/CFD/WP.6).

(e) A working paper by China entitled "Chinese Delegation's proposal on the main principles of a comprehensive programme of disarmament" (CD/CFD/WP.8).

(f) A working paper by Czechoslovakia entitled "Draft section of a comprehensive programme of disarmament concerning the general guidelines for efforts to limit the arms race and achieve disarmament" (CD/CFD/WP.9).

(g) A working paper by Venezuela entitled "Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament: Principles" (CD/CFD/WP.10).

(h) A working paper by Poland entitled "Comprehensive programme for disarmament and the concept of education for peace" (CD/CFD/WP.12).

(i) A working paper by Czechoslovakia on principles of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (CD/CFD/WP.13).

(j) A working paper by Czechoslovakia on forms and machinery (CD/CFD/WP.15).

6. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Working Group prepared an outline of a comprehensive disarmament programme (CD/CFD/WP.2/Rev.1), and the Secretariat, at the request of the Ad Hoc Working Group, prepared the following working papers:

(a) List of documents (CD/CFD/WP.1).


(c) List of specific measures as contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and Reports of the Disarmament Commission, 1979 and 1980 (CD/CFD/WP.11).


7. At the beginning of its work the Ad Hoc Working Group decided to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament using as a framework for its discussion the "Outline of a Comprehensive Disarmament Programme" proposed by the Chairman. The outline as adopted by the Working Group in CD/CFD/WP.2/Rev.1 consists of seven chapters as follows:

- Introduction or Preamble
- Objectives
- Principles
- Priorities
- Measures
- Stages of Implementation
- Machinery and Procedure
8. Since chapter 1 of the Outline - Introduction or Preamble - will be dependent on the nature of the form and content of the other chapters in the programme, the Working Group decided to defer its consideration. It was also agreed that the Working Group should first undertake a general exchange of ideas on the six substantive chapters to enable members to state their views, seek and obtain clarifications, make suggestions and proposals, and generally lay the basis for the second stage of work when the Working Group would embark on drafting negotiated texts. As it turned out, the Working Group had sufficient time only for the first stage; therefore this report does not contain any negotiated texts nor agreed views unless it is explicitly stated. The views in paragraphs 9-15 were expressed either in statements or in the working papers submitted by delegations.

9. Under the chapter "Objectives", discussions centred around the identification of the general objectives. It was generally agreed that the ultimate objective or the long-term goal of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It was suggested that the immediate objective of the comprehensive programme should be to eliminate the danger of war, particularly nuclear war, to make disarmament progress in disarmament measures through the consolidation of the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, thus ensuring the cessation and reversal of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and the relaxation of international tension. Other objectives suggested were: development of confidence building measures, mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament, the promotion of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security and between disarmament and development and the establishment of the new international economic order. It was recalled that the objectives of a comprehensive disarmament programme would have to be achieved on a step by step basis in the whole disarmament process.

10. Under "Principles", the Working Group's attention was called to the principles for disarmament negotiations contained in paragraphs 26 to 42 of the Final Document of the first special session. It was pointed out however that while those paragraphs contain some fundamental principles, they also contain parts which are strictly speaking, not principles. Further, it was thought that the provisions which can be considered as principles or guidelines are in fact to be found in various parts of the Final Document. It would therefore be necessary to undertake a careful examination of the Final Document in order to identify and assemble together the many principles therein. In any case, since the comprehensive programme will have to be self-contained, it should encompass in essence all the principles that are thought to be relevant, including even those that are not to be found in the Final Document but which may be found appropriate. Several working papers submitted on this chapter as well as statements made by delegations will enable the Working Group to compile a fairly exhaustive list.

11. With regard to "Priorities", a view was expressed that this chapter has a direct link with the stages of implementation, in that priority accorded to measures will have to be reflected in the stage at which they are implemented. Attention was called to paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which sets out priorities in disarmament negotiations. Though negotiations on disarmament measures can be conducted concurrently, nevertheless, it should not mean a relegation to a secondary or subordinate position of issues of topmost priority while concentration is placed on peripheral issues. It was felt that the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the implementation of measures towards this end should have the highest priority.
12. On "Measures", it was agreed that for the current stage of its work, the Working Group should first try to draw up a detailed and full list of all measures which could be included in the comprehensive programme. To this end, the Secretariat was requested to prepare a compilation of all measures contained in the Final Document of the first special session and the reports of the two substantive sessions of the Disarmament Commission as well as in the draft treaties submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962. In addition to these documents, other documents that emphasize the particular ideas and concerns of delegations were submitted. Due to lack of time, a substantive consideration could not be given to the various proposals.

13. On "Stages of Implementation", the discussions focused on the issue of time frames. It was felt on the one hand that the comprehensive programme in its totality must be conceived within a time frame for its completion. According to this view, specific measures in accordance with priorities accorded to them should also have time frames so that the implementation of the programme could proceed from one stage to the next until final accomplishment of general and complete disarmament. A programme without time frames, it was felt, would be pointless. Indeed, without a time frame the comprehensive programme of disarmament would be merely an enumeration of disarmament measures whose achievement would be illusory. The commitment towards time frames would, in fact, be an expression of the political will of States to implement the programme. On the other hand, it was emphasized that the implementation of a programme could not be subject to a timetable set in advance, as it is unrealistic to provide rigid time frames for the conclusion of the relevant international agreements since that depends on a number of factors which it is frequently difficult to anticipate. It was argued that the setting of deadlines was not compatible with the conditions of a negotiation, a fortiori with the requirements of a series of interdependent negotiations. Another alternative view was also stated according to which, while tentative deadlines should be presented as desirable goals to be aimed at, special care should be taken to avoid the impression that they constituted inflexible targets.

14. On "Machinery and Procedure", the discussion centred on identification of the various topics on which this chapter may be based. It was suggested that these include, examination of machinery for negotiations, machinery for deliberations, procedure for keeping the United Nations informed of all efforts in the field of disarmament, machinery for monitoring implementation and ways and means for promoting public awareness. It was also observed that thought should be given to means of co-ordination of disarmament negotiations bearing in mind that these negotiations will take place in various forums both within and outside the United Nations system.

15. Having completed its general exchange of ideas on the substantive chapters, the Working Group had a brief preliminary discussion on "Introduction or Preamble". The discussion centered mainly on the nature of the programme. On the one hand, it was held that the comprehensive programme should constitute a legally binding instrument, much like a treaty or convention, under which States would accept a legal commitment to implement a series of disarmament measures within a specific period of time. On the other hand, it was held that the programme should be seen as a framework for negotiations, the implementation of which States would commit themselves to, though not in a formal legal manner. It was also held that the programme should include first of all a complex of measures which should be negotiated on with a view to concluding appropriate international treaties and therefore it could not be construed as a legally binding document. Another point of view held that the comprehensive programme could entail on States, obligations somewhat less than those arising from international treaties but more than a mere "moral commitment" to implementation.
Conclusions

16. Bearing in mind that the Committee on Disarmament should conclude negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament in time for submission to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is essential that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a comprehensive programme should be enabled to resume its work immediately on the commencement of the next session of the Committee.

17. The discussions which have taken place during the current session of the Ad Hoc Working Group have served to focus attention on some of the issues that have to be clarified. It should be possible for the Working Group to proceed to elaboration of its text at the next session using the elements of the comprehensive programme submitted by the Disarmament Commission in 1978, the Final Document of the special session, the draft Declaration of the 1980's as the Second United Nations Decade on Disarmament, as well as the working papers that were presented by various delegations.
Proposal for the Six Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
Submitted by a Group of Socialist Countries

I. General Considerations

The cessation of the arms race, disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, and the permanent elimination of war from the life of society constitute the most pressing and urgent task of the present age. General and complete disarmament under effective international control continues to represent the end goal of all measures taken in the disarmament sphere.

The history of the last few years bears witness to the fact that the task of curbing the arms race is feasible. During these years, it has proved possible to make progress in some directions towards limiting the arms race: nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere; in outer space and under water have been banned; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is in force; States have agreed to refrain from the employment of weapons of mass destruction on earth, on celestial bodies, and on the sea and ocean floor; bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons have been prohibited and eliminated; a ban has been introduced on military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The first positions have also been conquered along the road towards the limitation of strategic armaments, and, consequently, the halting of the arms race in its most dangerous sector.

But the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, continues to threaten international peace and the security of peoples, and this at the same time runs counter to the interests of economic development and of the social and spiritual progress of mankind.

At present, when the international situation has become more difficult, and the cause of peace and détente is at risk, it is of the utmost importance not to weaken but, on the contrary, to stimulate the efforts of all peace-loving States to consolidate peace, eliminate the threat of war and achieve practical measures in the field of halting the arms race and of disarmament.

Effective and constructive co-operation, based on mutual trust and political will, among all States, irrespective of their social system and level of economic development, is of great importance for the achievement of disarmament and the fulfilment of its objectives.

Such co-operation must be displayed, developed and extended through mutual contacts and in all forums where States conduct negotiations on disarmament, especially in the Committee on Disarmament, so that the objectives of the negotiations may be reached as soon as possible.

Such co-operation must demonstrate the joint resolve of States to achieve a decisive break-through in disarmament negotiations and, at the same time, it must be supported by the creation of a favourable atmosphere of trust in relations between States.

Reissued for technical reasons.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia.

GE.80-65046
Broad international co-operation is also necessary for the development and, especially, for the subsequent application of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on the basis of the decisions of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to disarmament.

The UN must serve as a powerful stimulus and an effective instrument for the more active conduct of negotiations on disarmament and for the attainment of concrete agreements in that field. In selecting the Programme's main priorities, the whole accumulated experience of disarmament negotiations should be taken into account, so as to ensure that the Programme is truly comprehensive and, what is particularly important, that there are real possibilities of implementing the proposed measures. Great attention should be given in this connexion to the methodological aspects of the Comprehensive Programme. Those aspects are important both from the point of view of the composition of the Programme and from that of finding the best paths towards efficient and rapid progress.

II. Main Objectives and Principles

(a) The immediate objective of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is to preserve, strengthen and further develop the positive results achieved so far in restraining the arms race, and to secure the application of practical measures in this field.

(b) It is also important to maintain and strengthen the impetus given by the tenth special session of the General Assembly to the initiation and acceleration of urgent negotiations on the cessation of the arms race in all its aspects, if possible on a world-wide basis.

(c) International détente and the positive political processes connected with it can be genuinely stable if they are accompanied and reinforced by measures of military détente and, above all, by new practical results in the field of halting the arms race and of disarmament.

(d) The principal and ultimate goal of efforts by States in this field is general and complete disarmament under strict international control; only general and complete disarmament can give mankind the sound and enduring world peace and security which are necessary to solve today's problems of economic and social development on a world scale.

(e) Concrete partial measures towards the limitation of the arms race, armaments reduction and disarmament are called upon to play an important part as stages on the way to general and complete disarmament and the construction of a stable peace.

(f) It is necessary to ensure that disarmament negotiations are conducted on the widest possible range of issues. All negotiations which have in recent years been initiated in this field in various international forums or on a bilateral basis, but which, for one reason or another, have at present been suspended or postponed, must be resumed and continued.

(g) With a view to efficiently uniting the efforts of all States to achieve the desired progress, it is important, in elaborating a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and in the process of its implementation, to develop and apply the principles of international co-operation in this sphere approved by the United Nations.

(h) An important condition for the success of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations is the readiness of States to display a constructive approach to the negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.
(i) It is essential that all States should give evidence of a consistent and constructive approach and show goodwill and determination in putting forward initiatives and in implementing the results achieved in negotiations, as well as readiness to take account of the lawful rights and interests of others. They must display readiness to consider, with full responsibility and in a spirit of co-operation, any proposals or initiatives designed to promote the adoption of mutually acceptable concrete disarmament measures and secure the more rapid progress of disarmament negotiations.

(j) Parallel disarmament negotiations must be conducted in a conscientious manner on all priority issues, including appropriate measures for creating an atmosphere of trust, so that the negotiations may be mutually complementary and lead to an early decisive breakthrough in the disarmament field. Disarmament negotiations should be continuous, and should proceed at a rapid pace so as to outstrip the qualitative development and build-up of the armaments forming the subject of the negotiations and, where possible, to prevent the development of new types and systems of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.

(k) It is also necessary to develop joint efforts towards the adoption of concrete disarmament measures whose implementation would increasingly ensure that the resources released as a result of those measures were increasingly used to meet social and economic needs, thus helping, in view of the close connection between disarmament and development, to bridge the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

(l) All States must refrain from acts which might adversely affect disarmament.

(m) In particular, they should refrain from striving to attain military superiority and from using their military potential for aggressive purposes, especially that of the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign rule which are striving to assert their right to self-determination and the achievement of independence, or for interfering in the domestic affairs of other States.

(n) All States should strive consistently to renounce all ideas based on military intimidation or policies from a position of strength, and leading to the intensification or perpetuation of the arms race and to the further stockpiling of weapons.

(o) Measures towards the cessation of the arms race and disarmament must be based on the principle of non-impairment of the security of any of the parties to the agreement; strict observance of this principle and the renunciation of attempts to obtain unilateral advantages are an essential condition of the effectiveness of the negotiations and the viability of the agreements reached.

(p) The result of the negotiations and agreements must be to strengthen the security of the States parties thereto, as well as that of the international community as a whole.

(q) In ensuring favourable conditions for curbing the arms race and strengthening the security of States, exceptional importance attaches to the universal affirmation and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. Repudiation of the use or threat of the use of force must become the law of international life.

(r) In order to prevent a further arms race, a limit must be set to the qualitative refinement of armaments, particularly weapons of mass destruction, and to the emergence of new means of warfare. Scientific and technological advances must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
(a) A most important condition of the effectiveness of disarmament measures is the participation in the negotiations and resulting agreements of a maximum number of States, particularly nuclear Powers and States in possession of a major military potential. The participation of all nuclear Powers in efforts to halt the nuclear-arms race and to reduce and eliminate all armaments is essential for the achievement of real progress along this path. The accession of States to existing international agreements aimed at the limitation of the arms race and disarmament is an important prerequisite for further progress in this field.

(t) Agreements in the disarmament field must provide for effective control over disarmament measures, the scope and nature of such control being determined by the scope, nature and special features of the concrete measures provided for under the agreements.

(u) All States participating in disarmament negotiations must be guided by the universally recognized principles of international law and by observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence. States should take active steps, unilaterally or jointly, to propagate the ideals of peace, disarmament, co-operation and friendly relations between peoples.

III. Principal directions of efforts to limit the arms race and achieve disarmament

(1) Side by side with the ratification of the Soviet-United States Treaty on Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT-II), the immediate task in the field of practical measures for halting the arms race is the speediest possible successful completion of negotiations on the following matters:

- Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests;
- Prohibition of radiological weapons;
- Prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of stockpiles of such weapons;
- Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States not having such weapons in their territory, and non-emplacement of nuclear weapons in the territory of States in which none are now located.

(2) It is essential to initiate without delay business-like negotiations and to step up efforts in respect of the following urgently required measures to stop the arms race and avert the threat of war:

- Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons, and gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons up to and including their complete elimination; to this end, appropriate negotiations should immediately be initiated with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States and of a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, measures should be taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States;

A permanent ban on the use of nuclear weapons and renunciation by all States of the use of force in their relations with one another;
Further limitation and reduction of strategic armaments and their further limitation in a qualitative sense, taking into account all the factors affecting the strategic situation throughout the world, including Europe. The question of medium-range missiles in Europe should be discussed without delay, simultaneously and in organic combination with the question of United States forward-based nuclear weapons. This discussion should lead to appropriate agreements which could be implemented after ratification of the SALT-III Treaty. The decision to produce and deploy new types of medium-range missiles in Western Europe should also be revoked on this basis.

Adoption of further measures to strengthen the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal application of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world;

Elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from the territory of other countries;

Limitation and reduction of the level of military presence and military activity in certain regions, whether in the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf, in the interests of peace and stabilization of the international situation, as well as of ensuring the safe and uninterrupted use of major international shipping routes;

Limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean, and creation of a zone of peace in that region;

Conclusion of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction;

Conclusion of a convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons;

Cessation of the development of new types of highly destructive conventional weapons;

Conclusion of an agreement on the non-expansion of the armed forces and conventional weapons of the permanent members of the Security Council, and of the countries associated with them by military agreements;

Ensuring the safe and unobstructed use of major international shipping routes by limiting and reducing the level of military presence and military activity in certain regions;

Limitation of sales and deliveries of conventional weapons;

Elaboration of an international agreement prohibiting or limiting the use of conventional weapons which are excessively destructive or unselective;
Accession to the existing agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament by all States which have not yet acceded to them;

Reduction, in absolute or percentage terms, of the military budgets of States, particularly of major Powers and especially of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;

Conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe;

Conclusion among all States participating in the European Conference on Security and Co-operation of a treaty whereby each party would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against any other;

Further confidence-building measures in Europe;

Convening of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe;

Convening of a world disarmament conference.

(3) The mobilizing of public opinion for peace plays a tremendous part in efforts towards the strengthening of peace, the stabilization of international security, the elimination of armed conflicts and effective disarmament.

In this connexion it is necessary to:

(a) Promote as clear as possible a public understanding of the meaning of peaceful coexistence and friendly international co-operation, so that the objectives and tasks formulated in the Programme may contribute towards implanting ideas about the preservation of peace as categories in public thought, especially in the course of the Second Disarmament Decade;

(b) Ensure that the specialized agencies of the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations, should play an effective role in mobilizing public opinion towards the attainment of the chosen objectives in the field of disarmament, particularly by holding annual events within the framework of Disarmament Week and by other accessible means.

IV. Forms and Machinery of Negotiations

The achievement of practical results in halting the arms race and in disarmament calls for constructive negotiations among interested States in the course of which universally acceptable decisions may be sought and formulated. In solving urgent problems in this field, States should make use of all available negotiating channels and of all opportunities within the United Nations for extensive exchanges of views on these issues.

The composition of bodies engaged in preparing specific agreements should be such as to assure their working capacity and efficiency.
States should consult one another on disarmament issues at all levels, including the highest level, so as to create the political preconditions for solving problems in a spirit of goodwill and in a desire for rapprochement of their respective positions, and should also make maximum use, in the interests of disarmament, of all opportunities for co-operation created by States in other fields of their mutual relations.

In order to achieve more palpable progress in solving the problem of disarmament, which affects the interests of all States throughout the world, it is necessary to conduct negotiations in the broadest and most authoritative international forum, such as would be provided by a World Conference on Disarmament. The necessary steps should be taken to convene such a conference after the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. A world-wide forum of this kind could conduct discussions with due authority and at the necessary depth. The working bodies of the conference could draft appropriate decisions and carefully prepare practical agreements taking account of the interests of all States. The conference would thus lead to concrete and effective measures aimed at halting the arms race and promoting general and complete disarmament.
ITALY

Working Paper

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
"Objectives"

1. The purpose of the CFD is to establish an agreed framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament, which ensure that any partial measure contributes to progress towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

A primary objective of the CFD is thereby to harmonize the twin approach to disarmament issues, by ensuring that specific measures be sought within the context of an over-all programme leading to general and complete disarmament through an equitable, balanced and verifiable process.

2. Given its comprehensive nature, it encompasses all measures and steps thought to be advisable to this end, whether arms control and disarmament measures or parallel and related measures. It provides for gradual and balanced movement towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament by dealing with near-term as well as longer range actions; conventional armaments and forces as well as nuclear and mass destruction weapons; regional as well as global measures; international as well as national mechanisms to verify and manage the disarmament process.

3. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament aims at strengthening the positive results achieved so far in curbing the arms race, at stimulating ongoing negotiations and inducing concrete progress in order to maintain and enlarge the momentum generated by the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

4. The CFD pursues the objective of enhancing the security of all States. In this context it recognizes the need for strengthening and developing international security mechanisms, so as to facilitate the peaceful settlement of controversies between nations and supplement the United Nations capability to maintain and restore international peace and security.

5. As all nations have a vital interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations, the latter must be granted the active participation and support of all nations. The CFD pursues, as one of its objectives, an ever increasing involvement in disarmament matters of governments and world public opinion.
LETTER DATED 2 MARCH 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS TRANSMITTING PART OF THE REPORT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE PRESIDIOUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, MR. L.I. BREZHNEV, TO
THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, ENTITLED,
"TO STRENGTHEN PEACE, DEEPEN DÉTENTE AND CURB THE ARMS RACE".

I send you herewith a section of the report of the General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, to the
26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, entitled, "To strengthen
peace, deepen détente and curb the arms race". I would ask you kindly to
publish this extract as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V.L. Israelyan,
Representative of the USSR
to the Committee on Disarmament
TO STRENGTHEN PEACE, DEEPEN DEFENSE, AND CURB THE ARMS RACE

(From the report by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade L.I. BREZHNEV, to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

The pivotal line of the foreign policy of our Party and Government has been and continues to be the struggle to reduce the danger of war and to curb the arms race. At the present time, this objective has acquired particular significance and urgency. The fact is that rapid and profound changes are taking place in the development of military technology. Qualitatively new types of weapons, and first and foremost weapons of mass destruction, are being developed. These new types of weapons are such as to make control over them and, consequently, also, an agreed limitation of these weapons an extremely difficult if not impossible undertaking. A new phase in the arms race will undermine international stability and greatly increase the danger of the outbreak of war.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the policies of the aggressive imperialist forces have already brought about a considerable increase in international tension with all the dangerous consequences ensuing from this.

There is probably no other State that has in recent years put before mankind so wide a spectrum of concrete and realistic initiatives on the most crucial problems of international relations as the Soviet Union has done.

I shall start with the problem of limiting nuclear weapons, which are the most dangerous to humanity. Throughout these years, the Soviet Union has worked resolutely to put an end to the race in such armaments, and to stop their further spread across the world. A tremendous amount of work has been done, as you know, in preparing the Treaty with the United States of America on the limitation of strategic arms. Much has been done in the course of the negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. We have made an important move by declaring and reaffirming that we will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries that do not permit their deployment in their territories. But we have also offered something more: to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons and to begin reducing stockpiles of such weapons until they are completely eliminated.

The Soviet Union has also actively sought the prohibition of all other types of weapons of mass destruction. And we have succeeded in achieving a few things in this field during the period under review. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military Use of Environmental Modification Techniques has entered into force. Preliminary agreement has been reached on the basic provisions of a treaty banning radiological weapons. Negotiations continue, albeit at an intolerably slow pace, with a view to the exclusion of chemical weapons from the arsenals of States. Thanks to the actions of the peace-loving forces it was possible to check the implementation of plans for the deployment of neutron weapons in western Europe. The renewed attempts made by the Pentagon to suspend the Deterrent sword of this weapon over the European countries are arousing all the more indignation in the peoples. We for our part, reaffirm that we will not begin production of this weapon unless it appears in other States, and that we are prepared to conclude an agreement banning this weapon once and for all.
The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries have put forward a number of concrete proposals on military détente in Europe. In particular, we should like to participate in the All-European Conference to undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other, and we would suggest that the existing military blocs should not be expanded and new blocs should not be created in Europe and on other continents.

The Soviet Union and its allies have proposed the convening of a European conference to discuss and settle questions of military détente and disarmament in Europe. This question is in the focus of attention at the ongoing meeting in Madrid.

Neither have we slackened our efforts to achieve progress at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Here, the socialist countries have gone more than half way to meet our western partners. But it must be said frankly that if the western countries continue to drag out these negotiations, at the same time building up their military potential in Europe, we shall have to take this fact into consideration.

Many important initiatives taken by the Soviet Union and its allies during the past five-year period have been endorsed by the decisions of the United Nations, including those adopted at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Soviet proposals for strengthening international security and limiting the arms race remain in force. Soviet diplomats and all other officials who deal with foreign policy matters are continuing, under the guidance of the Politburo Central Committee, to press for their implementation.

Our actions are consonant with the aspirations of other countries and peoples. Suffice it to recall that many states from various continents have put forward proposals — which have received wide international support — for the declaration of nuclear-free zones, in addition to Latin America, of Africa and the Middle East, and for the creation of zones of peace in South East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean area. The decisions of the All-European Conference are, in fact, aimed at ensuring that the whole of Europe should become such a zone.

We are carrying on the struggle for a radical improvement in the international situation. The trustworthy compass here is, as it has been, the Peace Programme proclaimed by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Today, the state of world affairs requires new, additional efforts to remove the threat of war and to strengthen international security. Permit me to put before the Congress a number of ideas directed to this end.

In recent years, as you know, flash-points of military conflict, often threatening to grow into a major conflagration, have flared up in one or another region of the world. Experience has shown that it is not easy to extinguish them. It would be far better to take preventive measures, to forestall the occurrence of such hotbeds.

In Europe, for example, this purpose is to a certain extent served — and served fairly well on the whole — by the confidence-building measures in the military field carried out by decision of the All-European Conference. They include advance
notification of military exercises of ground forces, and the invitation to them of observers from other countries. At present, these measures apply to the territory of the European States, including the western regions of the USSR. We have already said that we are prepared to go farther and to give notice of exercises by naval and air forces. We have proposed — and we propose again — that there should also be advance notification of large-scale troop movements.

And now we wish to propose that the zone of application of such measures should be substantially extended. We are prepared to apply them to the entire European part of the USSR, provided the western States, too, extend the confidence zone correspondingly.

There is a region where the elaboration and application of confidence-building measures — naturally, with due consideration for its specific features — could not only define the situation locally, but also make a very useful contribution to the consolidation of the foundations of universal peace. That region is the Far East, where such Powers as the Soviet Union, China, and Japan border on each other. There are also United States military bases there. The Soviet Union would be prepared to hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries.

In making these far-reaching proposals for confidence-building measures, we proceed from the belief that their implementation will facilitate progress in the field of disarmament also.

Further, it is sometimes said about our proposals with respect to the Persian Gulf that they cannot be divorced from the question of the Soviet military contingent that is in Afghanistan. What can be said on this score? The Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate with regard to the Persian Gulf as an independent problem, and it is also prepared, of course, to participate in a separate settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. But we do not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed in conjunction with questions concerning Persian Gulf security. Naturally, only the international aspects of the Afghan problem can be discussed in this connection, and not internal Afghan affairs. Afghanistan's sovereignty, together with its status as a non-aligned State, must be fully protected.

Once again, we make a strong appeal for restraint in the sphere of strategic armaments. It should not be tolerated that the peoples of the world live under the menace of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

The limitation and reduction of strategic armaments is a paramount problem. For our part, we are prepared to continue the relevant negotiations with the United States of America without delay, preserving all the positive elements that have so far been achieved in this area. It goes without saying that the negotiations can be conducted only on the basis of equality and equal security. We will not consent to any agreement that would give unilateral advantages to the United States. There must be no illusions on that account. In our opinion, all the other nuclear Powers should join in these negotiations at an appropriate time.

The USSR is prepared to negotiate on the limitation of any types of weapons. We once proposed the baring of the development of the Trident naval-missile system in the United States and of a corresponding system in our country. The proposal was not accepted. As a result, the United States has built the new Ohio submarine armed with Trident-I missiles, while we, in turn, have built a similar system, the Typhoon. So, who has gained from this?
We are prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of the new submarines — the Ohio type by the United States and similar ones by the USSR. We could also agree to the banning of the modernization of existing and the development of new ballistic missiles for these submarines.

Now about nuclear-missile weapons in Europe. An ever more dangerous stockpiling of them is in progress. A kind of vicious circle has come about, the actions of one side provoking countermeasures by the other. How can this chain be broken?

We propose that there should be agreement that a moratorium should forthwith be set on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-missile systems of the Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union, that is, a freeze quantitatively and qualitatively on the existing level of these weapons, including, of course, the United States' land-based nuclear systems in that region. The moratorium could enter into force at once, the moment negotiations begin on this question, and it could operate until a permanent treaty is concluded on limiting or, still better, reducing such nuclear systems in Europe. In making this proposal, we expect the two sides to stop all preparations for the deployment of corresponding additional weapons, including the United States' Pershing-2 missiles and land-based strategic cruise missiles.

The peoples must know the truth about the destructive consequences for humankind of a nuclear war. We suggest that a competent international committee should be set up which would demonstrate the vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. The committee could be composed of the most eminent scientists from various countries. The whole world should be kept informed of the conclusions it draws.

There are, certainly, many other urgent international problems in the contemporary world of today. The wise solution of these problems would help take the heat out of the international situation and permit the peoples to breathe more freely. But what is required for this is a far-sighted approach, political will and courage, authority and influence. It is for this reason that we consider that it would be useful to convene a special meeting of the Security Council with the participation of the top leaders of its member States in order to look for ways of improving the international situation and preventing war. If they so wish, the leaders of other States could obviously also take part in the meeting. Naturally, thorough preparations would be needed for such a meeting, in order to ensure that it achieved positive results.

Thus, the new measures we are proposing embrace a wide range of issues. They concern both nuclear-missile and conventional weapons and also ground troops and naval and air forces. They bear upon the situation in Europe and in the Near, Middle and Far East. They cover measures both of a political and of a military nature. All these proposals pursue a single aim, our one over-all aspiration — to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the threat of a nuclear war, to preserve world peace.

This is, one might say, the organic continuation and development of our Peace Programme as regards the most burning, urgent problems of present-day international life.
The safeguarding of peace—no other task is more important now at the international level for our Party, for our people and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world.

By safeguarding peace we are working not only for the people who are living today, and not only for our children and grandchildren; we are working for the happiness of dozens of future generations.

If there is peace, the creative energy of the peoples, backed by the achievements of science and technology, will surely solve the problems that are now disturbing the peoples. Of course new and still loftier tasks will then confront our descendants. Well, that is the dialectics of progress, the dialectics of life.

Not war preparations, that doom the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but the consolidation of peace— that is the clue to the future.
TO THE EIGHTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in connection with the discussion of the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the memorandum "Peace, Disarmament and International Security Guarantees" introduced by Mr. A.M. Grigoryan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, in the statement which he made on 25 September 1980 during the general debate at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the memorandum to be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V.L. ISRAELIAN
China

Working Paper on the Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

1. The Chinese Delegation attaches great importance to the elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. At the first session of United Nations Disarmament Commission, on 15 May 1979, the Chinese Delegation submitted its Proposal on the Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, in which we made a preliminary exposition of China’s position on the objectives, principles and measures of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Now, looking into account the development of the situation in the past two years and the present state of world armaments, and drawing upon the reasonable views advanced by other countries, the Chinese delegation would like to make a further elucidation of its views and proposals on the elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

2. The elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament as a guide to progress in disarmament is the urgent demand of many States. The deterioration of the international situation in the early 1980s, the escalation of the arms race and the growing danger of war, have added to the relevance of work on the elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The First special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament held in June 1979 affirmed the necessity of drawing up a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The Disarmament Commission session of June 1980 and the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly of 1980 all adopted relevant resolutions, calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to speed up negotiations on the elaboration of the Programme in order that it could be submitted to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament in 1982 for deliberation and adoption. Therefore, this session of the CD should make positive efforts to get a draft Programme prepared as soon as possible.

3. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is an important integral part of the International Disarmament Strategy. It should point to the right direction and objectives for future progress in disarmament and lay down the principles which should be followed in international disarmament negotiations and in adopting measures for disarmament. The formulation of the Programme should be closely related to the actual situation in respect of international events and world armaments. Only thus can it have a positive and promoting effect on progress in disarmament.

With regard to orientation and objectives, as the international tension has resulted in continued intensification of the arms race jeopardizing peace and security, it is imperative to oppose the aggression, expansion and military occupation which has poisoned the international atmosphere, and oppose hegemonism, in order to create favourable conditions for disarmament. In view of the present international situation and the state of the arms race, the objectives of the

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Programmes should be, by formulating reasonable principles and practical and effective measures for disarmament, to put an end to the arms race, promote real progress in disarmament, oppose all armed aggression and a new world war, relax international tension and safeguard international peace and security. As the existing old international economic relations hinder the normal development of the world economy and landed a large number of developing countries in a serious plight, the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries and the speeding-up of the establishment of a New International Economic Order should be one of the objectives of disarmament.

As regards the principles to be followed in realizing disarmament, the Chinese Delegation had put forward 10 principles in its Proposal on the Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. We would now like to make some explanations on the important ones.

(1) The most fundamental principle of disarmament is that the States with the largest arsenals shall be the first to reduce their armaments. The current situation with regard to armaments is that both the nuclear and the conventional armaments of the superpowers are substantially larger than those of other countries, they have, moreover, used their mighty armaments as tools for carrying out aggression and expansion. In order to safeguard world peace and security, it is only right that they should take the lead in reducing their super- arsenals. This principle should be applied to all aspects of disarmament. After they have substantially reduced their armaments and narrowed the wide gap between their arsenals and those of the other nuclear weapon States and militarily significant States, the latter shall join them in reducing armaments according to reasonable ratios.

(2) The principle of universal security for all States. None of the various disarmament measures and stages should affect the security of States. No State shall be permitted to maintain and upgrade its military superiority and build its own "security" on the insecurity of other States. The principle of "equal security" shall not only be applied to the two superpowers, but shall also be universally applied to all States in the world.

(3) The principle of equal importance of nuclear and conventional disarmament. Since nuclear war poses an enormous threat to mankind, the problem of nuclear disarmament should be speedily and effectively resolved. However, conventional armaments account for four-fifths of the total world military expenditures and the utilization of conventional weapons for the conduct of war is the most real and direct threat to international peace and security. No State or military block shall be permitted either to use nuclear superiority or to use conventional arms superiority to threaten other countries. Therefore, full attention should also be given to conventional disarmament. Only if nuclear and conventional disarmament are carried out in conjunction, can progress be made toward the reduction of the danger of world war.

(4) The question of disarmament bears upon the security and interests of all States. All States in the world, regardless of their sizes, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, have the right to participate on fully equal footing in the deliberation, negotiation and solution of disarmament problems. The organization and procedures of disarmament machinery should be democratized. It should be free from manipulation and control by the superpowers and fully reflect the demands and wishes of all States. The role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be strengthened.

(5) Stringent and effective measures of international supervision and verification should be provided for in respect of disarmament measures of all spheres, in order to ensure their effective implementation.
All the above-mentioned principles were already reflected in the Final Document adopted by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and the reports of the Disarmament Commission. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should clearly provide for these important principles.

4. The aim of adopting the disarmament measures is to realise the objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The priorities and stages of the various measures should be established in accordance with the spirit of the main principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Each stage can have an indicative time-limit, in order to promote its implementation and periodic review. On this basis, we would like to make the following proposals on the principal measures:

(1) Effective measures and actions should be taken, on a priority basis, for nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament and the prohibition of chemical weapons and biological weapons.

(a) Nuclear disarmament

The ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The first stage of nuclear disarmament should be: the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals shall immediately cease all activities aimed at improving the quality and increasing the quantity of their nuclear weapons, stop the nuclear arms race and proceed to reduce their nuclear weapons. At certain stages of nuclear disarmament, other nuclear weapon States shall join them in reducing nuclear weapons according to reasonable ratios, and ultimately total destruction of nuclear weapons shall be realized. Before achieving nuclear disarmament, in order to reduce the nuclear threat against non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear weapon States shall unconditionally undertake the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

(b) Reduction of conventional weapons

The States with the largest conventional arsenals shall immediately stop their conventional arms race. As a first step, they shall undertake not to carry out armed aggression against and military occupation of other countries. They shall take the lead in substantially reducing their heavy and new-type conventional weapons and armaments, particularly their offensive weapons and armaments. At certain stages of conventional disarmament, other militarily significant States shall join them in reducing conventional arms according to reasonable ratios.

(c) Chemical and biological weapons

All chemical and biological weapons shall be completely prohibited and totally destroyed. Pending the attainment of this goal, all States shall unequivocally undertake not to use any chemical or biological weapons.

(d) Prohibition of all new-type weapons of mass destruction

(2) Adopt regional measures conducive to safeguarding the independence, sovereignty and security of all States. Various types of nuclear-weapon-free zones, zones of peace and zones of peace, freedom and neutrality can be established according to the wishes of the States concerned. All nuclear weapon States shall unconditionally
undertake the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against these zones. All attempts by any State to seek any form of hegemony in these zones shall be prohibited, and all forms of foreign military presence shall be eliminated.

5. Through conscientious negotiation and elaboration of all States, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to be examined and adopted by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament will guide and give an impetus to future progress in disarmament. Therefore, all States should undertake to make their best efforts for its implementation and realization.
Committee on Disarmament

Working Paper

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

I.

Introduction

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which is to provide the necessary framework for substantive negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament, should be a carefully worked out package of interrelated measures. Its task is to provide the international community with a framework for the measures needed to achieve progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Progress towards this aim can help to enhance international security and to preserve peace and international stability.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be based principally on documents which the international community has adopted by consensus, namely the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, the Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, elaborated by the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

II.

Objectives and Principles

The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control without diminishing the security of any State. It should contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. While the achievement of general and complete disarmament under the Programme is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the world-wide arms build-up.
Agreements to be negotiated within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should primarily aim at achieving gradually lower levels of armaments and armed forces. It is important that measures be envisaged which are designed to increase the confidence between States and to create a climate favourable to disarmament and arms control negotiations. It should be ensured that the implementation of the Programme makes an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States.

The following fundamental principle must be respected:

- The security of all States must be assured and safeguarded at all stages of the disarmament process.

- The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be unqualified security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

- Security and stability should be assured in all regions, taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situations.

- A balance should be ensured between the measures to be taken in different disarmament fields, taking into account the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects.

- All arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for effective international verification, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.

- The Charter of the United Nations must be scrupulously respected to ensure that disarmament efforts will not be countered by actions contrary to the principle of non-use of force in international relations.

III.

Framework

Negotiations on disarmament and arms control agreements should be conducted on a bilateral or regional, multilateral or global level, depending on how in each case effective disarmament agreements can most readily be achieved. Reciprocal benefits can be derived from conducting negotiations concurrently on different issues. At the initiative of the States of the regions, appropriate measures of regional disarmament should be adopted, taking into account the specific needs of the situation of the region. Such regional measures can i.e. be a valuable contribution to the facilitating of negotiations on multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.
The international disarmament machinery should ensure that all disarmament issues are being dealt with in an appropriate context. The Committee on Disarmament should fully discharge its responsibility as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

In this context, the United Nations has an important task. It should help to establish a climate in which successful negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament can be conducted, encourage States to participate constructively in such negotiations and promote the inclusion of adequate measures of verification in arms control and disarmament treaties. Where appropriate, the United Nations should also play an active role in promoting the implementation of verification regimes. The United Nations can furthermore support efforts undertaken at different levels and thus facilitate the conclusion and implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements.

IV.

Implementation and review

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should follow a phased approach. The objective of the first phase would be the successful conclusion of the negotiations currently in progress. On the basis of an evaluation of the implementation of the measures agreed upon and of the degree of confidence which has developed among the States concerned, further measures could be considered in later phases.

In each phase there must be a close link between disarmament measures and measures to build confidence. Confidence-building measures are a necessary prerequisite for a successful outcome of disarmament negotiations. Such measures could, in particular, be the notification of manoeuvres, the exchange of information and of observers and further measures that may be agreed upon in their appropriate regional context.

Provision should be made for a review of progress by the international community at the end of each phase in whatever form seems appropriate, so that plans for the next phase can be made taking into account the implementation of the measures which have been agreed upon in preceding stages, the internal progress of negotiations and external events. These regular reviews will form the basis for continued progress in the implementation of the Programme through entering into negotiations on further measures.

Each new phase will thus be preceded by a thorough and realistic evaluation, based on the results of international verification, of whether the measures agreed upon in earlier phases have been put into effect and whether their implementation has contributed to assuring and maintaining international stability and helped to preserve peace.
The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament must be implemented by all States in
good faith. States should express their firm will to implement the Programme through
the negotiation of specific agreements. These agreements should form a series of
specific interrelated measures in the context of an overall Programme. The measures
must respect the principles which have been enunciated above.

The achievement of the goals of the Comprehensive Programme will require the
negotiation of specific agreements and should lead to their conclusion and
implementation.

The negotiations should be based on a flexible and realistic step-by-step
approach. As arms control and disarmament negotiations cannot successfully be
discussed in isolation from security interests, the international political and
security situation should be taken into account in these negotiations. They should
be aimed at the achievement of realistic, balanced and verifiable agreements,
including on partial measures, which increase confidence and security among States.

The conditions for the parallel and successive negotiation of interdependent
agreements within an overall structure as well as the close interrelationship between
such negotiations and the international political and security situation require
flexibility in the implementation of the Programme. The elaboration of a fixed
timetable for the achievement of concrete results is therefore not feasible.

V.

Verification

Verification is the cornerstone for progress in disarmament and arms control.
Because arms control and disarmament measures concern the vital security interest
of the States involved, such measures must be verifiable. They should also make the
remaining arms situation more transparent and contribute to the strengthening
of confidence between the States concerned. Without strict international and
national verification means, as appropriate, a sufficient degree of confidence of
States into the observance of agreements can hardly develop. Negotiations on specific
disarmament measures should therefore aim at the inclusion of appropriate verification
arrangements in the respective agreements, and States should accept appropriate
provisions for adequate verification.

Effective verification is of paramount importance for the maintenance of the
undiminished security of States during the disarmament process. States should
therefore take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate
measures of verification, including on-site inspections, for each arms control and
disarmament agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures without
exaggerating the difficulties involved in their implementation. The valuable
contribution which verification can make to the promotion of international co-operation
should be recognized.
The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in specific agreements depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

VI.

Collateral and other measures

The international community should consider various measures which may facilitate the pursuit of policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build up confidence among States. Collateral and other measures therefore should, at each stage, form an integral part of the Comprehensive Programme. Such measures can increase confidence between States, thus preparing the way for negotiations on arms control and disarmament. They are not only a necessary prerequisite for the successful outcome of such negotiations but can also eliminate sources of tension and enhance the effectiveness of the international machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Their implementation, and the strengthening of international security and confidence which they entail can, in any case, create a climate favourable to the early implementation of disarmament and arms control measures contained in the Programme.

Such measures could, apart from others mentioned above, comprise the following:

- Achievement of greater transparency of military postures, i.e. the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures, enabling their comparison as a step towards their balanced reduction.
- Strengthening of international procedures and institutions for peace-keeping and peaceful settlement of disputes, for conflict containment and effective crisis management.
- Along with the disarmament process, strengthening of the security system of the Charter of the United Nations.
- The preparation of disarmament measures by thorough studies and reviews as appropriate of all the factors involved.
Ad hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF,
JAPAN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

GE.81-64279
A. Explanatory Memorandum

1. The present draft is based on the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, in which the Comprehensive Programme was outlined as encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality, and on the Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which have been adopted by the Disarmament Commission. The draft reflects in particular the discussions and negotiations held so far in the Committee on Disarmament and the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme.

2. In accordance with the provisions of the Elements, the Programme will comprise a phased approach covering measures in different fields of disarmament. The implementation of the Programme should be reviewed periodically by an appropriate existing forum of the United Nations. This would provide for the evaluation and appraisal of the progress of current and the prospects for future negotiations as well as for making recommendations concerning the continuing implementation of the Programme, taking into account the existing international political and security situation.

3. The draft takes due account of the fact that future developments in the field of security policy, in particular the future course of arms control and disarmament negotiations cannot be foreseen with certainty. Furthermore, it takes into consideration that it would be difficult to assign, a considerable time in advance, specific negotiations to one fixed phase. Therefore, while the draft contains specific suggestions for negotiations to be held and other steps to be taken in the first phase, disarmament and arms control measures to be considered in later phases are at present only listed without associating them with a particular phase. One of the main tasks of the review is to recommend which negotiations and other steps are most necessary and promising during the following phase.

There is a particular need to adapt collateral and other measures, in particular confidence-building measures, to the unforeseeable and changing requirements of the security situation on the global as well as on regional levels. Proposals for such measures can only be made taking into account the concrete situation prevailing at the time of the suggestion. Therefore the draft contains no specific proposals for collateral and other measures to be negotiated and considered in the second and subsequent phases; these will have to be decided upon on the occasion of the review.
4. This forward-looking approach based on previous experience offers the chance of making the best use of all existing opportunities to arrive at the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament as soon as possible. Its flexibility allows for the opening-up of avenues to disarmament which may have seemed closed or remained undetected at the time of the Programme's adoption. It also would help prevent the loss of time which might be caused if a pre-established, inflexible schedule, which cannot be adapted to changing and possibly favourable circumstances, had to be followed. For the same reasons, the draft does not provide for a fixed number of phases or for a set time scale for achieving progress in the Programme.

5. Issues relating to disarmament and arms control have a direct bearing on the security of States. It is important, therefore, that States be in complete control of their involvement at all stages of the negotiation process. While it is obvious that States are bound by international law to observe treaties and agreements which they have entered into, it is equally obvious that they cannot be bound to the success of negotiations before these have even started. That is why the Comprehensive Programme cannot contain a legal obligation for States to participate in, let alone to successfully conclude, negotiations on the complex issues involved. However, a strong political undertaking of States to implement the Programme will be of great value. The draft therefore provides for the expression of the firm will and determination of States to implement the Programme.
B. DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Final Document of its First Special Session devoted to Disarmament which in its paragraph 109 entrusted the Committee on Disarmament with the elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail,

Recalling also its resolution 54/85 II of 11 December 1979, endorsing the recommendations contained in the report of the Disarmament Commission on the elements of a Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament,

Convinced that disarmament and arms control are essential for the prevention of war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, in particular of developing countries,

Determined to pursue an international disarmament strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations play an effective role, aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

Calling upon all States to declare that they will respect the objectives, principles and priorities set out in the Programme and express their firm will and determination to implement the Programme through the negotiation of specific and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements,

Adopt the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as set forth in the annex to this present resolution.
GROUP OF 21

Working Paper on the charter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As stated in paragraph 10 of the 1980 report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which was incorporated to paragraph 69 of the report submitted by the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly during its thirty-fifth session (CD/139), it has been expressly agreed that "since the comprehensive programme will have to be self-contained, it should encompass in extenso all the principles that are thought to be relevant, including even those that are not to be found in the Final Document but which may be found appropriate".

Bearing in mind this decision, the Ad Hoc Working Group, during its 1981 session, has provisionally approved on the basis of a first reading the "principles" compiled by the Secretariat in working paper 29 of 16 April 1981, following the two objective criteria defined in the introduction to the document. In addition to those "principles" which have been all reproduced from the Final Document, the Working Group has also approved two which originated in proposals submitted by delegations.

It seems appropriate to note that the term "principles", as used both in the Secretariat compilation and in the present working paper, should be understood - as it also was in the Final Document - in a broad sense. If a more strictly accurate definition were desired, the term "principles and guidelines" would be preferable.

In view of what has just been stated, as well as of the tentative nature of the approval given by the Ad Hoc Working Group to these texts, it is obvious that both the Working Group and the Committee are entitled to reformulate the "principles" where deemed necessary or to incorporate additional formulations which may be proposed and agreed upon.

The Group of 21 feels, nevertheless, that the material already approved on first reading by the Working Group, in spite of its provisional character and of the fact that it remains subject to whatever modifications may be found advisable,
is already sufficiently illustrative of what should essentially have to be the contents of the chapter which under the title of "Principles" or "Principles and Guidelines" would form an integral part of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. It is for this reason that the Group has concluded it would be useful to submit to the Working Group and to the Committee the present working paper before the 1981 session comes to an end.

Finally, it is convenient to point out that, although in all the texts incorporated in this working paper their substance has been scrupulously respected, on some very few occasions minor modifications of form have been made. It should likewise be mentioned that the order followed in the enunciation of the "principles" is that which has been considered the most logical and appropriate and does not correspond to the order followed in working paper 29. Naturally, this order remains open to as many alterations as may be deemed advisable. As a last observation, it would be wise to bear in mind that in several instances exist repetitions which, no doubt, may be eliminated without difficulty at a later stage.
CHAPTER III

PRINCIPLES

All negotiations, measures and procedures encompassed by the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament shall be governed by the principles and guidelines set forth below:

All State Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter. (Paragraph 26).

All State Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal. (Paragraph 5).

Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order. (Second preambular paragraph of resolution S-10/2).

Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. (Paragraph 47).

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. (Paragraph 48).
CHINA

Working Paper

on the elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

The Chinese delegation has always attached great importance to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In May 1979, China submitted to the first session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission the "Proposal on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament" (A/CN.10/5). In July 1980, it again submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament a working paper containing: "Proposals on the main principles of a comprehensive programme of disarmament" (CD/CD/FP/8). We will continue our efforts in the Committee and stand ready to co-operate with other delegations.

The United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 35/46 states: "The Committee on Disarmament should expedite its work on the elaboration of the programme with a view to its adoption no later than at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled for 1982". There is not much time left, and the Committee on Disarmament will have to intensify its work. We earnestly hope that this session of our Committee will succeed in formulating a draft programme acceptable to all countries so as to contribute to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We are of the view that in order to enable the programme to guide the future disarmament process in a positive way, its formulation must constantly take into account the present international realities marked by the Superpowers' arms race and their intensified arms expansion and war preparations. Both the principles guiding the disarmament process and the priority order of the various disarmament measures should be determined on the basis of international realities. Only thus can disarmament negotiations be propelled forward in the right direction.

In view of the continuous exacerbation of international tension, the programme should clearly stress that the objective of disarmament is to oppose by effective means all acts of armed aggression and in particular the outbreak of a new world war, and to maintain international peace and security. All the disarmament measures must be evaluated and determined on the basis of this fundamental objective. The practical results of the disarmament process should be conducive to the economic and social development of the various countries concerned; and it is in line with the basic interests and pressing demands of the developing countries to specify that the promotion of the New International Economic Order is also one of the important objectives of the disarmament process.

GE.81-64745
As a nuclear war poses serious threats to mankind, the importance of effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament undoubtedly needs to be fully reflected in the programme. At the same time, we should attach the importance they deserve to the questions of reducing conventional armaments and the prohibition and destruction of biological and chemical weapons. In the post-war period, conventional wars have been waged year in and year out in some parts of the world, a fact we must bear in mind when elaborating the programme.

We are also of the view that while elaborating comprehensive disarmament measures we need also to give serious attention to partial measures, including regional measures. To exclude any form of foreign military presence from the zones of peace or the nuclear-free zones and to do away with all forms of armed aggression and occupation and military threats would contribute greatly to international peace and security.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament is to define the orientation and stages of future disarmament activities. It would give impetus to future disarmament work. The programme is not equivalent to a convention or a treaty; nonetheless, it is to be formulated by way of serious negotiations. All the countries should make efforts for its implementation and realization, and to this end, all countries should make full commitments to the programme. Our work on the programme is very important and it is our hope that good results will be achieved through the joint efforts of all the delegations here.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament adopted the following decision relating to item 6 on its agenda:

"The Committee decides that the Ad hoc working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament established on 17 March 1980 shall resume its work forthwith, in accordance with the conclusion reached by the Committee at its 100th plenary meeting (paragraph 68.16 of CD/139)."

In addition, the Committee on Disarmament decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group would report to the Committee on the progress of its work at any appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1981 session (document CD/151).

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 107th plenary meeting on 17 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Alfonso Garofa Robles (Mexico) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

3. The Ad Hoc Working Group held 34 meetings between 19 February and 23 April and between 18 June and 17 August 1981.

4. At their request, the Committee on Disarmament, at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981, decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group: Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway.

5. At the 127th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 24 April 1981, the Chairman submitted an oral progress report on the work done by the Ad Hoc Working Group.

6. In addition to the official documents of the Committee on Disarmament submitted under item 6 of its agenda and previous documents before the Ad Hoc Working Group, the following documents were submitted during the 1981 session:

- Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CFD/WP.17)

- Working paper on the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CFD/WP.18)

GE.81-64814
Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.19)

Statement by the representative of the USSR on 5 March 1981, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control", submitted to the ENDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/WP.20)

Statement by the representative of the United States of America on 5 March 1981, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", submitted to the ENDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/WP.21)

Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Objectives", submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/WP.22)

Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing supplementary proposals on the measures, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.24)


Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Measures", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.28)

Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Principles", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.13/Add.1)

Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/WP.23)

Working paper on the objectives of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.51)

Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Mexico. (CD/CPD/WP.3/Rev.1)

- Working paper containing a text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CFD/WP.35)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposal with respect to nuclear weapons, submitted by Australia. (CD/CFD/WP.37)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposal with respect to zones of peace, submitted by Australia. (CD/CFD/WP.36)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by France. (CD/CFD/WP.39)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/WP.40)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Poland. (CD/CFD/WP.42)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Machinery and Procedure", submitted by the German Democratic Republic and Venezuela. (CD/CFD/WP.45)
- Working paper on the first stage of nuclear disarmament measures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CFD/WP.44)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/WP.45)
- Working paper containing amendments to the sections "Conventional weapons and armed forces" and "Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic. (CD/CFD/WP.46)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/WP.47)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by Poland. (CD/CFD/WP.48)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CFD/WP.49)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by Mongolia. (CD/CFD/WP.50)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/WP.51)
- Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (CD/CFD/WP.52)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by Nigeria, Poland and Venezuela. (CD/CFD/WP.53)
In addition, the Secretariat prepared the following documents:
- Tabulation of Measures that are not explicitly included in the tabulations contained in documents CD/CFD/WP.11 and 14 (CD/CFD/WP.23)
- Results of the preliminary examination of chapters V ("Measures") and VI ("Stages of implementation") of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. (CD/CFD/WP.27)
- Tabulation of the Principles contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CFD/WP.29)
- Tabulation of the Objectives contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CFD/WP.32)
- Tabulation of the provisions concerning Machinery and Procedure contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CFD/WP.34)
- Compilation of certain proposals concerning Machinery and Procedure listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. (CD/CFD/WP.41)
- Results of the examination of Stage-I measures contained in document CD/CFD/WP.27 and of written and oral proposals made in connection therewith. (CD/CFD/WP.54)

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1961 SESSION

7. The Ad Hoc Working Group continued the consideration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on the basis of the outline adopted in 1960, which contains the following chapters: Introduction or Preamble; Objectives; Principles; Priorities; Measures; Stages of Implementation; and Machinery and Procedures.
8. The Ad Hoc Working Group decided to defer the consideration of the Introduction or Preamble pending the examination of the substantive chapters of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in view of the fact that the form and substance of the latter would determine its character and content.

9. The Ad Hoc Working Group completed a preliminary examination of all the substantive chapters of the Programme. In the case of the chapters concerning measures and stages of implementation, which were considered in conjunction with each other, the Working Group was also able to have a second round of more detailed discussions on measures for a first stage. It was understood that in this preliminary phase of the Group's work no definite conclusions would be reached on the matters under discussion.

10. The Ad Hoc Working Group began the consideration of each chapter with an examination of the relevant provisions of the Final Document on the basis of tabulations prepared by the Secretariat, which, in the case of the measures, also included the measures provided for in the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament elaborated by the Disarmament Commission in 1979 and in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. The Working Group then examined the available working papers which in whole or in part related to each chapter. Doubts were expressed in several cases about the appropriateness of including particular proposals in a particular chapter. It was agreed that the Working Group would be in a better position to settle such problems at a later stage.

11. With respect to the objectives of the Programme, the inclusion of the relevant provisions of the Final Document as contained in document CD/CEP/DP.52 was approved. At the same time, it was suggested that in the context of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament those provisions required further elaboration. In addition, consideration was given to the following working papers: CD/CEP/DP.4, CD/CEP/DP.5, CD/CEP/DP.22, CD/CEP/DP.31, CD/CEP/DP.35 and CD/CEP/DP.35. Some of the proposals contained in those working papers were also approved on a preliminary basis, although in some cases questions were raised as to whether a particular text defined an objective. Other proposals gave rise to various objections, some having to do with drafting and others with matters of substance.

12. Similarly, the Ad Hoc Working Group approved the inclusion of the principles for disarmament negotiations contained in paragraphs 26 to 42 of the Final Document, as well as other provisions of that document that could be considered principles, as presented in the relevant tabulation (CD/CEP/DP.29). It was suggested that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should stress, above all, the principles contained in the Final Document. The Working Group also examined the following
working papers: CD/CFD/WP.6, CD/CFD/WP.8, CD/CFD/WP.10 and CD/CFD/WP.13/Add.1. As in the case of the objectives, preliminary agreement was reached on some proposals, while on others differing views were expressed. The Working Group also had an exchange of views on the question of what should be considered a "principle". It was observed that various texts under consideration, including paragraphs of the Final Document, did not strictly speaking constitute "principles". It was suggested that this question could be decided later and that consideration could be given to the possibility of using a broader heading for the chapter in question, such as "Principles and Guidelines".

13. With respect to priorities, the inclusion of paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Final Document was approved.

14. With respect to machinery and procedures, the Ad Hoc Working Group approved the inclusion of the provisions of the Final Document, as contained in document CD/CFD/WP.34. The view was expressed that in elaborating this chapter of the Programme the Working Group would have to take account of developments that had taken place since the first special session within the framework of the United Nations system related to machinery and procedures. In this respect, the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research was mentioned by some delegations. The view was also expressed that consideration should be given to the need for the development of international institutions, as contemplated in the 1962 draft treaties for general and complete disarmament (CD/CFD/WP.7 and Add. 1) and in various proposals submitted to the tenth special session of the General Assembly, listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document (CD/CFD/WP.41). It was suggested that the structure of the section on machinery and procedure of the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament worked out by the Disarmament Commission should serve as a model. It was noted that the two approaches were not incompatible and that within the framework of the elements prepared by the Disarmament Commission it would be appropriate to consider new ideas such as those contained in the proposals presented at the special session. The view was expressed that the Working Group should not prejudge the conclusions of the study of institutional arrangements to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.2/

15. In the first round of discussions, the Ad Hoc Working Group identified measures sing a four-stage programme as a working hypothesis for the stages of implementation. It was understood that this did not imply any commitment on the part of any delegation.

2/ During the consideration of the report leading to its adoption, some delegations suggested that the question of machinery and procedures had been adequately elaborated in the Final Document of the special session. In this connection, reference to the relevant provisions of the Final Document in the draft Comprehensive Programme of disarmament would be sufficient. Several other delegations maintained that the content of paragraph 14 was adequate.
Apart from the measures provided for in the Final Document, in the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament elaborated by the Disarmament Commission and in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second-Disarmament Decade, the Working Group examined additional measures proposed in the following documents: CD/128, CD/166, CD/CPD/WP.4, 9, 24, 25 and 26. With respect to the draft treaties for general and complete disarmament that the Soviet Union and the United States submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1962, which had been circulated as documents of the Working Group (CD/CPD/WP.7 and Add.1), the representatives of those States made statements in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of their respective Governments in relation thereto (CD/CPD/WP.20 and 21). The results of the preliminary examination of measures according to stages of implementation are reflected in document CD/CPD/WP.27. That document constituted the framework for a further and more detailed examination of the measures to be included in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. In that context, consideration was given to additional proposals contained in the following documents: CD/CPD/WP.23, CD/CPD/WP.30 CD/CPD/WP.33, CD/CPD/WP.36 and Add.1, CD/CPD/WP.37, CD/CPD/WP.38, CD/CPD/WP.39, CD/CPD/WP.40, CD/CPD/WP.42, CD/CPD/WP.44, CD/CPD/WP.45, CD/CPD/WP.46, CD/CPD/WP.47, CD/CPD/WP.48, CD/CPD/WP.49, CD/CPD/WP.50, CD/CPD/WP.51, CD/CPD/WP.52 and CD/CPD/WP.53.

As noted earlier, the second round of discussions covered measures for a first stage. Different views were expressed on the specific measures under consideration and on questions of a general nature, such as, the way in which the measures should be defined and the relationship between the determination of the measures to be included in the Programme, on the one hand, and the clarification of the concept of stages, on the other hand. The results of the deliberations are reflected in document CD/CPD/WP.54 which is annexed to this report.

16. At the beginning of its work during the 1981 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group devoted its first two meetings to a general discussion of the questions of time frames and the nature of the Programme, two matters that had given rise to differing views in the course of the 1980 session, as indicated in the Working Group's report to the Committee (document CD/139, paragraphs 68.13 and 15). At the request of the Chairman, working papers were submitted presenting the different positions on those matters (CD/CPD/WP.17, 18 and 19), which provided a basis for a useful exchange of views. However, there was general agreement that the search for common grounds would be more productive at a later stage when delegations would have a clearer picture of the content of the Programme. Other working papers which were subsequently submitted to the Working Group by delegations also addressed these matters, but no further discussion took place on the basis of these later papers.
IV. CONCLUSION

17. During the current session, the Ad Hoc Working Group was able to make good progress towards the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Nevertheless, considerable work remains to be done in resolving several important and complex issues involved in the elaboration of the Programme, in particular, issues relating to measures, stages and nature of the Programme. Consequently, and bearing in mind that the Committee on Disarmament has been called upon to conclude negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Working Group agreed to recommend to the Committee that the Group should resume its work on 11 January 1982.

Corrigendum

In paragraph 7, line 1, "" should be replaced by ""C6"".
GROUP OF 21

Working Paper on the Chapter entitled "Measures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament:"

EXPLANATORY NOTE

During the course of the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the delegations belonging to the Group of 21 have submitted a document containing in detail specific measures which should be included in a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during four stages of implementation (CD/CPR/WP/56, Add 1, Add 2, Add 3). The formulations in respect to these specific measures are provisional in nature representing the highest common denominator achieved within the Group of 21 at the present stage. Revisions, amendments or additional formulations to the contents of this Chapter may be proposed by any delegation, whenever deemed necessary. In spite of its provisional character, the present document is sufficiently illustrative of what should essentially be the contents of the Chapter under "Measures". For this reason, the Group of 21 has concluded that it would be useful to submit this document to the Committee before the end of its 1981 session.
Stage 1

Disarmament Measures:

Nuclear Weapons

1. Nuclear Test Ban

The immediate conclusion of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(i) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake without further delay multilateral negotiations on a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time to come. It should be equitable and non-discriminatory and thus be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system also negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament and to which all States will have access.

(ii) The parties who have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should immediately resume and intensify their negotiations and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty.

3/ The inclusion of this item would be applicable only if, contrary to the present expectations, this treaty is not negotiated before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
2. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

The Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race in all its aspects and substantial progress towards the achievement of Nuclear Disarmament would constitute important measures during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned. The prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war should also be considered as a matter of urgent priority in the first stage.

(i) Cessation of the Qualitative Improvement and Development of Nuclear Weapon Systems:

Negotiations, during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, to achieve an agreement or agreements, for the prohibition of:

(a) the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of multiple independently retargetable vehicles and on the complete destruction of their stockpiles;

(b) the research, development and testing of new nuclear weapon systems, covering all categories of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

(c) the replacement of nuclear weapons systems currently deployed, by new and modernized versions of such systems;

(d) the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons systems;

(e) the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

(ii) Cessation of the Production of all Types of Nuclear Weapons and their Means of Delivery, and the Production of Fissile Material for Weapons Purposes:

Along with measures to halt the technological arms race in nuclear weapons, steps should be taken to halt the production of such weapons and their means of delivery along with a cessation of production of fissile material for weapons purposes.
Commencement of Negotiations on an agreement to bring about a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery along with an agreement to halt the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such an agreement could be negotiated in the following step-by-step manner:

(a) Declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, at a mutually agreed date, of their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of their existing and proposed facilities for the production of nuclear weapons, delivery systems of such weapons and for fissionable material for weapons purposes to be submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General.

(b) Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspection to establish the base on which the treaty prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, would be implemented.

(c) Negotiations on the general and complete prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, along with a cessation of production of nuclear weapons involving the application of international safeguards to all nuclear facilities in all States to prevent the diversion of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such international safeguards would be applied on an universal and non-discriminatory basis to all States.

(iii) Continuation of negotiations on nuclear disarmament between the USSR and the United States:

(a) Immediate ratification by the USSR and the United States of the SALT-II Agreement.

(b) The initiation, without delay, of further negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments between the USSR and the United States leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms. These negotiations should culminate, as soon as possible, in Stage I, in a treaty which should achieve:
- a reduction of at least 20 per cent in the numbers of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery vehicles in the arsenals of the USSR and the United States.
- comprehensive limitations on the qualitative improvement of strategic armaments, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic armaments.
(iv) The early conclusion of an agreement negotiated between the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to achieve on the basis of the principle of undiminished security, a substantial reduction of medium range and other nuclear-weapon delivery systems and warheads deployed with respect to the European theatre.

(v) Avoidance of the Use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War:

Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued and bearing in mind the devastating results which a nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, urgent measures should be negotiated to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, in Stage I, negotiations on the following measures should be concluded without delay:

(a) A binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States, without any conditions, qualifications or restrictions, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(b) An international agreement prohibiting the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(c) Measures to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas and periods of tension, by the establishment of hot lines and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict, especially a nuclear conflict. Such measures should clarify the role of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, especially through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States - (horizontal proliferation) - and on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether - (vertical proliferation). The international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation should include the following:

(a) measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament mentioned above; (b) the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to
apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs; (c) unhindered access for all States to nuclear technology, including its latest achievements, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries; (d) respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements or contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (e) agreed measures of verification applied on an universal and non-discriminatory basis.

Establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. While the States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give undertakings, in particular: (i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone; (ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conferences of OPANAL and other relevant fora.

(b) Ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by all States concerned.

(c) In Africa the Organization of African Unity has affirmed the demobilization of the continent. The United Nations General Assembly in successive resolutions has supported the African initiative for the demobilization of the continent and at its tenth special session the General Assembly, by consensus, called upon the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective. The main threat to nuclear proliferation in Africa and to the peace and security of the continent arises from the nuclear capability of South Africa. To assist the implementation of the Declaration on the demobilization of Africa, therefore, all States should:
(i) keep a constant watch on South Africa's nuclear capability;

(ii) refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field which would assist the apartheid régime in manufacturing nuclear weapons.

(d) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/147 would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(e) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

(f) Ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.
Stage I

Disarmament Measures

OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

1. Conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction.

2. Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

3. Universal adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

4. Commencement of negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement or agreements on the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons taking into account recent developments in science and technology.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND ARMED FORCES

Agreements and other measures relating to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be achieved taking into account the right of all States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

1. The States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional disarmament. Therefore, by the end of Stage I, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States should each reduce their conventional armaments and armed forces by at least 25 per cent.

2. Other militarily significant States shall undertake an agreed smaller proportion of reduction in the levels of their armed forces.
3. A more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity should be achieved by end of Stage I. This will involve, besides the above-mentioned reductions by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, reductions in the conventional armaments and armed forces of other members of the NATO and Warsaw Treacties leading to agreed lower levels of forces and armaments. This would be achieved through the on-going negotiations in Vienna or at a broader European Conference on Security, Disarmament and Confidence Building Measures. The above-mentioned measures of conventional weapons disarmament will involve:

(a) the demobilization of personnel and withdrawal of forces from foreign territories and the dismantling of foreign military bases;

(b) the destruction of agreed categories of conventional armaments and other military equipment especially weapons of great destructive capacity;

(c) measures for confidence building and security including restrictions on mobility of forces.

4. The above-mentioned measures should also include agreements for a reduction in the production of conventional weapons proportionate to the reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons agreed upon.

5. During Stage I, consultations and conferences should also be held at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level, among States for the consideration of various initiatives and proposals for confidence building and for the control, restraint or reduction of conventional armaments particularly in regions of arms concentration, areas of tension, etc.

In this context, consultations could also be held between arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons on the basis in particular of the principle of uniminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

6. Prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects:

(i) Signature and ratification by all States of the agreement negotiated by the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
(ii) Broadening of the prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, either through amendments to the existing Protocols or through the conclusion of additional Protocols, in accordance with Article 2 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

(iii) The result of the above-mentioned Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.

7. An agreement for the cessation of the development, production and deployment of new types of highly destructive conventional weapons.

Military Expenditures

1. Upon the commencement of this Programme, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States should agree to an immediate freeze in the current levels of their defence budgets. All other nuclear-weapon States are invited to follow this example.

2. During Stage I, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States will make reductions in their military expenditures in proportion to their reductions of nuclear, conventional and other weapons, reductions in the production of such weapons, reductions in their armed forces and dismantling of military facilities, bases, etc.

3. Other States may also make reductions in their military expenditures in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements; or reach agreement to freeze the levels of their military spending at certain levels.

4. The above-mentioned States should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.

5. Agreements on reduction of military expenditures should be elaborated on the basis of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries. All member States, particularly
the most heavily armed States, should endeavour, wherever feasible, to make use of
the reporting instrument, contained in document A/35/479, in reporting their
military expenditures. This reporting instrument should be further refined.

Verification
(To be elaborated subsequently)

Related Measures
1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques:
   Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile
use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of
further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.
2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and
the subsoil thereof:
   Elaboration and adoption of further measures in the field of disarmament for
the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the
subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms
race in that environment, taking into account the emerging régime under the
3. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:
   In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be
taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the
spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies:
During Stage I, an international agreement should be negotiated prohibiting
States from placing weapons of mass destruction into Outer Space.
4. Establishment of zones of peace, in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the Final Document:
   (a) The Indian Ocean
   Concrete action should urgently be taken to ensure conditions of peace and
security within the region, in particular with a view to the elimination of foreign
military bases and foreign military presence in the region and to early achievement
of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.
   (b) South East Asia
   Steps should be taken by interested States in this region to further elaborate
the concept of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" with a view to concluding
an agreement on its establishment.
Confidence-Building and Security Measures

1. All States, especially the militarily significant States, shall undertake confidence-building and security measures such as the following and other measures yet to be agreed upon, as a contribution to preparing for further progress in disarmament:

(i) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(ii) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament;

(iii) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

2. In various regions of the world, States shall seek to reach agreement on various confidence-building measures, taking into account the particular conditions and requirements of the regions concerned.

In adopting such confidence-building measures, States will give full consideration to the study on the subject to be prepared by the United Nations Group of Intergovernmental Experts.

Such measures should include agreements providing for the advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres.

Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

1. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons.

2. Achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of appropriate equality and parity by agreement on appropriate mutual reduction and limitation of armaments and armed forces in accordance with paragraph 82 of the Final Document, which would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security.
3. Withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces from the territories of other States in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and observance of the principles of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.

4. The dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and elimination of the military presence and rivalry of foreign powers from various regions of the world.

Preventing the use of force in international relations

An international agreement or solemn understanding by all States, particularly the militarily significant States, to strictly observe the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law regarding respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, to conduct inter-State relations on the basis of sovereign equality and to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations.

Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament

1. In order to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted.

2. In the course of the Decade of the 1980s, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the arms race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connection with Disarmament Week. These actions should constitute a large-scale programme to further alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular.

3. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the arms race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

* This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.
4. As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research established by Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.

Disarmament and International Security */

1. All States shall undertake a solemn commitment to support all measures for strengthening the structure, authority and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security. Full consideration will be given in this context to the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

2. All States shall undertake to utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Disarmament and Development /**

1. Peace and development are indivisible. In order to ensure that the process of disarmament envisaged in the comprehensive programme makes an effective contribution to economic and social development, especially of the developing countries, and to the full realization of the New International Economic Order:

(i) The militarily significant States shall undertake concrete measures at the rational level to reallocate resources from military purposes to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of the developing countries, and report to the United Nations and/or the international disarmament authority on the measures contemplated or undertaken.

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

/** This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.
(ii) A significant part of the savings from the reduction of military expenditures particularly by the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States shall be provided as an additional flow of resources for the economic and social development of the developing countries. Immediately after the adoption of the comprehensive programme, a separate account for the transfer of savings resulting from disarmament should be set up under the aegis of the United Nations Development Programme.

In the elaboration of measures under subparagraphs (i) and (ii) above, adequate consideration will be given to the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

2. Concrete measures shall be undertaken by all States to strengthen international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, taking into account the provisions of all relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, in particular to ensure the success of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to be convened in principle by 1983, as decided upon in General Assembly resolution 34/63 of 29 November 1979, as well as other promotional activities in this field in the United Nations system including those within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Stage II

Disarmament Measures

Nuclear weapons

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

   (i) Effective implementation of the agreement or agreements concluded
to ensure the complete and universal halt to the qualitative improvement
and development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems;

   (ii) Conclusion of negotiations on an agreement to bring about the
cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery
as well as on an agreement to halt the production of fissionable material
for weapon purposes in accordance with the process outlined in Stage I;

   (iii) Further reduction, through an international agreement or agreements,
of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, including:

      (a) a further reduction by 50 per cent in the strategic,
tactical and other nuclear weapons and delivery systems
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States;

      (b) an agreed proportionate reduction in the nuclear weapons
and delivery systems of other nuclear-weapon States;

      (c) destruction of the non-nuclear components and assemblies
of nuclear weapons reduced or dismantled by the nuclear-
weapon States and transfer of surplus weapons-grade
materials to peaceful purposes.

At the end of Stage II, the nuclear-weapon States will register and
serialize the nuclear weapons remaining with them and register the remaining
fissionable materials for use in such weapons.
2. **Nuclear non-proliferation**

Universal application of the international consensus to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons developed jointly by the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States during Stage I.

3. **Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones**
   (i) Measures to further strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free zones which are established and those which may be established during Stage I;
   (ii) Creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

4. **Other weapons of mass destruction**
   (i) Universal adherence to an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction;
   (ii) Universal adherence to a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.
   (iii) Adoption of an international agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of other weapons of mass destruction including new types and systems of such weapons.

5. **Conventional weapons and armed forces**
   (i) Negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements providing for:
      (a) a further 25 per cent reduction in the armed forces and conventional weapons of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States;
      (b) a proportionate reduction of the conventional weapons and armed forces of other militarily significant States.
      (c) proportionate reduction by the above-mentioned States of their production of conventional arms;
      (d) consistent with reductions made by the above-mentioned States a freeze of the conventional weapons and armed forces of other States at agreed levels.
   (ii) Based on the results of the consultations and conferences envisaged during Stage I, a multilateral agreement between arms suppliers and recipients to limit the transfer and trade in conventional weapons to a level designed to ensure the limitations and relative balance agreed upon under paragraph 1 above.
   (iii) Conclusion of a multilateral agreement for the cessation of the qualitative development of all types and systems of conventional weapons.
6. Military expenditures

(i) During Stage II, the nuclear-weapon States, other militarily significant States and those other States which are to reduce their armaments and armed forces during this Stage will make further reductions in their military expenditures proportionate to the reduction of nuclear and conventional armaments, armed forces, production of armaments to be carried out by them;

(ii) Other States which have agreed during Stage I to freeze or reduce their military budgets may agree to make further reductions in their military expenditures in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements;

(iii) States which have not frozen or reduced their military expenditures during Stage I may reach agreement to freeze or reduce their military expenditures at certain mutually agreed levels in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements;

(iv) The above-mentioned States should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced;

(v) The adoption of a mutually agreed international reporting system to be devised within the United Nations, on the basis of which all States particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should submit annually a full itemized report on their respective military budgets to the United Nations and or the appropriate international authority;

(vi) Human and material resources released as a consequence of the reduction of military budgets should be reallocated for economic and social development especially of the developing countries. 8/

7. Verification

(To be elaborated subsequently)

8. Related measures

(i) Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:
   (a) an agreement by States concerned to provide advance information of the launching of space vehicles to permit inspection;
   (b) measures to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration of outer space.

(ii) Further steps to strengthen zones of peace and prevent military competition on the seas:
   (a) establishment of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean;
   (b) establishment of zones of peace in other appropriate regions of the world.

8/ The specific modalities for promoting the objective are elaborated in the section on Disarmament and Development.
9. Other measures

(i) All States shall endeavour to further elaborate and extend confidence-building measures especially in regions of arms concentration and where international tensions and disputes exist;

(ii) An international agreement for dismantling of all foreign military bases and elimination of all foreign military presence from all the regions of the world by the end of Stage II;

(iii) Continuation of the programmes by governments, governmental and non-governmental international organizations to mobilize world public opinion in favour of complete disarmament.

10. Disarmament and international security

States shall conclude appropriate agreements with the United Nations to provide United Nations Peace Keeping Forces in accordance with Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

11. Disarmament and development

(i) All States concerned, especially the military significant States, shall submit periodically full and detailed reports to the United Nations on the measures undertaken by them to reallocate from military purposes to economic and social purposes, especially for the benefit of the developing countries;

(ii) An International Disarmament Fund for Development shall be established under the aegis of the United Nations to which contributions shall be made principally by the most heavily armed States in proportion to their military expenditures as a means of generating sizeable additional flow of resources for the economic and social development of the developing countries;

(iii) States shall undertake to support full and unhindered international co-operation in all fields of scientific research to promote economic and social development particularly in the developing countries and, in this context, to engage in free exchange of scientific and technological information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel and to provide full access to technology.

\* This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

\** This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

\*** This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.
Stage III

Disarmament Measures

Nuclear weapons

Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

(1) Conclusion of an international agreement, and its implementation by the end of Stage III, providing for:

(a) the elimination of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon States;

(b) the dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons;

(c) the transfer of all fissionable materials remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon States for purposes other than nuclear weapons.

Other weapons of mass destruction

(1) Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prevention of the emergence of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreement could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

Conventional weapons and armed forces

(1) Multilateral agreement providing for:

(a) further reduction of 25 per cent in the conventional armaments and armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America;

(b) further proportionate reduction in the conventional armaments and armed forces of other nuclear-weapon and militarily significant States.

(c) consistent with reduction made by the above-mentioned States, a reduction to agreed levels of certain other States.
(2) An international agreement for the complete cessation of production of conventional weapons by all States except for such light fire arms as may be required for preservation of internal security and to halt all applied research development and testing of armaments.

Military Expenditures
(1) During Stage III, the nuclear-weapon States, other militarily significant States and those other States which are to reduce their armaments or armed forces during this Stage will make reductions in their military expenditures — proportionate to the reductions of nuclear, conventional and other weapons, armed forces, production of armaments, dismantling of military facilities, etc., which they are to make.
(2) Other States should endeavour also to reach agreement to freeze or reduce their military expenditures at certain mutually agreed levels in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements.
(3) The above-mentioned States should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures, including an itemisation of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.
(4) All States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should continue to submit annually a full itemised report on their respective military budgets to the United Nations and/or the appropriate international authority.

Verification
(to be elaborated subsequently)

Related measures
(1) Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space: an international agreement by States to place all activities for the peaceful exploration of outer space under international supervision.
(2) Further steps to prevent military competition on the high seas and international air space.

Disarmament and international security*/

Commencement of negotiations by States with the United Nations with a view to concluding agreements to place their internal security forces, at the completion of general and complete disarmament, at the disposal of the United Nations for the purposes of peace-keeping.

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.
**Disarmament and Development**

(1) A substantial part of the savings resulting from the various disarmament measures envisaged in this Stage of the Programme shall be placed at the disposal of an International Disarmament Fund for Development as an additional flow of resources for the economic and social development of the developing countries.

**Stage IV**

**Conventional weapons and armed forces**

A multilateral agreement among all States, including all militarily significant States, to: (a) fully disband their armed forces; (b) destroy all types of armaments; (c) abolish military establishments, recruitment, planning, training, etc.; (d) prohibit appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form.

The agreement should provide for States to maintain contingents of internal security forces equipped with light firearms.

It would also provide for dismantling and converting to peaceful uses the military facilities and bases and production plants, etc., remaining at the disposal of States at this Stage except for such agreed facilities as may be required for internal security forces within their own territories.

**Military expenditures**

(1) By the end of Stage IV, all States shall cease all military expenditures, except those expressly agreed upon for the maintenance of mutual security forces within their own territories, and prohibit its appropriation of funds for military purposes.

(2) All States shall submit detailed reports annually throughout Stage IV regarding the progressive reductions made in their military expenditures and plans for further cuts leading at the end of the Stage to complete cessation of military expenditure.

**Related measures**

States would undertake to report to the appropriate international authority any scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance. The international authority would make appropriate recommendations after examination and study of such reports and developments.

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* This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.
Disarmament and international security

Conclusion of agreements by States with the United Nations to place their internal security forces at the disposal of the United Nations for the purposes of peace-keeping.

Disarmament and development

The further savings resulting from the achievement of general and complete disarmament, at the end of the comprehensive programme, shall be placed at the disposal of an International Disarmament Fund for Development.

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

**/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.
Ad hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

GROUP OF 21

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to eliminate the danger of nuclear war, to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim to maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to initiate and expedite urgent negotiations on halting the arms race in all its aspects, to open the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis, to increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension and to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament.

The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the New International Economic Order is fully realized.
Ad Hoc Working Group on a
Comprehensive Programme
of Disarmament

DELEGATIONS OF BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARY,
MONGOLIA, POLAND AND THE USSR

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

I. It is suggested that the Group of 21's working paper contained in
document CD/229, CD/CED/WP.56, of 27 January 1982, should be taken as a basis
for discussion.

II. It is proposed that the following additions should be made to that document:

1. In the second sentence of the first paragraph, after the words, "first
special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament," insert "to
consolidate and develop everything positive that has been achieved so far in the
sphere of the curbing of the arms race,"

2. In the same sentence, after the words "to initiate", insert a comma and
add the word "renew" before "and expedite".

3. At the end of the first paragraph, after the words "international tension," put a comma and insert the following: "to help strengthen the foundations for the
peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems and the development of
cooperation between them".

4. Insert the following as a second paragraph:

"The implementation of the measures provided for in the Programme should serve
to strengthen both international security and the security of individual States.
Genuine security can be guaranteed only by the limitation, reduction and elimination
of weapons, through disarmament."

GE.82-60058
Ad Hoc Working Group on a  
Comprehensive Programme  
of Disarmament  

DELEGATIONS OF BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA,  
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARY,  
MONGOLIA, POLAND AND THE USSR  

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the  
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament  

I. It is suggested that the Group of 21's working paper contained in  
document CD/230, CD/CND/WP.57, of 27 January 1982, should be taken as a basis for  
discussion.  

II. It is proposed that the following amendments and additions should be made to  
that document:  

1. In the first two lines, replace the words, "the achievement of general  
   and complete disarmament under effective international control" by the  
   words, "the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".  
2. In the last paragraph, amend the third sentence to read as follows:  
   "Measures to avert the threat of a nuclear war and to halt the nuclear  
   arms race, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery  
   systems must, therefore, be accorded the highest priority."  
3. At the end of the last paragraph, add the following sentence: "The fact  
   that the negotiations in progress on certain items have not been completed  
   should not be used to justify the deferral of negotiations on other items."  

GB.82-60064
Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND AND THE USSR

Working paper on the charter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

I. It is suggested that the Group of 21's working paper contained in document CD/208, CD/CIPD/WP.55 of 10 August 1981, should be taken as a basis for discussion.

II. It is proposed that the following additions should be made to that document:

1. In the first paragraph, containing the provisions of paragraph 26 of the Final Document, after the words, "relating to the maintenance of international peace and security", insert, "as well as to take into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

2. At the end of the sixth paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 49 of the Final Document, add the following sentence: "The existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced."

3. After the sixth paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 49 with the addition suggested in the paragraph 2 above, insert the paragraph, containing the text of the paragraph 54 of the Final Document: "Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned".

GE.82-60249
Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, 
Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
and Czechoslovakia

Working paper on the agenda item entitled
"Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament"

General provisions

The solving of the problem of disarmament is a matter of world-historic 
significance: disarmament is called upon to play a decisive role in preventing 
war and affording genuine security to peoples.

Under present-day conditions disarmament, which is a material guarantee of 
international security, must represent the main trend of the combined efforts of 
all States to overcome international tension and construct a universal and 
enduring peace. Arms limitation and disarmament open the way towards a solution 
of humanity's global problems.

During the 1960s and 1970s certain positive results were achieved in the field of arms limitation. International agreements were concluded on the 
prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under 
water; the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the prohibition of the 
placement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea bed and the ocean floor 
and in the subsoil thereof; the prohibition of bacteriological weapons; the 
prohibition of the military use of environmental modification techniques; 
agreements were reached on the limitation of strategic arms; certain confidence-
building measures in Europe began to be put into effect. A system of negotiations 
on disarmament matters was established on a multilateral and a bilateral basis. 
All this demonstrates that real measures in the field of arms limitation are 
possible and practicable. What was done provided a foundation for further steps 
in the direction of arms limitation and disarmament.

The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to 
disarmament adopted a set of tasks and measures, agreed by all States Members of 
the United Nations, aimed at the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. 
These tasks and measures have lost none of their urgency today.

GE.82-60533
However, at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s the arms build-up gathered new momentum. The stepping-up of the arms race is accompanied by the advancement of doctrines proclaiming the "admissibility" and "acceptability" of nuclear war and justifying the race for military supremacy. War hysteria is being whipped up, hostility and hatred in relations between States and peoples are being fanned. These actions have led to the interruption of many negotiations in the most important areas of arms limitation.

The arms build-up poses a mortal danger to civilization and threatens to create a deadlock in efforts aimed at solving vitally important international problems in the sphere of economics, social development, culture, public health and the preservation of the environment.

The task of limiting the scale of the arms race and of curbing the arms race has assumed a particularly urgent nature at the present time also because the instruments of war are undergoing profound change. Qualitatively new types and systems of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, are being developed, and this may make the monitoring of such weapons and, consequently, their agreed limitation and prohibition more difficult or even impossible. The development of military technology is constantly exercising a destabilizing effect on the world situation and intensifying the danger of war.

The arms race can and must be halted.

The execution of this task calls for the development and application of a programme of urgent and radical steps which would not only check the arms race in some of its areas but would also pave the way towards the main objective, that of general and complete disarmament.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament represents an agreed set of measures aimed at halting the arms race and at the stage-by-stage implementation of real disarmament within established time-limits. The decision concerning the elaboration of such a Programme adopted at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is an expression of the desire of peoples to put an end to the arms race.
Objectives of the Programme. The Programme's immediate objectives are the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and the implementation of urgent measures that would halt the arms race and pave the way towards enduring peace. The ultimate objective is the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The implementation of measures envisaged in the Programme should help to strengthen both international security and the security of individual States. Genuine security can be guaranteed only through arms limitation, reduction and elimination — through disarmament.

One of the Programme's important objectives must consist of consolidating and developing all the positive results achieved thus far in the field of checking the arms race.

The application of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should contribute towards the preservation and intensification of the process of relaxation of international tension and help to strengthen the basis for the peaceful coexistence of States with different social structures and the development of confidence and co-operation between them.

Principles. All the States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their adherence to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation to abide strictly by the principles of the Charter in the process of elaboration and implementation of measures relating to arms limitation and disarmament, and, inter alia, to take into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Negotiations must be directed primarily towards limiting and halting the quantitative growth and qualitative improvement of arms, and in particular of weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare, so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used exclusively for peaceful ends. There is no type of weapons that could not be prohibited and abolished on a mutually agreed basis.

All States are in duty bound to assist efforts in the disarmament field. This applies first and foremost to the nuclear-weapon States and other States of major military importance. The existing balance in the sphere of nuclear strength must remain undisturbed at all stages, with a constant lowering of nuclear strength levels.
Side by side with the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, reductions must be carried out in the field of conventional arms. States which possess the most important military arsenals bear a special responsibility in this process. The adoption of measures in the disarmament field must take place on a just and balanced basis so as to guarantee the right of every State to security and to ensure that no one State or group of States may acquire superiority over other States at any stage of implementation of the Programme. At each stage the objective should be the non-impairment of security at the lowest possible level of arms and armed forces.

The principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.

The process of arms limitation and disarmament must be continuous.

States must refrain from actions which might exercise a negative effect on efforts in the disarmament field and must adopt a constructive approach in the interests of achieving agreement.

Specific measures

1. **Nuclear weapons**
   
   (a) An undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

   (b) Cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed, and the immediate start, towards those ends, of appropriate negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. As stated in proposals submitted previously by the socialist countries, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons should cover the cessation of manufacture of means of delivery and fissionable materials for the purposes of weapon development; as a first step, a discussion should be held concerning the possible stages of nuclear disarmament and the approximate contents of those stages, particularly that of the first stage; measures within that stage should include the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons; parallel with the above, measures should be taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.
(c) Further limitation and reduction of strategic arms in the quantitative and the qualitative sense.

(d) Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

(e) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

(f) Adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(g) The conclusion of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear weapon States, and, as a first step, the issuance by nuclear-weapon Powers of declarations of similar contents undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no such weapons on their territories, with approval of such declarations by the Security Council.

(h) Conclusion of a treaty on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present; the renunciation by nuclear weapon States of further actions related to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of other States.

(i) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

2. Chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction

(a) Renunciation of the manufacture and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons and also of the stationing of chemical weapons in countries where there are none at present.

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.
(c) The conclusion of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and also of agreements concerning particular new types or systems of such weapons. As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, as already proposed by the socialist States, the permanent members of the Security Council and other States of military importance should make similar declarations of renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; those declarations would be approved by a decision of the Security Council.

(d) Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

3. Prevention of the spread of the arms race to new areas of space being conquered by man

(a) Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition on the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

(b) Further measures designed to prevent the transformation of outer space into a sphere of military confrontation.

(c) Further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

(d) Further measures for the prevention of military or any other hostile use of means of environmental modification techniques.

4. Armed forces and conventional weapons

(a) Renunciation by the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements of increasing their armed forces and conventional weapons as a first step towards the eventual limitation of armed forces and conventional weapons.

(b) Reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons.

(c) Restriction of sales and deliveries of conventional weapons.

(d) Further measures related to the limitation or prohibition of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.
5. Regional measures

(a) The extension of the confidence-building measures in the military field contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the achievement of agreement on new confidence-building and disarmament measures. The convening, to those ends, of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe.

(b) Mutual reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe and also on a regional basis in other parts of the world.

(c) An undertaking not to enlarge existing or to establish new military and political groupings.

(d) The ending of the division of Europe into military and political alliances and, as a first step, the abolition of the military organizations of both groupings, starting with mutual reduction of military activities.

(e) Conclusion among all States participants in the European Conference of a treaty all parties to which would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another.

(f) Limitation and reduction of the level of military presence and military activity in particular regions — the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the region of the Persian Gulf.

(g) The transformation of the Mediterranean Sea area into a zone of stable peace and co-operation; the extension to that area of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory.

(h) Limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean; establishment of a zone of peace in that region.

(i) Development of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the holding of negotiations to that end among all interested countries.
(j) Conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

(k) The establishment of a zone of peace and stability in South-East Asia.

(l) Withdrawal of armed forces from foreign territory and abolition of foreign military bases.

6. Related and other measures

(a) Conclusion of a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations.

(b) Further measures relating to the prevention of unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

(c) Measures relating to the prevention of a possibility of sudden attack.

(d) Adherence to existing international agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament by all States which are not yet parties to those agreements.

7. Limitation of military expenditure

(a) Limitation in both absolute and percentage terms of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States.

(b) As a first step towards the implementation of that measure, the freezing of military budgets.

Disarmament and other global problems

Arms limitation and disarmament form a global problem of the first importance. The application of measures in that field is the key to guaranteeing international security, an important condition for the economic and social development of all States and an essential prerequisite for solving the problem of the protection and preservation of the environment and other global problems.

A close relationship exists between disarmament and development. Disarmament can and should make an effective contribution to economic and social development on a just and democratic basis and to the establishment of a new international economic order, inter alia by switching resources from military purposes to purposes of development, particularly of the developing countries.
Funds released as a result of the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction of their stockpiles should not be used under other expenditure headings of the military budgets of nuclear weapon States.

The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the aid-receiving countries, and without any discrimination. A special committee could be set up for the allocation of such funds.

Time-limits and procedures for the implementation of the Programme.

Bearing in mind the urgency of the problems it covers, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be implemented within the shortest possible time. It is the duty of each Government to manifest the political will needed in order to fulfil this historic task.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be implemented by stages in such a way as to ensure with the greatest degree of efficiency the immediate reduction and ultimate removal of the threat of war, a steady reduction of the level of confrontation, and the consistent limitation and reduction of nuclear, conventional and any other weapons until they are completely eliminated.

Within each stage, parallel action may be taken in different areas of arms limitation and disarmament: on partial and comprehensive measures in a particular arms field; in respect of qualitative and quantitative parameters of weapons and armed forces; on a global scale and at regional level; confidence-building measures in the military sphere and steps aimed at strengthening the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.
Priority attention should be devoted to measures aimed at averting the threat of nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race. To this end it is essential as soon as possible to resume the interrupted negotiations on arms limitation and to intensify the negotiations in progress with a view to completing them by achieving appropriate agreements. At the same time it is necessary to embark upon the solution of other urgent problems so as to achieve a breakthrough in halting the arms race and to make a start on the process of genuine disarmament. The fact that, for one reason or another, negotiations in progress on one set of questions have not been completed cannot serve as a basis for postponing negotiations on other questions.

**Monitoring of arms limitation and disarmament**

Agreements on arms limitation and disarmament should provide for adequate reliable monitoring of their implementation so as to ensure compliance with the agreements by all parties. The forms and conditions of monitoring depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the specific agreement. Questions relating to monitoring should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.

Accumulated experience shows that national technical means form a reliable basis for monitoring compliance with agreements. Where necessary, different methods of verification and other monitoring procedures, including international ones, should be combined on a voluntary basis. The strengthening of confidence would assist the application of additional monitoring measures.

A most important precondition for the application of specific agreed measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament is the political will of Governments; references to technical difficulties of monitoring should not be used as a pretext for refusing to reach agreement on measures for halting the arms race.

**Mechanisms and procedures**

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should serve as an incentive for the broad development of constructive collective efforts in that field on the basis of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament and for the resumption and intensive continuation of negotiations which were conducted over the last few years and have now been interrupted. It is essential to make more active use of all existing negotiating channels, both multilateral and bilateral. Efforts should be made to improve the efficiency of work of the unique multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament, in particular by further improving the organization of its work.
The convening of a world conference on disarmament - an international forum with the widest participation by States - would have exceptional significance for the adoption of effective measures towards halting the arms race.

The United Nations, which bears prime responsibility and plays one of the central roles in the disarmament field, should encourage all measures in that sphere. It is important that the United Nations should be periodically informed about the results of negotiations and about compliance with the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, including all efforts in the disarmament field outside the scope of its competence, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

Conferences for the review of the operation of agreements play a substantial role in maintaining the viability and efficiency of fulfilment of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. Taking account of useful experience in that respect, it is advisable to provide for a possibility of periodic review of the progress of implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament may be convened, as required.

Participation of world public opinion in efforts to achieve disarmament

World public opinion is called upon to play an important role in the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The United Nations should promote public awareness of the danger of the arms race and all its consequences.

It is important to show the disastrous consequences for mankind to which a nuclear war would lead. To that end, an authoritative international committee should be set up which would demonstrate the necessity of averting a nuclear catastrophe. The holding of a world disarmament campaign, the collection of signatures in support of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, and the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the Prohibition of Societies for Life in Peace would also be of great significance in this respect. All Governments should take steps to prohibit war propaganda in any form.

While meeting the vital needs of the present day, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is at the same time turned towards the future. The present generation must not only ensure a peaceful life during the remaining decades of our century but must also guarantee the entry of mankind into the third millennium under conditions of peace and universal security.
GROUP OF 21

Working Paper on the chapter entitled "Machinery and Procedures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

1. In order to assure the most effective implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, two kinds of bodies will continue to be required in the field of disarmament - deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.

2. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. (Further provisions regarding the special role of the United Nations on the various aspects of the process of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be elaborated subsequently, including the relationship between disarmament and development and its practical consequences.)

3. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures.

4. The First Committee of the General Assembly should continue to deal only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions. (Further possible provisions regarding the manner in which the First Committee should annually consider the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament may be elaborated subsequently.)

5. The Disarmament Commission shall continue to function as a subsidiary deliberative body of the General Assembly. The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly. (Further provisions regarding the specific responsibilities of the Disarmament Commission in relation to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and its procedures are to be elaborated subsequently.)

6. The Committee on Disarmament shall continue to be the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. (Further provisions relating to the Committee on Disarmament are to be elaborated subsequently.)

7. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

8. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

9. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it in the most effective manner, disarmament Secretariat of the United Nations shall be strengthened and developed in the light of the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/392). (Further provisions on this aspect are to be elaborated subsequently.)

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10. (This chapter on Machinery and Procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should include provisions concerning the mobilization of public opinion to be elaborated taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 15, 55, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 and 129 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and the fact that, pursuant to resolution 55/22 C, the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, is to take decisions with respect to the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign.)

11. As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. (Further provisions regarding studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations and on the possible role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research are to be elaborated subsequently.)

12. (Provisions regarding the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies are to be elaborated subsequently.)

13. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened every five years at the end of each stage of the Programme to review its implementation. The first special session devoted to the review of the Programme’s implementation shall be held in June/July 1987. Such special sessions of the General Assembly shall assess the implementation of the measures included in the stage under review. Should the assessment reveal that the full implementation of those measures has not been achieved, consideration would be given to the re-adjustments that need to be made and to the steps that are necessary to stimulate progress in the implementation of the Programme. In addition, the review shall also serve the purpose of elaborating in more concrete terms, the measures to be implemented in Stages II, III and IV of the Programme, taking into account the existing situation, including developments in science and technology. United Nations studies could make an important contribution to the task of elaborating the specific measures to be negotiated in the second and subsequent stages.

14. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at the end of each stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there should be a continuous review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included in the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General, with the assistance of United Nations Disarmament Secretariat, should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

15. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, provide for further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme. In this connection, the proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will, inter alia, be taken into account. (Further relevant provisions related to this question may be elaborated subsequently.)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, the Committee decided to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue its work during the 1981 session. In its report on that session, the Working Group, bearing in mind that considerable work remained to be done in resolving several important and complex issues and that the Committee on Disarmament had been called upon to conclude negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, agreed to recommend to the Committee that the Working Group should resume its work on 11 January 1982. The Committee on Disarmament adopted that recommendation at its 148th plenary meeting on 20 August 1981. In accordance with that decision, the Working Group resumed its work on 11 January 1982. At its 150th plenary meeting on 2 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament confirmed that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue its work during the first part of the 1982 session.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. During the 1980 session, Ambassador Olu Adeniji (Nigeria) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico) was the Chairman during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. Mr. Gennady Efimov, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Working Group in 1980 and Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, did so in 1981 and 1982.


4. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

*/ Re-issued for technical reasons.
5. In addition to the official documents of the Committee on Disarmament circulated under the agenda item entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", the following working papers were submitted by Member States in the course of the three sessions of the Ad hoc Working Group:

- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Mexico. (CD/CFD/WP.3 and Rev.1)


- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CFD/WP.5)

- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Principles and guidelines", submitted by Mexico. (CD/CFD/WP.6)

- Working paper on the main principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CFD/WP.8)

- Working paper entitled "Draft section of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concerning the general guidelines for efforts to limit the arms race and achieve disarmament", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CFD/WP.9)

- Working paper on the principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Venezuela. (CD/CFD/WP.10)


- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Principles", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CFD/WP.13 and Add.1)

- Working paper on forms and machinery, submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CFD/WP.15)

- Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CFD/WP.17)

- Working paper on the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CFD/WP.10)
- Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Sumnerrhayes, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/AP.15)

- Statement by the representative of the USSR on 3 March 1961, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control", submitted to the BIDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/AP.20)

- Statement by the representative of the United States of America on 5 March 1961, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", submitted to the BIDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/AP.21)

- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Objectives", submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/AP.22)


- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Measures", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/AP.28)

- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/AP.30)


- Working paper containing a text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CPD/AP.35)


- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposals with respect to nuclear weapons, submitted by Australia. (CD/CPD/AP.37)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposals with respect to zones of peace, submitted by Australia. (CD/CND/INF.39)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CND/INF.27, submitted by France. (CD/CND/INF.39)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CND/INF.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CND/INF.40)

- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Poland. (CD/CND/INF.42)

- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Machinery and Procedure", submitted by the German Democratic Republic and Venezuela. (CD/CND/INF.43)

- Working paper on the first stage of nuclear disarmament measures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CND/INF.44)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CND/INF.27, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CND/INF.45)

- Working paper containing amendments to the sections "Conventional weapons and armed forces" and "Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension" (Stage I) of document CD/CND/INF.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic. (CD/CND/INF.46)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CND/INF.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CND/INF.47)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CND/INF.27, submitted by Poland. (CD/CND/INF.48)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CND/INF.27, submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CND/INF.49)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CND/INF.27, submitted by Mongolia. (CD/CND/INF.50)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CND/INF.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CND/INF.51)

- Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (CD/CND/INF.52)
Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by Nigeria, Poland and Venezuela. (CD/CFD/WP.55)


Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/VP.58)

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/VP.59)

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/VP.60)

Working paper containing an addition to the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CFD/VP.61)


Draft text for the section on "Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Yugoslavia. (CD/CFD/VP.64)

Working paper on the chapter entitled "Measures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/VP.67)

Working paper on Verification, submitted by the United States of America. (CD/CFD/VP.69)

Working paper on Verification, submitted by the German Democratic Republic. (CD/CFD/VP.70)
In addition, the secretariat prepared the following documents:

- List of documents. (CD/CND/M.1)

- Compilation of documents submitted by the nine Non-Nuclear Weapons States to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1962 (CD/CND/2/Add.1, CD/CND/2/Add.1, EHDC/5, EHDC/13, EHDC/50 and Add.1).


- Tabulation of measures that are not explicitly included in the tabulations contained in documents CD/CND/M.11 and 12. (CD/CND/M.29)

- Results of the preliminary examination of chapters V ("Measures") and VI ("Stages of Implementation") of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. (CD/CND/M.27)

- Tabulation of the Principles contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CND/M.29)

- Tabulation of the Objectives contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CND/M.32)

- Tabulation of the provisions concerning Machinery and Procedure contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CND/M.34)

- Compilation of certain proposals concerning Machinery and Procedure listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. (CD/CND/M.41)

- Results of the examination of Stage-I measures contained in document CD/CND/M.27 and of written and oral proposals made in connection therewith. (CD/CND/M.54)

III. SUBSTANTIATIVE WORK

6. In 1980, the Ad Hoc Working Group adopted an outline of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CD/CND/M.2/Add.1) consisting of the following chapters: Introduction or Preamble; Objectives; Principles; Priorities; Measures; Stages of Implementation; and Machinery and Procedures. */ That outline constituted the basis for the consideration of the programme in 1980 and 1982.

*/ A full account of the work carried out in 1980 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1980 report (CD/139, paragraph 65).
7. In 1981, the Ad Hoc Working Group completed a preliminary examination of the substantive chapters of the Programme. It decided to defer the consideration of the Introduction or Preamble pending the elaboration of these chapters in view of the fact that the form and substance of the latter would determine its character and content. In the case of the chapters concerning measures and stages of implementation, which were considered in conjunction with each other, the Working Group was also able to have a second round of more detailed discussions on measures for a first stage. */

8. In 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group focused on the task of elaborating the texts of the various substantive chapters of the Programme.

9. With respect to objectives of the Programme, the Ad Hoc Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 5 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate the relevant chapter and designated Ambassador François de la Corse (France) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted to the Working Group a text that reflected different views on some points. At its 56th meeting on 10 March 1982, the Working Group adopted that text (CD/Inf/10.65).

10. At its 50th meeting on 11 February 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group established a contact group to elaborate the principles of the Programme and, at its 51st meeting on 15 February 1982, it designated Ambassador Gerhard Herder (German Democratic Republic) as its co-ordinator. As in the case of objectives, it did not prove possible to reach agreement on all questions of substance. In addition, differing views were held regarding the appropriateness of including certain paragraphs in the chapter on principles. The contact group agreed that questions concerning the placement of those paragraphs should be decided at a later stage in the context of the whole Programme, bearing in mind that duplication should be avoided. At its 56th meeting on 10 March 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group (CD/Inf/10.65).

11. With respect to prioritization, the Ad Hoc Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 9 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate that chapter of the Programme and designated Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted an agreed text which was adopted by the Working Group at its 55th meeting on 1 March 1982 (CD/Inf/10.62).

12. With respect to measures and stages of implementation which, as previously, were considered in conjunction with each other, at its 54th meeting on 25 February 1982, the Working Group established a contact group to elaborate that part of the Programme and requested the Chairman to act as co-ordinator of the contact group. The contact group prepared a text that grouped measures in a first, an intermediate and a last stage, it being understood that this was without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation. An informal drafting group was convened, with Mr. Murtaza Ali (Pakistan) as co-ordinator, with a view to reconciling the alternative formulations contained in

*/ A full account of the work carried out in 1981 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1981 report (CD/220, paragraph 127).
that text. The drafting group narrowed the areas of disagreement and, to the extent possible, unified and streamlined some of the alternative texts that were under discussion in the contact group. The text it elaborated was adopted by the contact group on 14 April 1982 with some changes. At its 50th meeting on 15 April 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group as orally amended at that meeting (CD/CTD/WP.71).

13. The same contact group was also charged with the task of elaborating the chapter on machinery and procedure. It submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group a text reflecting differences of view on some points. At its 57th meeting on 8 April 1982, the Working Group adopted that text with some additions and amendments (CD/CTD/WP.68).

14. At various stages of its consideration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Working Group focused attention on the question of time frames and nature of the programme. Divergent views were advanced since the initial stage as indicated in the Working Group's report covering its 1980 session (CD/136, paragraphs 66 (13) and (15)). In 1982, these two matters were examined at meetings of the Working Group and of the contact group referred to in paragraphs 12 and 13 above. Concerning the question of time frames, it was generally agreed that the programme should be implemented in the shortest possible time. Beyond that, different views continued to be maintained. On the one hand, it was again stressed that there should be a time frame for the implementation of each stage, as well as the Programme as a whole. It was felt that, otherwise, there would be no standard by which to judge whether progress was being made towards the full realization of the Programme. It was also argued that the acceptance of time frames would be a manifestation of political will to implement the measures contained in the Programme. It was further argued that the implementation of the Programme in an agreed time frame would generate the requisite confidence of the international community and have a positive influence on the climate of international relations by introducing an element of predictability in the process of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, it was recognized that only an indicative time frame should be set since in the course of the implementation of the Programme changing circumstances might call for readjustments. On the other hand, it continued to be argued that it would be inappropriate to set a time frame, whether indicative or not, for the implementation of the stages included in the Programme, because the setting of such time frames was not compatible with the conditions of a negotiation, a fortiori with the requirements of a series of interdependent negotiations. In this view, periodic reviews, envisaged as part of the machinery and procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, would give impetus for continued progress in the implementation of the Programme, provide a standard by which to assess such progress, permit its evaluation and the readjustment of the Programme, if necessary. Regarding the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, various views were advanced. One view was that the Programme should be embodied in a legally binding instrument. It was proposed that a solemn Declaration should accompany the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. A concrete proposal was made that the Declaration and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should then be signed by Heads of State or Government of all Member States of the United Nations, and finally noted by the Security Council in a resolution adopted under those provisions of the Charter that are designed to create obligations for States. Another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should not be embodied in a legally binding agreement since States cannot be bound to the success
of negotiations before such negotiations have begun. But it was considered that a strong political undertaking by States to implement the programme, for example, in the form of a resolution adopted by consensus at the special session of the General Assembly, would create the necessary impetus for the completion of the implementation of the Programme at the earliest possible time. Still another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should represent an agreed set of measures aimed at halting the arms race and at disarmament and should serve as an incentive for the broad development of constructive collective efforts in the disarmament field. It was noted that under the United Nations Charter the General Assembly may make recommendations with regard to principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and that the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament may serve as a precedent for the adoption of the Programme. While no conclusions were reached on these two matters, it was recognized that the discussions had served to clarify the questions at issue and would thus facilitate the search for generally acceptable solutions.

15. The view was generally held that the deliberations at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will contribute to the harmonization of the divergent positions reflected in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Some delegations also felt that their final position with regard to the formulations contained in the draft Programme could only be determined in the light of the content of the Programme as a whole. Other delegations felt that the progress made in the Working Group should have a bearing on the future work, and that their final position on the entire Programme would be determined in the light of the agreement reached on the specific provisions of the Programme, the time frames and a binding commitment to the implementation of the Programme.

IV. CONCLUSION

16. The Ad Hoc Working Group agreed to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that is annexed to this report, with the recommendation that it be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its second special session devoted to disarmament.
ANNEX

DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. Introduction or Preamble

(To be elaborated subsequently)

II. Objectives

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to [prevent the outbreak of nuclear war] [eliminate the danger of a nuclear war], to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim:

- to maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

- to consolidate and develop the positive results achieved so far, in particular in the sphere of the curbing of the arms race and of confidence-building measures and of détente;

- to [initiate [,] or resume] [provide for the initiation of] and [to] expedite [at the initiation and expediting of] urgent negotiations on halting the arms race in all its aspects, in particular the nuclear arms race;

- to open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.

2. [The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the New International Economic Order is fully realized] [The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme should be to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, to avert the danger of war and to create conditions for a just and stable international peace and security and the full realization of the new international economic order]

3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued:

- to strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [in mind that genuine security can be guaranteed only by the limitation, reduction and elimination of weapons through disarmament]

- to contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;
[- to make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;]

- to increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;

- [to consolidate the foundations of the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems and] strengthen the development of co-operation between all States with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme [to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme (based on paragraph 12 of the Final Document)];

- [to stimulate in all countries the contribution that public opinion could make to the cause of disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament].

III. Principles

1. [The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]

2. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.

3. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

4. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

5. [In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the]
political will to reach agreements.] [In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament.]

6. [It must be recognized that the political will of States is a decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament. States should therefore display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.]

7. [The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.]

8. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

9. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

10. [Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.]

11. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

12. Negotiations should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere.]
13. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

14. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States [, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals,] have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation. [All States are obliged to promote efforts in the sphere of disarmament. This applies first and foremost to the States possessing nuclear weapons and to other militarily significant States. The existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced.]

15. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. [It must therefore be recognized that a continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the New International Economic Order based on justice, equity and co-operation.]

16. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

17. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples [, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.]

18. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

19. The process of arms limitation and disarmament must be carried out without interruptions and proceed at a rapid pace, so as to outstrip the qualitative development and build-up of weapons which are the subject of the negotiations and, where possible, prevent the development of new types and systems of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.

20. [The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be in accordance with the [Fundamental principles enshrined in] [relevant provisions of]
the Final Document and should be carried out in such a balanced and equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals, the specific requirements of regional situations and the necessity for adequate measures of verification. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.]

21. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage [, taking into account the existing situation regarding armaments of different kinds, and in particular the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects.]. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. [In the negotiations between parties approximately equal militarily the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.]

22. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

23. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

24. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

25. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

26. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. [The negotiations on the [balanced] reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.]
27. [States with the largest military arsenals have the primary responsibility for disarmament. They should immediately halt their arms race and take the lead in reducing their nuclear and conventional armaments. After they have substantially reduced their armaments, the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States should join them in reducing armaments.]

28. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

29. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security. [All arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for effective international verification, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.]

30. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control [, proceeding from the fact that there is no type of weapon that could not be eliminated on a mutually agreed basis.].

31. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

32. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would also contribute to the attainment of that goal.

33. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.
34. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

35. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. It must therefore be recognized that a continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the New International Economic Order based on justice, equity and co-operation.

36. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

37. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

38. [Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.]

39. [As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situation, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.]

40. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

41. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.
42. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

43. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

44. [Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.]

45. [In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.]

46. [Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.]

47. [In particular, publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.]

48. [Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, States hereby declare that they will respect the principles stated above and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme in strict adherence to them] [in full implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament].

IV. Priorities

1. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:

   - nuclear weapons;

   - other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;

   - conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and

   - reduction of armed forces.

2. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments.

3. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
V. Measures and stages of implementation

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear Weapons 

(1. Nuclear test ban

[The conclusion of an equitable and non-discriminatory treaty on a nuclear test ban would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(i) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake [without further delay] multilateral negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear [weapons] tests by all States in all environments for all time. It should be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system satisfactory to all parties concerned and provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.

(ii) The parties who have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should [immediately resume and intensify their negotiations [and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to] contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty].] 

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

[Substantial progress towards] the cessation of the nuclear arms race in all its aspects and [substantial progress towards] the achievement of nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the implementation of the Programme would constitute a major contribution to the rapid achievement of general and complete disarmament. [In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.]

*/ Some delegations reserved their position with respect to the division of the chapter "Nuclear weapons" into separate sub-sections.

**/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.
(i) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems:

Negotiations, during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, to achieve an agreement or agreements, to bring about a halt to [qualitative improvement,] [research, development, production and testing] [research, development, testing and qualitative improvement] of nuclear weapons systems [and of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons], [in parallel with the measures to reduce nuclear weapons and as appropriate integrated with such measures].

These negotiations should [address] [achieve an agreement or agreements for the prohibition of]:

(a) [the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles and on the complete destruction of their stockpiles;]

(b) [research, development, testing] and deployment, including for replacement purposes] of all new types and new systems of nuclear weapons;

(c) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons systems];

(d) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems];

(e) [the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of intermediate and medium range missiles as well as tactical nuclear weapons;]

(f) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-submarine warfare capabilities that could endanger the central strategic stability;]

(g) [conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.]

(ii) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes:

Commencement of negotiations [with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States] [on an agreement] [to halt the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery along with a cessation of production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes].
[Such an agreement could be negotiated in the following step by step manner:] [Such negotiations could address:]

(a) Declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, at a mutually agreed date, of their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of their existing and proposed facilities for the production of [all] nuclear weapons, delivery systems of such weapons and for fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes to be submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General.

(b) Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspections, as part of [the agreement] [or agreements] to be negotiated, to establish the base on which [the agreement] [or agreements] prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes, would be implemented.

(c) Measures aimed at [eventually] bringing about the general and complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes along with [the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons] [measures to reduce nuclear weapons, and as appropriate integrated with such measures] involving the application of [international] [full fuel cycle] safeguards [under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency] to [all] nuclear facilities in all States to prevent the diversion of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes. Such international safeguards would be applied [as a first step to the civil nuclear programmes of all States] [to all States on a universal and non-discriminatory basis].

[(a) The cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons which should cover the cessation of manufacture of means of delivery and fissionable materials for the purposes of weapons development;

(b) The gradual reduction of stockpiles of all types of nuclear weapons;

(c) The complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

Parallel with the above, measures should be taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.]

[(iii) Reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time:

Such measures would include at the appropriate time and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned the progressive and balanced reduction of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
(a) as a starting point, the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of negotiations [already begun] [between the two States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals] on intermediate range nuclear forces and also on the process of strategic arms reduction:

- a continuation of the process aimed at agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic nuclear arms [belonging to these two States];

- pursuit of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of [their] intermediate range nuclear forces based on the principle of equality within the framework of strategic arms control efforts;

(b) [once these reductions have reached an agreed stage] [the reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two parties concerned have reached a dimension such as to justify the acceptance by the other nuclear-weapon States of the principle of a limitation or reduction of their own nuclear forces], initiation of further negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.]

3. Limitation and reduction of strategic arms

Continuation of [negotiations on] [the process of] further limitation and reduction of strategic arms [between the USSR and the United States]:

[(a) Immediate ratification by the USSR and the United States of the SALT-II Agreement.]

[(b) [The initiation, without delay, of further negotiations [on] [aimed at]] [measures for further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms] [the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments between the USSR and the United States leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitation on, strategic arms. [These negotiations should culminate, as soon as possible, in the first stage, in a treaty which should achieve:

- a reduction of at least 20 per cent in the numbers of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery vehicles in the arsenals of the USSR and the United States.

- comprehensive limitations on the qualitative improvement of strategic armaments, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic armaments.]]

3/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.
I have the honour to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, over which I have had the privilege of presiding during the Committee's sessions in 1981 and the part of 1982 that has already elapsed, together with a draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which is annexed to the report.

Since the content of the report is what is customarily termed self-explanatory, I shall confine myself to making just a few comments. Firstly, I should like to say that this has been one of the most industrious working groups of what the United Nations General Assembly has described as the "single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament" since, as is well known, it began its work in the current year by holding daily meetings during the last three weeks of January, before the Committee met, and, after the resumption of the Committee's work on 2 February, it held an average of three meetings a week, without counting the very numerous meetings of its subsidiary bodies. Thanks to this, the Group has been successful in carrying out the task which was entrusted to it, albeit with the inevitable limitations imposed by the circumstances known to all.

In the report to which I am referring, there already appear the names of those who merit special mention for the valuable contribution which they made to the Group's work: Ambassador Olu Adeniji of Nigeria, who presided over the first 10 of the 59 meetings held; Ambassador François de la Force of France; Ambassador Gerhard Richter of the Democratic Republic of Germany, and Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva of Brazil, who co-ordinated the work of their respective contact groups, and Mr. Tariq Aziz of Pakistan, who acted as co-ordinator of an informal drafting group. I should simply like, therefore, to record my especial gratitude to someone who, as a result of having undertaken to draft the report in consultation with the chairman, was obviously unable to make an appropriate reference in the report to her participation in the Group as its Secretary. In the light of the experience which has enabled me to observe her at work at very close quarters and to rely on her untiring co-operation for approximately a year and a half, I consider it only just to take this opportunity of placing on record my view that Miss Ada Levin can serve as a model for the discharge of any office such as that which she has held in this Group, by virtue of her absolute objectivity, her knowledge of disarmament matters, her outstanding drafting-abilities and her lively intelligence, which has so frequently produced formulas that have gained general acceptance.
With regard to the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which the Working Group transmits to the Committee as an annex to its report and which, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 36/92 F adopted by the Assembly on 9 December 1981, has to be submitted "in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament", I do feel it is my duty on this occasion to make a few comments on the basis of my lengthy and intimate connection with the efforts made to prepare the Programme.

I shall begin by emphasizing that the structure of the document which the Group is submitting to the Committee corresponds to that which has been approved since 1980 and which, as indicated in paragraph 68 (7) of the Committee's report to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, should comprises — in addition to an introduction or preamble which would be prepared last of all six chapters dealing with objectives, principles, priorities, measures, stages of implementation, and machinery and procedures, respectively. The only change that has been made in this structure is that, for reasons which would appear obvious, two of these headings have been merged to serve as a title for the fifth chapter, which deals with both "measures and stages of implementation".

As for the contents of the Programme, the Working Group has endeavoured to keep as faithfully as possible to the mandate clearly defined in paragraph 109 of the Final Document, in which it was stipulated that the Programme should encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated", reiterated word for word in paragraph 7 (b) of the "elements" approved, also by consensus, by the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 34/83 F of 11 December of the same year, and confirmed by the Committee on Disarmament when it adopted the report which the Working Group submitted to it in 1980, in paragraph 10 of which it was expressly agreed that "the Comprehensive Programme will have to be self-contained.

The fact that a considerable number of the provisions of the Programme are still between square brackets should not be a reason for discouragement but, on the contrary, should serve as a spur for efforts to find texts capable of gaining general approval. To this end, it should not be forgotten that the draft Final Document which the Preparatory Committee for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament transmitted to the Assembly as a result of five meetings — three of which were held in 1977 and the last two in the first half of 1978 — had also been riddled with square brackets but that did not prevent the Assembly from finally approving by consensus a document which was completely free of those symbols of differences of opinion.
However difficult the efforts required to achieve this purpose may be, this will probably not be one of the most difficult tasks that has ever been brought to fruition, especially if no delegation tries to renege on the commitments undertaken in the Final Document in 1978. It would also seem that it will be by no means impossible to reach an agreement on the number of stages that the programme should comprise, in the light of the flexibility that has been evidenced by many of the delegations that have formulated the main working papers submitted to the Group, since, with general acceptance, the Group has been able to channel its deliberations, as it were, in the nature of “working hypotheses”, firstly on the basis of four stages and subsequently on the basis of three. A similar comment might be made concerning the revision machinery or procedure, in respect of which too there already appears to be a more or less general acceptance of a five-yearly régime and of the fact that such revision or examination should be undertaken through specific special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

If the foregoing is taken into account, there would appear to be some justification for concluding that the two most difficult problems still outstanding — and that of determining whether or not the Programme should have a calendar for its implementation and that of determining the extent to which the Programme should be of a binding nature. If one accepts, as we think it reasonable to do that all the States participating in the second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament may be expected to give evidence of goodwill and good faith in the formal and informal negotiations taking place at that session, there will be a solid basis for expecting that a satisfactory solution to these problems will be found.

With regard to the question of time-limits to be included in a possible calendar, it should first of all be pointed out that, for the moment, no one is thinking of rigid time-limits like those which appeared in the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1962 by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. In this connection, it is also encouraging to note that reference has been made in the deliberations on this subject — and, above all, that the reference was made by the representative of one of the most important members of the group known as the Group of Western European and Other Countries — as an example of recommendable terminology to that used in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, in which the time factor undoubtedly occupies a prominent place.

With regard to the nature of the Programme, although, on the one hand, it would seem that the hypothesis that it may be possible to obtain a consensus in order to give the Programme the legal status of a multilateral treaty will have to be discarded, it is clearly apparent, on the other hand, from the comments made at the various meetings which the Group devoted to consideration of this subject, that there is a general trend towards finding formulas which will enable the Programme to be placed at a level far above that of the resolutions annually adopted by the General Assembly. This will undoubtedly require the inclusion in the Programme of provisions similar to those contained in paragraph 126 of the Final Document, in which the States that participated in the first special session “solemnly” reaffirmed, inter alia, “their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear
war;" and "implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race". This will certainly require also that the Programme make an express provision along the lines of the statement in paragraph 17 of the Final Document emphasizing the pressing need to "translate into practical terms" the provisions adopted and to "proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament". Furthermore, in view of the fact that, unfortunately, the Final Document has been to a considerable extent treated by the nuclear Powers as a dead letter, consideration must be given to the possibility of including in the introduction and final paragraphs alike of the Comprehensive Programme, provisions which both politically and morally impart the greatest possible, though freely accepted, binding character to the text, a binding character which, it is to be hoped, will be greater than that achieved in 1978.

In this connection, it is worth remembering that, at the Group's meetings, representatives submitted a number of valuable suggestions aimed at highlighting, through symbolic acts, both the importance of the Programme and, more particularly, the political commitment of Governments to execute its provisions. Among these suggestions, pride of place -- in view of its originality and potential effectiveness -- should perhaps go to the suggestion that the Programme should be signed by the Heads of State or Government of all the States Members of the United Nations. In my opinion, the fact that most if not all of them will almost certainly not be in New York at the closure of the Assembly's session should not be an obstacle to an acceptance of this suggestion; quite the contrary, in fact. A special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations might very well be given the responsibility of taking the original text of the Programme to all the capitals of those States for the purpose of collecting the signatures of their respective Heads of State or Government. This could, at the same time, help to ensure that public opinion in each of those countries has a true awareness of the significance of the Programme.

Recently, particularly during the last year or so, there has been throughout the world an increasing number of acts of all kinds which reveal the concern that the nuclear arms race and the emergence of doctrines such as the credible possibility of a limited nuclear war or the illusory hypothesis of a nuclear victory, have aroused throughout mankind. If, as the Assembly stated in 1978, all peoples have a vital interest in the success of the negotiations on disarmament, it may be asserted without any exaggeration that the thousands of millions of human beings who make up these peoples will follow very closely the work of the special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament which is to be held at United Nations Headquarters from 7 June to 9 July 1982. This may very well be the decisive element in making the representatives of those peoples deliberating in New York realize the need to approve by consensus a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which, starting from the text which the Ad Hoc Working Group is today submitting to the Committee, may give new life to the pressing objectives which, for four years, have been set out in paragraph 109 of the Assembly's Final Document. It must never be forgotten that, as stated in the Final Document itself, the most acute and urgent task of the present day is to remove the threat of a nuclear war, since this threat has confronted mankind with a choice between proceeding to disarmament or facing annihilation.
REPORT OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 176th plenary meeting, on 5 August 1982, the Committee on Disarmament decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to continue negotiations on the Programme as envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to submitting a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, taking into account the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was understood that the Ad Hoc Working Group would not conduct formal meetings during the remainder of the 1982 session of the Committee, but that informal consultations or meetings of an exploratory character would be held. In accordance with that decision, the Working Group resumed its work on 16 February 1983.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 175th plenary meeting on 5 August 1982, the Committee on Disarmament reappointed Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Working Group.


4. At their request, the Committee at its 208th plenary meeting on 31 March 1981 and 212th plenary meeting on 14 April 1982, decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group: Austria, Burundi, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

5. The Ad Hoc Working Group had before it the documentation submitted during previous sessions of the Committee on Disarmament.

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1983 SESSION

6. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group took as the basis for its work the texts that resulted from the negotiations on the Comprehensive Programme.
of Disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (A/S-12/32, Annex I), which, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee established at that session, reflected the persistence of significant differences of opinion on various aspects of the Programme, notably the chapter on Measures and stages of implementation (A/S-12/32, paragraph 28).

7. The Ad Hoc Working Group decided to establish Contact Groups to proceed with the elaboration of the various sections of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament as follows: Contact Group on Objectives; Contact Group on Principles; Contact Group on Priorities; Contact Group on Measures and stages of implementation and Contact Group on Machinery and Procedures. The Working Group further decided to appoint Ambassador François de la Gorce (France) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Objectives; Ambassador Baruch Grinberg (Bulgaria) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Principles; Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Priorities; Ambassador Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Measures and stages of implementation; and Ambassador Curt Lidgård (Sweden) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Machinery and Procedures. During the second part of the session, Ambassador Ahmad was unable to continue as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Measures and stages of implementation and, at his suggestion, the Chairman of the Working Group acted as Co-ordinator of that Contact Group. Also during the second part of the session, the Working Group appointed Ambassador Borislav Konstantinov (Bulgaria) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Principles in view of the fact that Ambassador Grinberg could not continue performing that function.

8. Efforts were made in the Contact Groups to achieve agreement on the sections of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament assigned to them. However, differences of view persisted. Further efforts to reconcile those differences were made in the Ad Hoc Working Group. In addition, informal consultations were held during June, July and August under the guidance of the Chairman of the Working Group. With a view to reaching agreement, where it was not possible to arrive at generally acceptable new formulations, the language of relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was largely used.

9. The resulting texts are included in the Annex to this report. As indicated therein, the texts of some paragraphs are pending. In addition, differences of view remain regarding the appropriateness of including certain paragraphs and the desire to add further paragraphs. It was agreed that their placement in the Programme should be decided at a later stage, bearing in mind that duplication should be avoided.

10. In the time available to it, the Ad Hoc Working Group was not able to consider the Introduction. It agreed to include in the Annex to this report the draft of the Introduction prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that was established at that session, it being understood that this draft would, in any case, need to be redrafted in light of the overall content of the Programme.

11. The Ad Hoc Working Group was also unable to devote attention to questions relating to stages of implementation, time frames and nature of the Programme.
IV. CONCLUSION

12. The Ad Hoc Working Group agreed to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the texts that are annexed to this report, on the understanding that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete. The Working Group further agreed to recommend to the Committee that those texts be submitted to the General Assembly for further consideration at the Assembly's thirty-eighth session with a view to the final adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
PROGRESS REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE
COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 245th plenary meeting, on 28 February 1984, the Conference on Disarmament decided to re-establish an ad hoc subsidiary body on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to renew, as soon as the circumstances were propitious for that purpose, its work on the elaboration of the Programme with a view to the submission to the General Assembly, not later than at its forty-first session, a complete draft of such a Programme. The Conference further decided that the ad hoc subsidiary body would report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of its 1984 session, in order that the Conference may be in position to submit to the General Assembly the progress report requested in resolution 38/183 K. The term "ad hoc subsidiary body" was used pending a decision by the Conference on its designation.

2. At its 248th plenary meeting, on 8 March 1984, the Conference on Disarmament decided to designate the ad hoc subsidiary body as "Ad Hoc Committee".

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

3. At its 266th plenary meeting, on 21 June 1984, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Miss Aída Luisa Levin, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Committee.

4. The Ad Hoc Committee held two meetings between 10 and 24 July 1984.

5. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Bangladesh, Colombic, Democratic Yemen, Finland, Norway, Portugal and Spain.

6. The Ad Hoc Committee had before it the documents of previous sessions related to the agenda item. 1/

1/ The list of documents may be found in the reports of the previous Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which are an integral part of the reports of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/139, CD/228, CD/292, CD/335 and CD/421).
III. WORK DURING THE 1984 SESSION

7. In accordance with its mandate and as provided in General Assembly resolution 38/183 K, the Ad Hoc Committee was called upon to renew its work on the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament as soon as the circumstances were propitious for that purpose. It was agreed that present circumstances were not conducive to making progress towards the resolution of outstanding issues and that, therefore, it would not be fruitful to pursue the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at this session.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

8. Bearing in mind that under the terms of the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate the complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be submitted to the General Assembly not later than at the Assembly's forty-first session and in view of the difficulties encountered in the past, it is to be hoped that maximum efforts will be exerted to ensure that early next year the circumstances will be such as to permit the resumption of the work on the elaboration of the Programme and its successful conclusion.
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/634*/
23 August 1985
Original: ENGLISH

Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. Organization of work and documents

1. In accordance with the provisions of its mandate, as adopted by the Conference on Disarmament at its 245th plenary meeting, on 28 February 1984, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament resumed its work on 7 March 1985 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico). Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs served as the Committee's Secretary.

2. The Ad Hoc Committee held 25 meetings between 7 March and 15 August 1985.

3. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain and Turkey.

4. In addition to the documents of previous sessions relating to the agenda item, 1/ the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following documents submitted by member States in the course of the 1985 session:

   CD/CPD/WP.72 Working paper by a group of socialist countries on item 8 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament"

   CD/CPD/WP.73 Proposal by the United States of America for paragraphs 5 and 6 of Section V. A. of CD/415

*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

1/ The list of documents may be found in the reports of the previous Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which are an integral part of the reports of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/139, CD/228, CD/292 and CD/335).

GE.85-64005
Proposal by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the text of a paragraph of the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament relating to bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations

Proposal by the delegation of Argentina concerning the paragraph of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament relating to negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear and space weapons

Proposal by the delegation of Argentina for the paragraph of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space

Proposed amendment by the delegation of France to the draft text submitted by the delegations of the United States and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning chapter V, section A, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Annex to document CD/415 (CD/CPD/WP.73 and 74)

Proposal by the delegation of France for the paragraph of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament relating to multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament

Text for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament submitted by France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

Proposal by the delegation of Yugoslavia for paragraph 4 (c) of Section E, of Chapter V, of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the establishment of zone of peace in the Mediterranean

Proposal of the delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco for paragraph 4 (c) of Section E, of Chapter V of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the establishment of zone of peace in the Mediterranean

In addition, the secretariat prepared a document containing the results of the examination of texts for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CD/CPD/WP.81).

II. Substantive work during the 1985 session

5. In pursuing the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee took as the basis of its work the text annexed to the 1983 report of the previous ad hoc Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/415), which was an integral part of the Committee's report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly (CD/421).
6. The Ad Hoc Committee concentrated its work on the resolution of various outstanding questions. Contact Groups, open to all interested delegations, were established to elaborate pending texts in chapter V, "Measures and stages of implementation". A Contact Group was also set up to deal with paragraph 6 of the Introduction and paragraph 5 of chapter VI, "Machinery and Procedures". In addition, consultations were held among concerned delegations with a view to reconciling differences on certain points.

7. The Ad Hoc Committee had an initial discussion of the draft of the Introduction, which had been prepared by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during that session, and which had not yet been considered. Different views of a preliminary nature were expressed in the course of the discussion and, therefore, no conclusion was reached. As noted above, paragraph 6 was considered in a Contact Group in conjunction with paragraph 5 of the chapter on Machinery and Procedures.

8. Intensive efforts were made in the Contact Groups and in consultations among concerned delegations, to reach agreement on the text of the respective paragraphs of the Programme. In some cases, it was possible to arrive at agreed texts. In others, the relevant texts reflect points of difference or remain pending. The results of the work are contained in the annex to this report. It was understood that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete.

III. Conclusion

9. Early in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Chairman suggested the desirability of concluding the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the 1985 session so that the Conference might be in a position to submit the Programme to the General Assembly on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations. However, in view of the fact that during the 1985 session, despite intensive efforts, only modest progress was achieved, the prospects for realizing that objective do not seem very encouraging. If, unfortunately, that ultimately turned out to be so, it seems imperative that the work on the elaboration of the Programme be resumed at the beginning of the 1986 session with the firm intention of discharging the Committee's mandate and enabling the Conference to submit a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly "not later than at its forty-first session".
REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE
COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. Organization of work and documents

1. In accordance with the provisions of its mandate, as adopted by the
Conference on Disarmament at its 245th plenary meeting, on 28 February 1984,
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament resumed its
work on 20 February 1986 under the Chairmanship of
Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico). Miss Aida Luisa Levin, Senior
Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs
served as the Committee's Secretary.

2. The Ad Hoc Committee held 21 meetings between 20 February and
25 August 1986.

3. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the
representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to
participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Bangladesh, Finland,
Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

4. In addition to the documents of previous sessions relating to the agenda
item, 1/ the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following documents submitted
by member States in the course of the 1986 session:

CD/CIP/WP.83 Working paper of a group of socialist countries on the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

CD/CPD/WP.84 Text for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament,
isubmitted by France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Norway,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
United States of America

CD/CPD/WP.85 Working paper submitted by the delegation of the USSR

II. Substantive work during the 1986 session

5. In pursuing the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee took as the basis of its work the text
annexed to its 1985 report (CD/634), which was an integral part of the
Conference's report to the fortieth session of the General Assembly (CD/642).
6. The Ad Hoc Committee continued to concentrate its work on the resolution of various outstanding questions. As in 1985, Contact Groups, open to all interested delegations, were established to resolve existing differences with respect to certain texts in Chapter V, "Measures and stages of implementation". A Contact Group was also set up to deal with paragraph 6 of the Introduction and paragraph 5 of Chapter VI, "Machinery and Procedures". In addition, consultations were held under the guidance of the Chairman.

7. Intensive efforts were made in the Contact Groups and in the consultations held by the Chairman with a view to reconciling differences and reaching agreement on paragraphs of the Programme that remained outstanding. While the relevant texts continue to reflect points of differences, the areas of disagreement were narrowed and, in some cases, considerable progress was made towards harmonizing positions. The results of the work are contained in the annex to this report. It was understood that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete.

III. Conclusion

8. In the time available to it during the 1986 session, despite intensive efforts, the Ad Hoc Committee was not able to resolve all outstanding issues. In view of that fact, and bearing in mind that under resolution 40/152 D the Conference on Disarmament had been requested to submit to the General Assembly a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at its forty-first session, at the suggestion of the Chairman, consideration was given to the desirability of continuing the work during the first part of the 1987 session with a view to completing the elaboration of a draft of the Programme at that time and submitting it to the General Assembly before the closing of the forty-first session. Taking into account the progress achieved during the 1986 session, the Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that work on the elaboration of the Programme be resumed at the beginning of the 1987 session for the purpose of completing the Committee's task during the first part of the 1987 session and submitting it to the General Assembly at that time.

Note

1/ The list of documents may be found in the reports of the previous Ad Hoc Working Group and in the 1985 report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which are an integral part of the reports of the Committee on Disarmament and of the Conference on Disarmament respectively (CD/139, CD/228, CD/292, CD/335 and CD/642).
CONFERECE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/783
20 August 1987

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE
COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. Organization of work and documents

1. In accordance with the provisions of its mandate (CD/442), as adopted by
the Conference on Disarmament at its 245th plenary meeting, on
28 February 1984, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament resumed its work on 12 February 1987 under the Chairmanship of
Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico). Miss Aida Luisa Levin, Senior
Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs,
served as the Committee's Secretary.

2. The Ad Hoc Committee held 27 meetings between 12 February and
20 August 1987. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal
consultations.

3. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the
representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to
participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Bangladesh,
Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Turkey,
Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

4. In addition to the documents of previous sessions relating to the agenda
item, 1/ the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following documents submitted
by member States in the course of the 1987 session:

CD/CPD/WP.86 Working paper on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space, submitted by a group of socialist countries;

CD/CPD/WP.87 Working paper on a zone of peace and co-operation in the
South Atlantic, submitted by Brazil;

1/ The list of documents may be found in the reports of the previous
Ad Hoc Working Group and in the 1985 and 1986 reports of the Ad Hoc Committee,
which are an integral part of the reports of the Committee on Disarmament and
of the Conference on Disarmament respectively (CD/139, CD/228, CD/292, CD/335,
CD/642 and CD/732).

GE.87-63232/0241g
II. Substantive work during the 1987 session

5. During the 1987 session, the Ad Hoc Committee pursued the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament bearing in mind that its mandate called for the submission of a complete draft of such a Programme to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-first session. The Committee took as the basis of its work the text annexed to its 1986 report (CD/728).

6. At the beginning of the session, contact groups, open to all interested delegations, were established to resolve existing differences with respect to certain texts. Consultations were also held under the guidance of the Chairman. In some cases it was possible to reach agreement on the text of the relevant paragraphs, but in others differences persisted. In the course of the work, new proposals were submitted. Additional points of disagreement also arose with respect to existing texts during the course of the Committee's deliberations. Further efforts to reconcile differences were made in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee itself, as well as in informal meetings and in contact groups. Intensive work was carried out, particularly during the months of July and August, with a view to completing the elaboration of the Programme and submitting a draft thereof to the General Assembly at its forty-first session. However, it did not prove possible to harmonize positions on a number of issues, as reflected in the annex to this report.

III. Conclusion

7. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee agreed to submit to the Conference on Disarmament the results of its work on the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as contained in the Annex to this report, with the understanding that delegations could not take final positions thereon until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete. In view of the fact that areas of disagreement remain with respect to various aspects of the Programme, and bearing in mind that the Preparatory Committee for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has recommended the inclusion in the agenda of the third special session of an item entitled "Consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", the Ad Hoc Committee further agreed to recommend to the Conference on Disarmament that the Committee be re-established at the outset of the 1988 session, with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
Special Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Following the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was re-established to continue negotiations on the subject with a view to submitting a revised draft of the Programme to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, taking into account the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The subsidiary body was again re-established at the 1984 session, and renamed "Ad Hoc Committee", to renew, as soon as the circumstances were propitious for that purpose, the work on the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament with a view to the submission to the General Assembly of a complete draft of such a Programme, not later than at its forty-first session. In accordance with the Committee's mandate, the results of its work, as contained in the annex to its 1987 report (CD/783), were submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

In that report, the Committee, noting that areas of disagreement remained with respect to various aspects of the Programme and, bearing in mind that the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament had recommended the inclusion in the agenda of the third special session of an item entitled "Consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", recommended to the Conference on Disarmament that the Committee be re-established at the outset of the 1988 session with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Conference agreed to that recommendation (CD/787, para. 91) and re-established the Ad Hoc Committee at its 436th plenary meeting, on 2 February 1988, with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. During the period covered by this report, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico), was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Ms. Aida Luisa Levin, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, served as the Committee's Secretary.

3. During this period, the Ad Hoc Committee held a total of 100 meetings.
4. At various stages of the work, representatives of the following States not members of the Conference participated in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Zimbabwe.

5. In addition to the documents submitted by member States in the course of the 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1987 sessions, 1/ the Ad Hoc Committee had before it at the 1988 session a proposal submitted by the United Kingdom for inclusion in the Section "Other Measures" of chapter V of the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CD/CFD/WP.90).

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING 1983-1988

6. In 1983, the Ad Hoc Working Group, in accordance with its mandate, took as the basis of its work the texts that resulted from the negotiations on the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/S-12/32, Annex I). Contact groups were established to deal with the various chapters of the Programme. The results of the work were reflected in the annex to the 1983 report, with the understanding that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete. As indicated in the annex, the text of some paragraphs remained pending and there were differences of view regarding the appropriateness of including certain paragraphs and the desire to add further paragraphs. In addition, in the time available to it, the Working Group was not able to consider certain questions.

7. As noted above (para. 1), under the terms of its mandate in 1984, the Ad Hoc Committee was called upon to renew the work on the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament as soon as the circumstances were propitious for that purpose. At the 1984 session, it was agreed that the circumstances were not conducive to making progress towards the resolution of outstanding issues and that, therefore, it would not be fruitful to pursue the elaboration of the programme at that session.

8. In 1985, the Ad Hoc Committee resumed the task of the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, taking as the basis of its work the text annexed to the 1983 report of the previous Ad Hoc Working Group. At that and subsequent sessions, the Committee concentrated its work on the resolution of various outstanding issues. At each session, contact groups were established and consultations were held among interested delegations with a view to resolving existing differences. In addition, at various stages, consultations and informal meetings were held under the guidance of the Chairman. In the course of the work new proposals were submitted. Additional points of disagreement also arose with respect to existing texts.

9. Intensive efforts were made with a view to completing the elaboration of the Programme and submitting a draft thereof to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. In some cases it was possible to reach agreement on the text of the relevant paragraphs and in others considerable progress was made towards harmonizing positions. However, as reflected in the annex to this report, points of difference remained on a number of issues.
IV. CONCLUSION

10. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee agreed to submit to the Conference on Disarmament the results of its work on the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as contained in the annex to this report, for submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. It was understood that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete.

Note

1/ The list of documents may be found in the relevant reports of the Ad Hoc Working Group and of the Ad Hoc Committee, which are an integral part of the annual reports of the Committee on Disarmament and of the Conference on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly (CD/335, CD.421, CD/540, CD/642 and CD/732 and Add.1).
Annex

[Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]

[Texts for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]

I. Introduction

1. The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm that the ultimate goal of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Progress towards this goal requires the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. Negotiations on the entire range of those issues should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all peoples of the world in this sphere.

2. In paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament - now the Conference on Disarmament - was requested to ["] undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail [and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated"][. In the same paragraph of the Final Document it was also stated that: "The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme".

3. The Conference on Disarmament has elaborated and adopted by consensus this draft comprehensive programme of disarmament for its presentation to the ... session of the United Nations General Assembly. In addition to the present introduction, the programme comprises five chapters, the titles of which are the following: "Objectives", "Principles", "Priorities", "Measures and stages of implementation", and "Machinery and procedures". */

4. The Programme is adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly. Through the adoption of the Programme all Member States of the United Nations express their willingness to make every effort possible toward the realization as soon as possible of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

*/ The final text of this paragraph will be determined when the Conference on Disarmament adopts the Programme.
II. Objectives

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to eliminate the danger of war, [in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day,] [inter alia, nuclear war,] to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, [in particular the nuclear arms race,] and to clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end the programme will also aim:

- To maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

- To initiate or engage in further negotiations, to expedite the halting of the arms race in all its aspects, [in particular the nuclear arms race;]

- To consolidate and develop the results reflected in agreements and treaties achieved so far, relevant to the problems of disarmament;

- To open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.

2. The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail [and in which the New International Economic Order is fully achieved].

3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued:

- To strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

- To contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;

- To make, through the implementation of the programme, an effective contribution to the establishment of conditions favourable to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;

- To increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;

- To establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme;

- To promote further public understanding and support for the efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament, through accurate, balanced, factual and objective information and education in all regions of the world.
III. Principles

1. [The United Nations Charter together with the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament embodies the basic philosophy for achieving general and complete disarmament.]

2. [The objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. Yet today the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons which alone are sufficient to destroy all life on earth, constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind and, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. Therefore, it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons.]

3. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. [They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.]

4. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.

5. [Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances or be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.]

6. [The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the}
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. On the other hand, progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.)

7. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

8. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

9. [The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]

10. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security.

11. [In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. The continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter and resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.]

12. [Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.]

13. [Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.]

14. [Mindful of the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space that could undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament, all States should refrain in their activities relating to outer space from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, thus securing that it shall not become a new arena for an arms race.]
15. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

16. [In accordance with the Charter,] the United Nations has a central role and [a] primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiation.

17. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, all the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

18. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

19. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

20. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

21. [Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.]

22. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. [Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security.]

23. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would contribute to the attainment of that goal.
24. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

25. [The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.]

26. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [i.e., horizontal, vertical and spatial,] is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis. */

27. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

28. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.

29. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.

*/ One delegation reserves its position on the inclusion of the text following the first sentence in the chapter on principles.
30. As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situations, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

31. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

32. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament.

33. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

34. [Each fully implemented arms limitation or disarmament measure helps to build [the] confidence [needed] [and] to advance to more significant steps toward general and complete disarmament measures.]

35. [Respect for and the effective exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms [, especially the right to live in a nuclear-weapon-free, demilitarized and non-violent world,] are essential factors for international peace, justice and security.]

36. [Confidence-building measures, especially when applied in a comprehensive manner, have a potential to contribute significantly to the enhancement of peace and security and to promote and facilitate the attainment of disarmament measures.]

37. [A better flow of objective information on military capabilities could help relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements.]
[1. [The United Nations as well as generally accepted principles of international law provide the basic norms required for progress in the field of disarmament. The process of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control should take duly into account the basic principles and priorities established by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.]

[The United Nations Charter as well as generally accepted principles of international law provide norms of conduct for nations required for progress in the field of disarmament. Only strict observance of these norms can create conditions necessary for the achievement of the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, also reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.]

2. All States Members of the United Nations should affirm their full commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, strictly observe its provisions as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security [including the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States] and refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament and the process of building confidence and security, displaying a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.

3. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

4. Recognizing that security is an inseparable element of peace, that the arms race is inherently unstable and that enduring peace and security for the future cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry, all States should adopt defence policies and military doctrines which could contribute to reductions in armed forces and armaments to the levels necessary for defence, to a decrease in military confrontation and to greater confidence and stability in relations among States. All States should seek to strengthen and ensure international security through peaceful and mutually beneficial co-operation and disarmament agreements, which is essential in order to halt and reverse the arms race and prevent war, in particular nuclear war.

5. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

6. All States have the obligation to promote international peace and security and to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. [All States have the right to participate in the disarmament process.] All States have the right to participate on the basis of equality in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security.
7. Progress in the field of disarmament should contribute to the social and economic development of all nations, particularly developing nations.

8. Outer space shall be the province of all mankind. Its exploration and use shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all States and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. All States, in particular the major space Powers, should contribute actively to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

9. Bearing in mind the right of each State to security, the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to enhance the security of each State and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

10. The United Nations have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and in the promotion of international peace and security. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

11. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

12. Qualitative as well as quantitative aspects must be taken into account in disarmament and arms limitation agreements in order to promote international peace and security and to ensure [that improvement in armaments does not undermine the validity and viability of agreements and] that ultimately scientific and technological developments be used for peaceful purposes.

13. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for effective measures of verification in order to create necessary confidence, monitor and promote compliance. The specific measures of verification in any specific agreement should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

14. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of the countries with the largest military arsenals and other militarily significant countries.
15. All efforts should be exerted to achieve the prohibition of all other weapons of mass destruction, in particular the final elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction at the earliest possible date.

16. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to further the relaxation of international tension and thus create favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures.

17. As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situations, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations should also play an important role in order to facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament, which would enhance international peace and security.

18. All States should promote a better flow of objective information on military capabilities in order to contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and in order to facilitate the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements, which would enhance international peace and security.

IV. Priorities

1. */ In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:

- nuclear weapons;

[- prevention of an arms race in outer space,]

- other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;

- conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and

- reduction of armed forces.

2. [Effective measures of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the prevention of an arms race in outer space have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments.]

*/ Some delegations expressed the belief that the order of the items listed in this paragraph does not constitute an agreed order of importance.
3. [Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.] Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

V. Measures and stages of implementation

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear weapons

1. [Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.]

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.]

2. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require [urgent] negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) [A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive] [Significant] and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any type of nuclear armaments.
3. Nuclear test ban:

The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. */ It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, all efforts should be made to conclude, as an important part of the process of nuclear disarmament, a multilateral nuclear test ban treaty at the earliest possible date. Therefore, it is necessary to make all efforts for the elaboration of a multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban at the earliest possible date. Therefore, negotiations should be immediately initiated for the urgent conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. It is necessary to undertake all possible efforts and immediately hold negotiations for the urgent elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; before the conclusion of such a treaty all nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. It is therefore necessary as an important part of the process of nuclear disarmament to make every effort to achieve an effective and verifiable multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban at the earliest practical date.

4. [Pending the conclusion of further agreements relating to nuclear disarmament the USSR and the United States should, on a reciprocal basis, continue to refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements concluded between them.]

5. Negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear and space arms:

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have expressed consciousness of their special responsibility for maintaining peace and have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to accelerate the work at their bilateral nuclear and space arms negotiations has been widely welcomed. In this context nations of the world have endorsed the proclaimed objective of these negotiations and have stressed the importance of their being pursued with utmost dispatch with the objective of reaching early agreements. In this regard the United States and the Soviet Union should also continue to keep in view the following:

(a) The objective to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth as well as limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

(b) The need to take fully into account the security interests of all States.

*/ Some delegations reserved their position with respect to the first sentence of this text.
(c) The need to display a spirit of flexibility and to maintain equal and undiminished security for all at constantly decreasing levels of armaments and the principle that neither side should seek to achieve military superiority over the other.

(d) The requirement for effective measures for verification of compliance with agreements.

(e) The fact that while reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR are directly to be negotiated and effected by the two sides involved, the overall subject of nuclear disarmament is of world-wide concern since nuclear weapons and their accumulation pose a threat not only to their possessors and their allies but every other nation.

(f) [The United Nations General Assembly has reiterated its belief that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.]

[The fact that bilateral negotiations do not in any way diminish the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.]

(g) The need to keep the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament appropriately informed of the state of negotiations, inter alia, in view of the responsibilities entrusted to these bodies as well as the universal desire for progress towards disarmament.

The Soviet Union and the United States, having agreed to accelerate the pace of their bilateral negotiations, should exert every effort to achieve agreements on substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals to be implemented during the initial phase of the disarmament process, which should be as brief as possible. In this context, the two sides have already agreed on the principle of 50 per cent reductions in their nuclear arms appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. During this initial phase other agreements helpful to the overall disarmament process should also be concluded and put into effect.

Following is the text of the Joint United States-Soviet statement which was issued on 8 January 1985, regarding their negotiations on nuclear and space arms:

"As previously agreed, a meeting was held on 7 and 8 January 1985 in Geneva between George P. Schultz, the United States Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms - both strategic and intermediate-range - with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."
The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups.

The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.

6. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament:

[The urgent initiation of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is of vital interest to the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements would be facilitated by substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations in this area between the States which possess the most important arsenals and have a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. Also, multilateral negotiations are particularly important to achieve significant and universal progress toward the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This will require negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages, taking due account of the relative quantitative and qualitative importance of existing arsenals and the necessity of maintaining the undiminished security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, at each stage, and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

In the course of such negotiations, a combination of the measures as detailed in paragraph 2 above, or a combination of different elements of such measures, could be considered.

The overall objective of the measures for nuclear disarmament outlined in the preceding paragraphs for negotiation during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme, and of those included in subsequent stages, would be to achieve qualitative and quantitative limitations on and significant reductions of the nuclear-weapon arsenals existing at the beginning of the stage.]

7. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war:

[There is today an international consensus that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. There is no objective of greater importance than the prevention of nuclear war. The surest way to remove the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. [All Member States recognize the need to prevent war, especially because war can escalate to nuclear war. As an important step in improving international security and reducing the risk of war, including nuclear war, the nuclear-weapon States with the most important nuclear arsenals should seek deep and verifiable reduction in their nuclear arsenals [to equal levels in a more stable configuration].] Pending the]
achievement of nuclear disarmament for which negotiations should be relentlessly pursued. All States should co-operate for the adoption of practical and appropriate measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and to avoid the use of nuclear weapons.

In this context account should be taken of existing undertakings by nuclear-weapon States about no-first-use of nuclear weapons as well as about non-use of any weapons except in response to an attack. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the situation in the wake of any use of nuclear weapons cannot be limited or controlled and would lead to a global war endangering the very survival of human civilization as it is known. It is therefore incumbent on all States, in particular, nuclear-weapon States to ensure that their future actions, policies and agreements [rule out the use of nuclear weapons.] are conducive to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

8. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:

The nuclear-weapon States should take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, efforts should be pursued to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

9. Nuclear non-proliferation:

It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.
Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

10. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

Bearing in mind the importance of significant nuclear arms reductions and other measures discussed in this chapter, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, can constitute an important [disarmament] [nuclear non-proliferation] measure. The process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones [that will enhance world-wide security and stability] in different parts of the world should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:

(a) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;

(b) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zones.

The following nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established:

(a) In Latin America, under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). In this respect, the States concerned should adopt all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at
the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conferences of
OPANAL and other relevant fora, and including ratification of Additional
Protocol I by all States concerned.

(b) In the South Pacific, under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). In this respect and in view of the measures
undertaken by the Parties to the Treaty, the attention of the States concerned
is drawn to the Protocols attached to the Treaty, with relevant measures which
they are invited to undertake.

Other international legal instruments which give comparable
nuclear-weapon-free status to their respective area of application are,
inter alia, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and other Celestial Bodies and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil Thereof.

In the light of existing conditions, where the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones has been proposed, and without prejudice to efforts
for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, the following
measures, among others, should be considered:

(a) In Africa, the Organization of African Unity has affirmed the
denuclearization of the continent. The United Nations General Assembly in
successive resolutions has supported the African initiative for the
denuclearization of the continent and at its tenth special session the
General Assembly, by consensus, called upon the Security Council to take
appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective.

(b) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East
in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/147 would greatly enhance
international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in
the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will
refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way
possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting
the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and
agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role
in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
Middle East.

(c) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their
determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action
should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this
context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia
has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is
keeping the subject under consideration.

(d) Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the
world should be promoted at the initiative of States which intend to become
part of the zone.]
Specific proposals have been put forward for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Balkans. Regional States have expressed their determination to undertake individual or joint steps to bring about the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and to set up such a zone. Interested Balkan countries have engaged in a process of bilateral and multilateral dialogue on practical measures aimed at creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone and enhancing security, confidence, good neighbourliness and co-operation.

It was proposed that negotiations be opened without delay on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe. It is suggested that the corridor - from the territory of which all nuclear-weapon systems should be removed - should range approximately 150 kilometres along both sides of the borderline between the Federal Republic of Germany on one side and the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the other. At a subsequent stage, it would be expanded to cover the whole area of Central Europe as defined for the purpose of the Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.*)

Implementation of the plan for reducing armaments and increasing confidence in Central Europe which, inter alia, provides for gradual disengagement and reduction of jointly agreed operational and battlefield kinds of nuclear arms, so that all types of nuclear arms would be covered by international negotiations and agreements.

The right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories is internationally recognized. Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world have been undertaken at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone. Not all States have formally recognized these proposals.

Proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones have been put forward for various parts of Europe, including the Balkans, Central Europe and Northern Europe. Not all States in the respective areas have yet agreed on the merits of establishing such zones.

(e) [Ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.]

*) The proposal for a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe was first suggested by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (now known as the Palme Commission. One delegation emphasized that such a corridor would not constitute a nuclear-weapon-free-zone as defined in the present paragraph. Some delegations emphasized that a nuclear-weapon-free corridor (also widely referred to as a "zone") when, as proposed, expanded to cover the whole area of Central Europe, would in effect become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

2. All States which have not yet done so should accelerate the process of adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

3. It is necessary to make all possible efforts for the early achievement at the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of an international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

4. An international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons should be concluded, bearing in mind the negotiations under way in the Conference on Disarmament and all proposals made in connection therewith.

5. Effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such types and systems of weapons. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

1. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.

2. */ In view of the present situation where the concentration of troops and armaments in Europe **/ has reached an especially high level, it is necessary to strengthen strategic stability through the establishment, at a significantly lower level, of a stable, comprehensive and verifiable balance of conventional forces. The more stable situation should be achieved by agreements on appropriate and mutual reductions and limitations in the whole

*/ The mentioning of Vienna negotiations and the Stockholm Conference under the heading "Conventional weapons and armed forces" is without prejudice to the content of talks in those fora.

**/ With the common understanding that this does not refer to neutral and non-aligned States.
of Europe and on effective confidence- and security-building measures, taking into account the need to dispel the mutual suspicion and distrust accumulated over many years.

Such steps should ensure undiminished security of all States with full respect for the security interests and independence of all States, including those outside military alliances.

The agreement on a set of confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, held in Stockholm, represents a new step of great political importance. Its full implementation will reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities in that region. The agreed measures are of military significance and politically binding and are provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area */ and air space, whenever notifiable military activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe.

The positive results obtained at the Stockholm Conference show that, despite differences of opinion, concrete and verifiable agreements are possible in the sensitive field of military security. Their implementation is appropriate for furthering the process of confidence-building and improving security, making an important contribution to developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole. **/

3. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the

*/ In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.

**/ Further formulations on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe should be possible on the basis of work under way in Vienna.
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with
the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished
security of all States. Such measures might include the following:

(a) Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences
should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of
all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of
conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration
of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

(b) Consultations should be carried out among major arms suppliers and
recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer
of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished
security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a
lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect
their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and
independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the
obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

4. Prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons,
including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have
indiscriminate effects:

(a) Adherence by all States to the agreement adopted by the
United Nations Conference on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects.

(b) Broadening of the prohibition or restrictions of use of certain
conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to
have indiscriminate effects, either through amendments to the existing
Protocols or through the conclusion of additional Protocols, in accordance
with Article 8 of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

(c) The result of the above-mentioned Conference should be considered by
all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the
transfer of such weapons to other States.

D. Military budgets */

1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for
example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by
nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a
measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would
increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for
military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the
benefit of the developing countries.

*/ One delegation reserves its position on the inclusion of the current
text in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
2. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all
participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation
acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in
assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States
and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction
of military budgets.

3. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps
should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in
mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this
question.

E. Related measures

1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques:

Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the
adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor
and the subsoil thereof:

Consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the
prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the
subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms
race in, that environment, taking into account, as appropriate, the
the First and Second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, as
well as any relevant technological developments.

3. */ In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures
should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance
with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies.

    All States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should
contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and
take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest
of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international
co-operation and understanding. **/

*) The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament will be determined later.

**) Some delegations reserved their position on the first two paragraphs
until the language of this entire section is completed and its placement
resolved.
To this end all effective efforts should be made both bilaterally and multilaterally.

In this regard bilateral negotiations have been undertaken and should be continued to work out effective agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The two parties are requested to continue to keep the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly informed of the progress made in their bilateral sessions in order to facilitate multilateral work on this subject.

Efforts should be made by the Conference on Disarmament in the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and which has a primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. */

[4. The establishment of zones of peace: **/]

The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

(a) South-East Asia:

In the interest of the promotion of peace, stability and co-operation in South-East Asia, steps should be taken by all States of the region, primarily those States most directly interested, through consultations and dialogue among themselves, towards the early establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, which would be consistent with the Political Declaration of the Seventh Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi, held in March 1983. ***/

*/ Many delegations consider that the first paragraph, which reproduces paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, should be supplemented to reflect that present urgency and importance of the subject. They further consider that it should occupy a more prominent place in the Programme and, to that end, propose that it be included as subsection B in the section "Disarmament measures", under the heading "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Other delegations are considering the placement of this paragraph pending the balance of the overall document.

**/ Measures related to the Asian and Pacific Ocean region were also proposed.

***/ One delegation reserves its position on this text.
(b) Indian Ocean:

Achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security.

There is agreement within the United Nations for practical steps to be taken to establish a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean region.

Practical steps should be taken within the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to prepare for an early Conference, as a necessary step towards establishing a zone of peace.

Taking into account the political and security climate in the region, the Ad Hoc Committee should complete its preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean to enable the Conference to be opened at a date not later than 1988 to be decided by the Committee in consultation with the host country. Such preparatory work would comprise organizational matters and substantive issues, including the provisional agenda for the Conference, rules of procedure, participation, stages of conference, level of representation, documentation, consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreements that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the preparation of the draft final document of the Conference.

The Ad Hoc Committee should, at the same time, seek the necessary harmonization of views on remaining relevant issues.

The creation of a zone of peace requires the active participation of and full co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter, as well as the general principles of international law.

The creation of a zone of peace also requires respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States.

(c) Mediterranean:

Bearing in mind that security in the Mediterranean region is closely linked with European security and with international peace and security, positive steps should be taken by all States concerned to ensure peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region.

To this end further efforts are necessary for the reduction of tensions and of armaments; for strengthening of confidence; for the creation of conditions of security and fruitful co-operation in all fields for all countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, security, non-intervention and non-interference, non-violation of international borders, non-use of force or threat of use of force, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for permanent sovereignty over natural resources; for the promotion of just and viable solutions of existing problems and crisis in the area on the basis of the
provisions of the Charter and of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation and the right of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to self-determination and independence.

The States of the Mediterranean region and other concerned States should co-operate to define and implement, as appropriate, such steps and measures which should be conducive for creating conditions of peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

In this connection note is taken of the commitments assumed by the participants of the meeting of the Mediterranean members of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Valletta, Malta in 1984, and at Brioni, Yugoslavia, in 1987, with the objective of contributing to peace and security in the region. */

[(d) South Atlantic:

The declaration of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic constitutes a concrete step towards the goals set forth by the international community to be achieved through the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world for the benefit of all mankind, thereby contributing significantly to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the promotion of the principles and purposes of the United Nations. In this context, it is recognized that the States of the region have a special interest and responsibility to promote regional co-operation for economic development and peace.

States of other regions, in particular militarily significant States, should scrupulously respect the South Atlantic region as a zone of peace and co-operation, especially through the reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence there, the non-introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and the non-extension into the region of rivalries and conflicts foreign to it.

All States of the region and of all other regions should co-operate in the elimination of all sources of tension in the zone, respect the national unity, sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of every State therein, refrain from the threat or use of force, and strictly observe the principle that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible.

The elimination of apartheid and the attainment of self-determination and independence by the people of Namibia, as well as the cessation of all acts of aggression and subversion against States in the zone are essential for peace and security in the region. To that end, implementation of all United Nations resolutions pertaining to colonialism, racism and apartheid is urgently required.]}

*/ There was a proposal for the convening of a conference on the Mediterranean region.
OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence-building measures

In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following, and other measures yet to be agreed upon, should be undertaken:

(a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tensions, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(b) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.

(c) States should consider implementing measures based on the principles of openness and transparency, such as the provision of objective information on military matters.

2. Prevention of the use of force in international relations

(a) Strict adherence and full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any States or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

(b) Strengthening the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and full implementation of the decisions of the Security Council by all States Members of the United Nations in accordance with their obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter.

3. World public opinion in favour of disarmament

Knowledge of facts and opinions about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it is an essential condition for world public opinion to mobilize in favour of disarmament. In order to inform world public opinion on such issues, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information on these matters should be adopted in all regions in a balanced, factual and objective manner:
(a) Throughout the implementation of the programme, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should be encouraged, as appropriate, to undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connection with Disarmament Week.

(b) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

(c) The World Disarmament Campaign, which was solemnly launched by the General Assembly at the opening meeting of its second special session devoted to disarmament, should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions. The Campaign has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

(d) As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.

(e) Member States should be encouraged to make all efforts to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament issues, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the widest possible dissemination and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinion on the danger of the escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

4. Verification

Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.
In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections. Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage of negotiations on specific agreements. All States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties.

All States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements should strictly implement and fully comply with the entirety of the provisions of such agreements if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them. Any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties, but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements. Weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global and regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system. States parties should support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of such agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements.

[DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development, the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should make an effective contribution to economic and social development of all States, in particular of the developing countries. In this context, it is of particular significance that substantial progress in disarmament should be made in accordance with the responsibility that each State bears in the field of disarmament, so that real resources now being used for military purposes can be released to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

2. Disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries, by contributing towards reducing the economic disparities between developed and developing countries and establishing [the] [a] new international order on the basis of justice, equity and co-operation and towards solving other global problems.

3. The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.]
DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Intermediate Stage */

1. The intermediate stage should start no later than 1990 and last five to seven years.

2. The USSR and the United States should go on with the reduction agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out further measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear systems.

3. Other nuclear-weapon States should pledge to freeze all their nuclear weapons and also not to station them in the territories of other countries.

4. All nuclear-weapon States should eliminate their tactical nuclear arms, i.e. weapons having a range (or radius of action) of up to 1,000 km. This measure should be taken after the completion by the USSR and the United States of the 50 per cent reduction of their nuclear weapons that can reach each other's territory.

5. The Soviet-American accord on the prohibition of space-strike weapons should become multilateral with the mandatory participation in it of major industrial States.

6. All nuclear-weapon States should cease nuclear-weapon tests.

7. There should be a ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction.} **/

*/ The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation.

**/ Some delegations reserved their position on these paragraphs which represent the position of one group of States.
Last stage */

[1. The last stage should begin no later than 1995. During this stage the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons should be completed. By the end of 1999 there should be no more nuclear weapons on earth.

2. A universal accord should be worked out to ensure that nuclear weapons never again come into being.

3. The last stage should be completed by the end of 1999.] **/

VI. Machinery and Procedures

1. The United Nations [, in accordance with the Charter,] should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament.

2. Negotiations on multilateral measures of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should, as a rule, be conducted in the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

3. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

4. The United Nations should be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

5. The Programme has three stages: The first stage, the intermediate stage and the last stage. The objective of the last stage is to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The general wish being to complete the disarmament process, all efforts should be made to implement each stage, as well as the Programme as a whole at the earliest possible date in such a way as to contribute to the security of States and enhance international security.

In the first stage of the Programme, all States should make maximum efforts towards implementation of the priority measures and as many other measures included therein as possible.

Those measures that have not been implemented by the end of the first stage will be included in the intermediate stage. The scope of disarmament measures during the intermediate stage will depend on the progress made in the

*/ The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation.

**/ Some delegations reserved their position on these paragraphs which represent the position of one group of States.
Annex

Implementation of the first stage. In addition, the intermediate stage comprises the measures necessary to prepare for the last stage. The time of the implementation of the intermediate stage would depend on the measures included therein.

The last stage comprises the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the implementation of other measures necessary to assure that, by the end of the stage, general and complete disarmament under effective international control will have been achieved.

6. All efforts should be made by States, particularly through the conduct of negotiations in good faith, on specific arms limitation and disarmament measures, to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament, as defined in the Comprehensive Programme. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of this ultimate goal, there shall be reviews - including at special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - of the implementation of the measures included in the various stages of the Comprehensive Programme. The first such review will take place on a date to be decided by the United Nations General Assembly and will:

(a) review the implementation of measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme;

(b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress in its implementation;

(c) elaborate, if necessary, in more concrete terms further measures, taking into account the progress made so far and other relevant developments; and

(d) recommend the date of the next review.

7. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at special sessions, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included on the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

8. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, consider and recommend further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme.
9. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission shall continue functioning as a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, and shall consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament.

10. Proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session and annex II of the Concluding Document of the second special session devoted to disarmament should be considered, and decisions taken, at an appropriate time.

11. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.
REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 466th plenary meeting, on 19 July 1988, the Conference on Disarmament decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to continue negotiations on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the Programme for its submission to the General Assembly at its forty-third session or, at the latest, at its forty-fourth session if the achievement of that objective was not possible during 1988. The Conference requested the Ad Hoc Committee to report on the progress of its work before the end of the 1988 session.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

2. At its 466th plenary meeting, on 19 July 1988, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Committee.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee held six meetings between 28 July and 1 September 1988.

4. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Bangladesh, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Turkey and Zimbabwe.

5. In addition to the documents previously submitted under the agenda item, 1/ the Ad hoc Committee had before it a proposal submitted by Peru relating to the establishment of a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Pacific (CD/CPI/WP.91).
III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE SECOND PART OF THE 1988 SESSION

6. The Ad Hoc Committee continued negotiations on the Comprehensive programme of Disarmament on the basis of the text annexed to the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (CD/834).

7. The Ad Hoc Committee concentrated its work on various outstanding issues. Contact groups were established and consultations held among interested delegations with a view to resolving differences concerning certain texts. Some progress was made towards harmonizing positions and narrowing areas of disagreement. However, in the short time available, it was not possible to reconcile differences on a number of issues and, thus, complete the elaboration of the Programme in 1988. The results of the work are contained in the annex to this report. It was understood that delegations could not take final positions thereon until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

8. Bearing in mind the terms of its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee agreed that it should resume work at the outset of the 1989 session with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the Programme for its submission to the General Assembly, at the latest, at its forty-fourth session.

Note

1/ The list of documents may be found in the reports of the previous Ad Hoc Working Group and in the reports of the Ad Hoc Committee which are an integral part of the reports of the Committee on Disarmament and of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/139, CD/292, CD/335, CD/421, CD/540, CD/642, CD/732 and Add.1 and CD/834).
REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At the 484th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, on 7 February 1989, the President made a statement noting that the Conference on Disarmament did not need to take a decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, in view of its 1988 mandate. According to that mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee was to continue negotiations on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the Programme for its submission to the General Assembly as its mandate extended to the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

2. At the same plenary meeting, the Conference on Disarmament decided that Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico) would continue as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. J. Gerardi-Siebert, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Committee.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 23 meetings between 7 February and 24 August 1989.

4. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Bangladesh, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Zimbabwe.

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE SECOND PART OF THE 1989 SESSION

5. The Ad Hoc Committee continued negotiations on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on the basis of the text annexed to the report submitted to the General Assembly (CD/867).

1/ The list of documents may be found in the reports of the previous Ad Hoc Working Group and in the reports of the Ad Hoc Committee which are an integral part of the reports of the Committee on Disarmament and of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/139, CD/292, CD/335, CD/421, CD/540, CD/728, CD/783 and Add. 1, CD/832 and CD/867).

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6. The Ad Hoc Committee concentrated its work on various outstanding issues. Contact groups were established and consultations held among interested delegations with a view to resolving differences concerning certain texts. Some progress was made towards harmonizing positions and narrowing areas of disagreement. However, in the time available, it was not possible to reconcile differences on a number of issues and, thus, complete the elaboration of the Programme in 1989. The results of the work are contained in the annex to this report. It was understood that delegations could not take final positions thereon until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

7. Bearing in mind the terms of its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee agreed to submit to the Conference on Disarmament the results of its work on the elaboration of the Programme for consideration at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, as contained in the annex. The Ad Hoc Committee also agreed that it shall resume work with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard.
Annex

[Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]

[Texts for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]

I. Introduction

1. The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm that the ultimate goal of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Progress towards this goal requires the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. Negotiations on the entire range of those issues should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all peoples of the world in this sphere.

2. In paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament - now the Conference on Disarmament - was requested to [""] undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail [and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated"]). In the same paragraph of the Final Document it was also stated that: "The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme".

3. The Conference on Disarmament has elaborated and adopted by consensus this draft comprehensive programme of disarmament for its presentation to the ... session of the United Nations General Assembly. In addition to the present introduction, the programme comprises five chapters, the titles of which are the following: "Objectives", "Principles", "Priorities", "Measures and stages of implementation", and "Machinery and procedures". */

4. The Programme is adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly. Through the adoption of the Programme all Member States of the United Nations express their willingness to make every effort possible toward the realization as soon as possible of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

*/ The final text of this paragraph will be determined when the Conference on Disarmament adopts the Programme.
II. Objectives

Ultimate Objective

1. The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail. To that end all States, in carrying out their obligations, should seek to:

- strengthen international peace and security and respect the security of individual States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

- establish peaceful international relations based on the primacy of international law and trust between all States and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme;

- contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;

- increase international confidence and relax international tensions;

- make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the establishment of conditions favourable to the economic and social development of all States, in particular developing States.

Immediate Objectives

2. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security so as to eliminate the risk of war, in particular nuclear war, by identifying measures to halt and reverse the arms race in all its aspects. To this end, the Programme will also aim to:

- maintain and further the momentum in the disarmament process set forth by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

- facilitate the maintenance of international peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces;

- help promote and give impetus to further negotiations to expedite the halting of the arms race in all its aspects and bring about disarmament by indicating a concrete orientation to facilitate that process;

- encourage the strengthening of the results stemming from agreements and treaties relevant to the problems of disarmament;
encourage states, through accurate, balanced, factual and objective information and education in all regions of the world, to further public understanding and support for efforts to halt the arms race in all its aspects and to achieve disarmament.

III. Principles

[1. [The United Nations Charter together with the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament embodies the basic philosophy for achieving general and complete disarmament.]

2. [The objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. Yet today the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons which alone are sufficient to destroy all life on earth, constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind and, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. Therefore, it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons.]

3. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. [They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.]

4. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.

5. [Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances or be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.]
6. [The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. On the other hand, progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.]

7. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

8. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

9. [The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]

10. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security.

11. [In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. The continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter and resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.]

12. [Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.]

13. [Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.]
14. [Mindful of the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space that could undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament, all States should refrain in their activities relating to outer space from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, thus securing that it shall not become a new arena for an arms race.]

15. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

16. [In accordance with the Charter,] the United Nations has a central role and [a] primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiation.

17. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, all the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

18. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

19. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

20. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

21. [Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.]

22. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. [Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security.]
23. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would contribute to the attainment of that goal.

24. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

25. [The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.]

26. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [, horizontal, vertical and spatial,] is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis. */

27. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

28. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.

* One delegation reserves its position on the inclusion of the text following the first sentence in the chapter on principles.
29. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.

30. As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situations, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

31. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

32. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament.

33. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

34. [Each fully implemented arms limitation or disarmament measure helps to build [the] confidence [needed] [and] to advance to more significant steps toward general and complete disarmament measures.]

35. [Respect for and the effective exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms [, especially the right to live in a nuclear-weapon-free, demilitarized and non-violent world,] are essential factors for international peace, justice and security.]

36. [Confidence-building measures, especially when applied in a comprehensive manner, have a potential to contribute significantly to the enhancement of peace and security and to promote and facilitate the attainment of disarmament measures.]

37. [A better flow of objective information on military capabilities could help relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements.]]
1. [The United Nations Charter as well as generally accepted principles of international law provide the basic norms required for progress in the field of disarmament. The process of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control should take duly into account the basic principles and priorities established by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.]

[The United Nations Charter as well as generally accepted principles of international law provide norms of conduct for nations required for progress in the field of disarmament. Only strict observance of these norms can create conditions necessary for the achievement of the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, also reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.]

2. All States Members of the United Nations should affirm their full commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, strictly observe its provisions as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security [including the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States] and refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament and the process of building confidence and security, displaying a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.

3. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

4. Recognizing that security is an inseparable element of peace, that the arms race is inherently unstable and that enduring peace and security for the future cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry, all States should adopt defence policies and military doctrines which could contribute to reductions in armed forces and armaments to the levels necessary for defence, to a decrease in military confrontation and to greater confidence and stability in relations among States. All States should seek to strengthen and ensure international security through peaceful and mutually beneficial co-operation and disarmament agreements, which is essential in order to halt and reverse the arms race and prevent war, in particular nuclear war.

5. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

6. All States have the obligation to promote international peace and security and to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. [All States have the right to participate in the disarmament process.] All States have the right to participate on the basis of equality in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security.
7. Progress in the field of disarmament should contribute to the social and economic development of all nations, particularly developing nations.

8. Outer space shall be the province of all mankind. Its exploration and use shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all States and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. All States, in particular the major space Powers, should contribute actively to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

9. Bearing in mind the right of each State to security, the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to enhance the security of each State and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

10. The United Nations have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and in the promotion of international peace and security. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

11. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

12. Qualitative as well as quantitative aspects must be taken into account in disarmament and arms limitation agreements in order to promote international peace and security and to ensure [that improvement in armaments does not undermine the validity and viability of agreements and] that ultimately scientific and technological developments be used for peaceful purposes.

13. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for effective measures of verification in order to create necessary confidence, monitor and promote compliance. The specific measures of verification in any specific agreement should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

14. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of the countries with the largest military arsenals and other militarily significant countries.
15. All efforts should be exerted to achieve the prohibition of all other weapons of mass destruction, in particular the final elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction at the earliest possible date.

16. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to further the relaxation of international tension and thus create favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures.

17. As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situations, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations should also play an important role in order to facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament, which would enhance international peace and security.

18. All States should promote a better flow of objective information on military capabilities in order to contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and in order to facilitate the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements, which would enhance international peace and security.

IV. Priorities

1. */ In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:

- nuclear weapons;

[- prevention of an arms race in outer space,]

- other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;

- conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and

- reduction of armed forces.

2. [Effective measures of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the prevention of an arms race in outer space have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments.]

[/* Some delegations expressed the belief that the order of the items listed in this paragraph does not constitute an agreed order of importance.]
3. [Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.] Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

V. [Measures and stages of implementation]

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear weapons

1. [Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.]

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.]

2. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require [urgent] negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

   (a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

   (b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

   (c) [A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive] [Significant] and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any type of nuclear armaments.
3. Nuclear test ban:

The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. */ It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, all efforts should be made to conclude, as an important part of the process of nuclear disarmament, a multilateral nuclear test ban treaty at the earliest possible date.] [Therefore, it is necessary to make all efforts for the elaboration of a multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban at the earliest possible date.] [Therefore, negotiations should be immediately initiated for the urgent conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty.] [It is necessary to undertake all possible efforts and immediately hold negotiations for the urgent elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; before the conclusion of such a treaty all nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.] [It is therefore necessary as an important part of the process of nuclear disarmament to make every effort to achieve an effective and verifiable multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban at the earliest practical date.]

4. [Pending the conclusion of further agreements relating to nuclear disarmament the USSR and the United States should, on a reciprocal basis, continue to refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements concluded between them.]

5. Negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear and space arms:

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have expressed consciousness of their special responsibility for maintaining peace and have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to accelerate the work at their bilateral nuclear and space arms negotiations has been widely welcomed. In this context nations of the world have endorsed the proclaimed objective of these negotiations and have stressed the importance of their being pursued with utmost dispatch with the objective of reaching early agreements. In this regard the United States and the Soviet Union should also continue to keep in view the following:

(a) The objective to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth as well as limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

(b) The need to take fully into account the security interests of all States.

*/ Some delegations reserved their position with respect to the first sentence of this text.
(c) The need to display a spirit of flexibility and to maintain equal and undiminished security for all at constantly decreasing levels of armaments and the principle that neither side should seek to achieve military superiority over the other.

(d) The requirement for effective measures for verification of compliance with agreements.

(e) The fact that while reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR are directly to be negotiated and effected by the two sides involved, the overall subject of nuclear disarmament is of world-wide concern since nuclear weapons and their accumulation pose a threat not only to their possessors and their allies but every other nation.

(f) Bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.

(g) The need to keep the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament appropriately informed of the state of negotiations, inter alia, in view of the responsibilities entrusted to these bodies as well as the universal desire for progress towards disarmament.

The Soviet Union and the United States, having agreed to accelerate the pace of their bilateral negotiations, should exert every effort to achieve agreements on substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals to be implemented during the initial phase of the disarmament process, which should be as brief as possible. In this context, the two sides have already agreed on the principle of 50 per cent reductions in their nuclear arms appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. During this initial phase other agreements helpful to the overall disarmament process should also be concluded and put into effect.

Following is the text of the Joint United States-Soviet statement which was issued on 8 January 1985, regarding their negotiations on nuclear and space arms:

"As previously agreed, a meeting was held on 7 and 8 January 1985 in Geneva between George P. Schultz, the United States Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms – both strategic and intermediate-range – with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups."
The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month."

6. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament:

[The urgent initiation of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is of vital interest to the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements would be facilitated by substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations in this area between the States which possess the most important arsenals and have a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. Also, multilateral negotiations are particularly important to achieve significant and universal progress toward the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This will require negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages, taking due account of the relative quantitative and qualitative importance of existing arsenals and the necessity of maintaining the undiminished security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, at each stage, and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

In the course of such negotiations, a combination of the measures as detailed in paragraph 2 above, or a combination of different elements of such measures, could be considered.

The overall objective of the measures for nuclear disarmament outlined in the preceding paragraphs for negotiation during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme, and of those included in subsequent stages, would be to achieve qualitative and quantitative limitations on and significant reductions of the nuclear-weapon arsenals existing at the beginning of the stage.]

7. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war:

[There is today an international consensus that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. There is no objective of greater importance than the prevention of nuclear war. The surest way to remove the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. [All Member States recognize the need to prevent war, especially because war can escalate to nuclear war. As an important step in improving international security and reducing the risk of war, including nuclear war, the nuclear-weapon States with the most important nuclear arsenals should seek deep and verifiable reduction in their nuclear arsenals [to equal levels in a more stable configuration].] Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament for which negotiations should be relentlessly pursued all States should co-operate for the adoption of practical and appropriate measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and to avoid the use of nuclear weapons.]
In this context account should be taken of existing undertakings by nuclear-weapon States about no-first-use of nuclear weapons as well as about non-use of any weapons except in response to an attack. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the situation in the wake of any use of nuclear weapons cannot be limited or controlled and would lead to a global war endangering the very survival of human civilization as it is known. It is therefore incumbent on all States, in particular, nuclear-weapon States to ensure that their future actions, policies and agreements [rule out the use of nuclear weapons.] [are conducive to the elimination of nuclear weapons.]

8. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:

The nuclear-weapon States should take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, efforts should be pursued to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

9. Nuclear non-proliferation:

It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also
have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/30 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

10. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

Bearing in mind the importance of significant nuclear arms reductions and other measures discussed in this chapter, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, can constitute an important [disarmament] [nuclear non-proliferation] measure. The process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones [that will enhance world-wide security and stability] in different parts of the world should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:

(a) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;

(b) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zones.

The following nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established:

(a) In Latin America, under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). In this respect, the States concerned should adopt all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conferences of OPANAL and other relevant fora, and including ratification of Additional Protocol I by all States concerned.
(b) In the South Pacific, under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). In this respect and in view of the measures undertaken by the Parties to the Treaty, the attention of the States concerned is drawn to the Protocols attached to the Treaty, with relevant measures which they are invited to undertake.

Other international legal instruments which give comparable nuclear-weapon-free status to their respective area of application are, inter alia, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil Thereof.

In the light of existing conditions, where the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones has been proposed, and without prejudice to efforts for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, the following measures, among others, should be considered:

(a) In Africa, the Organization of African Unity has affirmed the denuclearization of the continent. The United Nations General Assembly in successive resolutions has supported the African initiative for the denuclearization of the continent and at its tenth special session the General Assembly, by consensus, called upon the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective.

(b) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/147 would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(c) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

(d) [Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world should be promoted at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone.]

[Specific proposals have been put forward for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Balkans. Regional States have expressed their determination to undertake individual or joint steps to bring about the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and to set up such a zone. Interested Balkan countries have engaged in a process of bilateral and multilateral dialogue on practical measures aimed at creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone and enhancing security, confidence, good neighbourliness and co-operation.]
[It was proposed that negotiations be opened without delay on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe. It is suggested that the corridor - from the territory of which all nuclear-weapon systems should be removed - should range approximately 150 kilometres along both sides of the borderline between the Federal Republic of Germany on one side and the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the other. At a subsequent stage, it would be expanded to cover the whole area of Central Europe as defined for the purpose of the Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.] */

[Implementation of the plan for reducing armaments and increasing confidence in Central Europe which, inter alia, provides for gradual disengagement and reduction of jointly agreed operational and battlefield kinds of nuclear arms, so that all types of nuclear arms would be covered by international negotiations and agreements.]

[The right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories is internationally recognized. Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world have been undertaken at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone. Not all States have formally recognized these proposals.

Proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones have been put forward for various parts of Europe, including the Balkans, Central Europe and Northern Europe. Not all States in the respective areas have yet agreed on the merits of establishing such zones.]

(e) [Ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.]

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

2. All States which have not yet done so should accelerate the process of adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

*/ The proposal for a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe was first suggested by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (now known as the Palme Commission). One delegation emphasized that such a corridor would not constitute a nuclear-weapon-free zone as defined in the present paragraph. Some delegations emphasized that a nuclear-weapon-free corridor (also widely referred to as a "zone") when, as proposed, expanded to cover the whole area of Central Europe, would in effect become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
3. It is necessary to make all possible efforts for the early achievement at
the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of an international
convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their
destruction.

4. An international treaty on the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons should be concluded,
-bearing in mind the negotiations under way in the Conference on Disarmament
and all proposals made in connection therewith.

5. Effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the
emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific
principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming
at the prohibition of such types and systems of weapons. Specific agreements
could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction
which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

1. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the
limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons
should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general
and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a
special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments
reductions.

2. */ In view of the present situation where the concentration of troops and
armaments in Europe **/ has reached an especially high level, it is necessary
to strengthen strategic stability through the establishment, at a
significantly lower level, of a stable, comprehensive and verifiable balance
of conventional forces. The more stable situation should be achieved by
agreements on appropriate and mutual reductions and limitations in the whole
of Europe and on effective confidence- and security-building measures, taking
into account the need to dispel the mutual suspicion and distrust accumulated
over many years.

Such steps should ensure undiminished security of all States with full
respect for the security interests and independence of all States, including
those outside military alliances.

The agreement on a se: of confidence- and security-building measures at
the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
in Europe, held in Stockholm, represents a new step of great political
importance. Its full implementation will reduce the dangers of armed conflict
and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities in that

*/ The mentioning of Vienna negotiations and the Stockholm Conference
under the heading "Conventional weapons and armed forces" is without prejudice
to the content of talks in those fora.

**/ With the common understanding that this does not refer to neutral
and non-aligned States.
region. The agreed measures are of military significance and politically binding and are provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area */ and air space, whenever notifiable military activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe.

The positive results obtained at the Stockholm Conference show that, despite differences of opinion, concrete and verifiable agreements are possible in the sensitive field of military security. Their implementation is appropriate for furthering the process of confidence-building and improving security, making an important contribution to developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole. **/

3. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include the following:

(a) Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

(b) Consultations should be carried out among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and

*/ In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.

**/ Further formulations on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe should be possible on the basis of work under way in Vienna.
independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the
obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

4. Prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons,
including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have
indiscriminate effects:

(a) Adherence by all States to the agreement adopted by the
United Nations Conference on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects.

(b) Broadening of the prohibition or restrictions of use of certain
conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to
have indiscriminate effects, either through amendments to the existing
Protocols or through the conclusion of additional Protocols, in accordance
with Article 8 of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

(c) The result of the above-mentioned Conference should be considered by
all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the
transfer of such weapons to other States.

D. Military budgets *

1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for
example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by
nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a
measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would
increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for
military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the
benefit of the developing countries.

2. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all
participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation
acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in
assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States
and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of
military budgets.

3. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps
should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in
mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this
question.

* One delegation reserves its position on the inclusion of the current
text in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
E. Related measures

1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques:

Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

Consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in, that environment, taking into account, as appropriate, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the proposals made during the First and Second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, as well as any relevant technological developments.

3. */ In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

All States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. **/

To this end all effective efforts should be made both bilaterally and multilaterally.

In this regard bilateral negotiations have been undertaken and should be continued to work out effective agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The two parties are requested to continue to keep the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly informed of the progress made in their bilateral sessions in order to facilitate multilateral work on this subject.

*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.

**/ Some delegations reserved their position on the first two paragraphs until the language of this entire section is completed and its placement resolved.
Efforts should be made by the Conference on Disarmament in the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and which has a primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. */

[4. The establishment of zones of peace:

The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

(a) South-East Asia:

In the interest of the promotion of peace, stability and co-operation in South-East Asia, steps should be taken by all States of the region, primarily those States most directly interested, through consultations and dialogue among themselves, towards the early establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, which would be consistent with the Political Declaration of the Seventh Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi, held in March 1983. **/

(b) Indian Ocean:

Achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security.

There is agreement within the United Nations for practical steps to be taken to establish a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean region.

Practical steps should be taken within the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to prepare for an early Conference, as a necessary step towards establishing a zone of peace.

*/ Many delegations consider that the first paragraph, which reproduces paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, should be supplemented to reflect that present urgency and importance of the subject. They further consider that it should occupy a more prominent place in the Programme and, to that end, propose that it be included as subsection B in the section "Disarmament measures", under the heading "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Other delegations are considering the placement of this paragraph pending the balance of the overall document.

**/ One delegation reserves its position on this text.
Taking into account the political and security climate in the region, the Ad Hoc Committee should complete its preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean to enable the Conference to be opened at a date not later than 1990 to be decided by the Committee in consultation with the host country. Such preparatory work would comprise organizational matters and substantive issues, including the provisional agenda for the Conference, rules of procedure, participation, stages of conference, level of representation, documentation, consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreements that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the preparation of the draft final document of the Conference.

The Ad Hoc Committee should, at the same time, seek the necessary harmonization of views on remaining relevant issues.

The creation of a zone of peace requires the active participation of and full co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter, as well as the general principles of international law.

The creation of a zone of peace also requires respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States.

(c) Mediterranean:

Bearing in mind that security in the Mediterranean region is closely linked with European security and with international peace and security, positive steps should be taken by all States concerned to ensure peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region.

To this end further efforts are necessary for the reduction of tensions and of armaments; for strengthening of confidence; for the creation of conditions of security and fruitful co-operation in all fields for all countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, security, non-intervention and non-interference, non-violation of international borders, non-use of force or threat of use of force, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for permanent sovereignty over natural resources; for the promotion of just and viable solutions of existing problems and crisis in the area on the basis of the provisions of the Charter and of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation and the right of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to self-determination and independence.

The States of the Mediterranean region and other concerned States should co-operate to define and implement, as appropriate, such steps and measures which should be conducive for creating conditions of peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
In this connection note is taken of the commitments assumed by the participants of the meeting of the Mediterranean members of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Valletta, Malta in 1984, and at Brioni, Yugoslavia, in 1987, with the objective of contributing to peace and security in the region. */

[(d) South Atlantic:

The declaration of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic constitutes a concrete step towards the goals set forth by the international community to be achieved through the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world for the benefit of all mankind, thereby contributing significantly to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the promotion of the principles and purposes of the United Nations. In this context, it is recognized that the States of the region have a special interest and responsibility to promote regional co-operation for economic development and peace.

States of other regions, in particular militarily significant States, should scrupulously respect the South Atlantic region as a zone of peace and co-operation, especially through the reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence there, the non-introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and the non-extension into the region of rivalries and conflicts foreign to it.

All States of the region and of all other regions should co-operate in the elimination of all sources of tension in the zone, respect the national unity, sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of every State therein, refrain from the threat or use of force, and strictly observe the principle that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible.

The elimination of apartheid and the attainment of self-determination and independence by the people of Namibia, as well as the cessation of all acts of aggression and subversion against States in the zone are essential for peace and security in the region. To that end, implementation of all United Nations resolutions pertaining to colonialism, racism and apartheid is urgently required.]

[(e) South Pacific:

In view of the interest of States concerned to strengthen peace, security and co-operation in the area, steps should be taken in order to establish in the future a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Pacific. One positive development has been the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga which together with the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides a sound basis to fulfil that goal as long as the States Parties are free to pursue the non-military nuclearization of the South Pacific. The Non-Aligned Movement has also endorsed this proposal since 1975 and it supports its implementation.

*/ There was a proposal for the convening of a conference on the Mediterranean region (CD/CFD/WP.85).
The States of the South Pacific and other concerned States should co-operate to define and implement, as appropriate, such steps."

OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence-building measures

In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following, and other measures yet to be agreed upon, should be undertaken:

(a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tensions, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(b) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament;

(c) States should consider implementing measures based on the principles of openness and transparency, such as the provision of objective information on military matters.

2. Prevention of the use of force in international relations

(a) Strict adherence and full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any States or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

(b) Strengthening the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and full implementation of the decisions of the Security Council by all States Members of the United Nations in accordance with their obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter.

3. World public opinion in favour of disarmament

Knowledge of facts and opinions about the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it is an essential condition for world public opinion to mobilize in favour of disarmament. In order to inform world public opinion on
such issues, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information on these matters should be adopted in all regions in a balanced, factual and objective manner:

(a) Throughout the implementation of the programme, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should be encouraged, as appropriate, to undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connection with Disarmament Week.

(b) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

(c) The World Disarmament Campaign, which was solemnly launched by the General Assembly at the opening meeting of its second special session devoted to disarmament, should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions. The Campaign has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

(d) As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.

(e) Member States should be encouraged to make all efforts to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament issues, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the widest possible dissemination and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinion on the danger of the escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

4. Verification

Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the
participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections. Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage of negotiations on specific agreements. All States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties.

All States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements should strictly implement and fully comply with the entirety of the provisions of such agreements if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them. Any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties, but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements. Weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global and regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system. States parties should support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of such agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements.

[DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT]

1. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development, the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should make an effective contribution to economic and social development of all States, in particular of the developing countries. In this context, it is of particular significance that substantial progress in disarmament should be made in accordance with the responsibility that each State bears in the field of disarmament, so that real resources now being used for military purposes can be released to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

2. Disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries, by contributing towards reducing the economic disparities between developed and developing countries and establishing [the] [a] new international order on the basis of justice, equity and co-operation and towards solving other global problems.
3. The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

1. The Charter of the United Nations recognizes the role of disarmament in the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. International peace and security is to be achieved through a range of measures, arrangements and procedures, including those related to disarmament, designed to reduce and eventually eliminate the risk of war and bring about settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

3. In a situation where international peace and security prevail all countries would be able to live free from fear of the threats of use or the use of force by other States, free from pressures seeking to undermine their sovereignty and the fundamental economic, political, social and civil rights of their peoples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

4. Prior to, during, and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, all States should fulfil, in accordance with all relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, their obligations and responsibilities to maintain international peace and security.

Intermediate Stage *//

[1. The intermediate stage should start no later than 1990 and last five to seven years.

2. The USSR and the United States should go on with the reduction agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out further measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear systems.

3. Other nuclear-weapon States should pledge to freeze all their nuclear weapons and also not to station them in the territories of other countries.

4. All nuclear-weapon States should eliminate their tactical nuclear arms, i.e. weapons having a range (or radius of action) of up to 1,000 km. This measure should be taken after the completion by the USSR and the United States of the 50 per cent reduction of their nuclear weapons that can reach each other's territory.

5. The Soviet-American accord on the prohibition of space-strike weapons should become multilateral with the mandatory participation in it of major industrial States.

*/ The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation.
6. All nuclear-weapon States should cease nuclear-weapon tests.

7. There should be a ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction. [*]

   Last stage **/

[1. The last stage should begin no later than 1995. During this stage the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons should be completed. By the end of 1999 there should be no more nuclear weapons on earth.

2. A universal accord should be worked out to ensure that nuclear weapons never again come into being.

3. The last stage should be completed by the end of 1999.] ***/

VI. Machinery and Procedures

1. The United Nations [in accordance with the Charter,] should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament.

2. Negotiations on multilateral measures of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should, as a rule, be conducted in the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

3. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

4. The United Nations should be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

5. The Programme has three stages: the first stage, the intermediate stage and the last stage. The objective of the last stage is to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The general wish being to complete the disarmament process, all efforts should be made to implement each stage, as well as the Programme as a whole at the earliest possible date in such a way as to contribute to the security of States and enhance international security.

   [*] Some delegations reserved their position on these paragraphs which represent the position of one group of States.

   **/ The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation.

   ***/ Some delegations reserved their position on these paragraphs which represent the position of one group of States.
In the first stage of the Programme, all States should make maximum efforts towards implementation of the priority measures and as many other measures included therein as possible.

Those measures that have not been implemented by the end of the first stage will be included in the intermediate stage. The scope of disarmament measures during the intermediate stage will depend on the progress made in the implementation of the first stage. In addition, the intermediate stage comprises the measures necessary to prepare for the last stage. The time of the implementation of the intermediate stage would depend on the measures included therein.

The last stage comprises the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the implementation of other measures necessary to assure that, by the end of the stage, general and complete disarmament under effective international control will have been achieved.

6. All efforts should be made by States, particularly through the conduct of negotiations in good faith, on specific arms limitation and disarmament measures, to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament, as defined in the Comprehensive Programme. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of this ultimate goal, there shall be reviews - including at special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - of the implementation of the measures included in the various stages of the Comprehensive Programme. The first such review will take place on a date to be decided by the United Nations General Assembly and will:

(a) review the implementation of measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme;

(b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress in its implementation;

(c) elaborate, if necessary, in more concrete terms further measures, taking into account the progress made so far and other relevant developments; and

(d) recommend the date of the next review.

7. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at special sessions, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included on the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.
8. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, consider and recommend further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme.

9. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission shall continue functioning as a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, and shall consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament.

10. Proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session and annex II of the Concluding Document of the second special session devoted to disarmament should be considered, and decisions taken, at an appropriate time.

11. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.
# REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE</td>
<td>2 - 20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. 1992 Session of the Conference</td>
<td>2 - 4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Participants in the Work of the Conference</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Agenda and Programme of Work for the 1992 Session</td>
<td>6 - 8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Attendance and Participation of States not members of the Conference</td>
<td>9 - 10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Expansion of the membership of the Conference</td>
<td>11 - 14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference</td>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING ITS 1992 SESSION</td>
<td>21 - 119</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Nuclear Test Ban</td>
<td>25 - 34</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament</td>
<td>35 - 56</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Matters</td>
<td>57 - 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Weapons</td>
<td>72 - 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space</td>
<td>75 - 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>77 - 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament</td>
<td>83 - 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency in Armaments</td>
<td>91 - 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</td>
<td>112 - 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX I

CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text on the establishment of a Preparatory Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material to be transmitted to the Preparatory Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
H. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

83. Bearing in mind the conclusions reached by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in its report to the Conference on Disarmament in 1989 to the effect that "it should resume work with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard", (CD/955, para. 7), the Conference continued to consider the question of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at its plenary meetings.

84. In conformity with the decision taken by the Conference at its 1990 session on its improved and effective functioning (CD/1036), at the 612th plenary meeting on 13 February 1992, the President of the Conference appointed Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt as Special Coordinator charged with seeking consensus on an appropriate organizational arrangement for agenda item 8. The Special Coordinator conducted informal consultations during the first and second parts of the 1992 session. He reported to the President that, as there had been no significant changes in the positions of delegations, those consultations had been inconclusive.

85. Twenty delegations of the Group of 21 reiterated the importance they attached to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. They referred to resolution 46/38 B which had been adopted by the forty-sixth General Assembly by 123 votes in favour. They felt therefore that a majority of the international community clearly favoured the continuation and conclusion of the work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The resolution recommended the conclusion of the work on the CPD which embraced issues which recently have been the subject of many important international gatherings. These included the role of the United Nations and the continuing relevance of its Charter; the efforts to ensure peace, stability and cooperation; the commitment to collective security; peace-keeping efforts;
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects regarding weapons of mass destruction, to name but a few of those brought to the attention of the international community in the final statement of the Security Council summit held in New York on 31 January 1992 and which have already been examined in depth in the multilateral negotiations that have been devoted throughout the years to a CPD. For this reason, among others, the significance that the large majority of countries attributed to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should not be mistakenly interpreted as the inertia of yesterday's priorities, but rather as the harbinger of a viable and practical way to approach the issues of today. The basic reasoning behind resolution 46/38 B, stated in preambular paragraphs, was that "a comprehensive programme of disarmament would provide an appropriate framework for the various multilateral, bilateral and unilateral initiatives and proposals put forward recently", and added: "Considering that the present international situation is conducive to a renewed effort towards the conclusion of the comprehensive programme of disarmament". Those delegations then referred to the conclusion drawn in the 1989 final report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly regarding the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Committee agreed that it should resume work with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard. Reminders that the international climate had changed abounded and was perhaps more conducive to greater multilateral understanding and cooperation. Yet the Conference on Disarmament was not able to implement resolution 46/38 B which called for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the solution of the outstanding issues and conclusion of those negotiations. Those delegations were convinced that a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would be beneficial to all States in seeking to establish an agreed framework for future multilateral disarmament negotiations.

86. Two delegations of the Group of 21 felt that the new international situation motivated a fresh look to be taken with regard to the agenda item on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should, according to these two delegations, consider, without prejudice, in which way the notions and ideas comprised in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be dealt with in the new international context.

87. At the same meeting, a nuclear-weapon State, not member of any group, expressed its support for the above proposal by 20 delegations of the Group of 21. It reiterated the importance it attached to agenda item 8. In the view of this delegation, in the present circumstances it was appropriate to resume work on the formulation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/38 B, so as to build on the texts already agreed to, with a view to resolving the outstanding issues.

88. The Western Group referred to resolution 46/38 B adopted in December 1991 by the forty-sixth General Assembly of the United Nations and invited delegates to take a close look at the voting pattern pertaining to this text. Whilst it was true that 123 votes were cast in favour, the group underlined that 6 countries expressed negative votes and no less than 32 others
abstained. It was also worth noting that these abstentions stemmed from
delegations belonging to all groups. This result not only showed growing
overall reservations about this subject but also underlined that present
circumstances were no more conducive to making progress on the Comprehensive
Programme of Disarmament than they were in previous years. Moreover, the
group pointed out that of those who voted negatively or abstained, 18 were
members of the Conference on Disarmament. This demonstrated clearly that
there was no consensus on this question.

89. The Group of East European and other States considered that the
proportion of votes cast for resolution 46/38 B during the last
General Assembly of the United Nations had clearly indicated the different
views which still exist on this question. The Group underlined that its
position had not changed with respect to the conclusion reached by the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in 1989 on "resuming
work with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when
circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard". The
Group believed that the Conference on Disarmament itself was able to find
various appropriate ways to transform all the positive international changes
that have occurred into a constructive process aimed at successful
negotiations on multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements in the
future.

90. It was agreed that the organizational framework to deal with this agenda
item, as in the case of other agenda items, be considered at the beginning of
the 1993 session.


I would be grateful if this could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all member States and non-member participant States of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Statement by President Clinton for the Opening of the 1997 CD Session

In my message to the Conference on Disarmament three years ago, I urged the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest possible time. Your success in that negotiation, and the subsequent adoption of the Treaty by the United Nations General Assembly, will help create a safer world. The successful conclusion of the negotiation is evidence of the Conference's potential to respond to the challenges it now faces.

Now the Conference on Disarmament should take the next steps on the road to a more secure world:

-- prompt conclusion of a ban on producing fissile material for use in nuclear explosives. Effectively cutting off the spigot for more nuclear weapons is a necessary step toward, and would greatly contribute to, the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.

-- negotiation as soon as possible of a comprehensive, global ban on anti-personnel landmines. These weapons of war have caused terrible suffering to innocent civilians and represent an enormous obstacle to restoring a more hopeful life after a conflict has ended. All the children of the world deserve to walk the earth in safety.

I call on the Conference to press forward with a renewed sense of purpose, to demonstrate to the world its capability to take these key steps to advance the process of nuclear and conventional disarmament.
LETTER DATED 21 JANUARY 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE AND A FACT SHEET
ON UNITED STATES' INITIATIVES ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

Attached is a copy of a Statement by the Press Secretary of the White
House on Anti-Personnel Landmines and a Fact Sheet on United States'

I would be grateful if these texts could be issued as an official
document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all member States
and non-member participant States of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.97-60102
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
January 17, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

United States Announces Next Steps on Anti-Personnel Landmines

President Clinton today announced that when the Conference on Disarmament opens its 1997 session in Geneva on Monday, the United States will seek to initiate negotiations on a worldwide treaty banning the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. As the President said before the UN General Assembly in September, "Our children deserve to walk the earth in safety." The United States hopes that the nations of the world will work with us to create that safety and ban the scourge of landmines, which every year kill or wound more than 25,000 civilians.

To give further impetus to this effort, the President has decided that the United States will observe a permanent ban on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. This action builds on the Landmine Export Moratorium Act sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy, which has temporarily prohibited the export and transfer of these weapons since 1992. We urge all other nations to join us in stopping the export and transfer of these mines, which will both hasten the completion of a comprehensive ban and save many innocent lives. As another step toward a ban, the President has decided to cap our anti-personnel landmine stockpile at the current level of inventory.

President Clinton last May announced the United States's intention to achieve as soon as possible a worldwide ban on landmines. In December in the UN General Assembly, nations voted 155-0 in favor of the U.S.-initiated resolution urging states to pursue such an agreement.
After extensive consultations with many countries, the President believes that the Conference on Disarmament offers the most practical and effective forum for achieving our aim of a ban that is global. Both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention were successfully negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament.

The United States looks forward to the opening of the Conference on Disarmament on Monday as an opportunity to begin discussion of these initiatives and to make early progress on starting negotiations. At the same time, the United States welcomes efforts outside that forum, including the free-standing process initiated by Canada, that can help provide momentum to our common goal.

# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 17, 1997

FACT SHEET

U.S. Initiatives on Anti-Personnel Landmines

People in 64 countries, mostly in the developing world, face a daily threat of being killed or maimed by the estimated 100 million landmines buried around the globe. The United States is committed to ending the carnage and devastation caused by anti-personnel landmines (APL) -- the hidden killers that murder and maim more than 25,000 people every year. In addition to those steps announced today, the United States has already undertaken a number of important actions.

Negotiations to Ban APL

On May 16, 1996, the President announced a new U.S. APL policy, which included a commitment to aggressively pursue an international agreement to ban use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible.

On December 10, in the UN General Assembly, nations voted overwhelmingly (155-0) in favor of the U.S.-initiated resolution urging states to pursue an agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines.

Today we announced that, at the opening of the Conference on Disarmament on January 20, the United States will begin work with other member nations to initiate negotiations on an agreement to ban APL. This 61-member forum in Geneva, Switzerland includes most of the world's strongest landmine ban advocates and most of the world's major APL producers. It is
the forum in which the recently-signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was negotiated, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

APL Export and Transfer Ban

Since 1992, the United States has observed by law a temporary moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, but this law expires in three years.

Today, we announced that the United States will observe a permanent ban on export and transfer of APL. We encourage all other nations to join us in a permanent ban on APL export and transfer to end forever the spread of these weapons.

APL Stockpile

As the President announced in May, the United States plans to destroy by the end of 1999 about three million non-self-destructing APL. Destruction of these mines is well underway. The United States will retain only those non-self-destructing APL needed for training and for defense in Korea.

Today we announced that the United States will cap its APL stockpile at the current level of inventory. We encourage other nations to do so as well.

APL Use Restrictions

On January 7, the President transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the amended Mines Protocol to the 58-nation Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The United States led the effort to strengthen the Protocol, which establishes new norms that can protect civilians, even as countries work toward the goal of an APL ban.

The Protocol now expands the scope of the original Protocol to include internal armed conflicts, where most civilian mine casualties have occurred; requires that all remotely-delivered anti-personnel landmines be equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features to a very high degree of reliability; requires that all
non-self-destructing mines only be used within marked and monitored fields; and that all APL be detectable, to facilitate mine clearance.

Expanding Demining Capabilities

In May 1996, the President directed the Department of Defense to significantly expand its humanitarian demining program to train and assist other countries in developing effective demining programs.

The Department of Defense was also directed last May to undertake a substantial program to develop improved mine detection and clearing technology and to share this improved technology with the broader international community. Research and development funding for this effort was increased in Fiscal Year 1997 to $14.7m.

# # #
The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item --- of its agenda on a "Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines" to negotiate, for conclusion at the earliest possible date, a universal, effectively verifiable and legally-binding international agreement to ban totally the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.

As a vital first step towards such an agreement, the Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal, effectively verifiable and legally-binding international agreement to ban totally the export, import or transfer of all types of anti-personnel landmines, as well as of their components and of anti-personnel landmine technology.

The Conference further directs the Ad Hoc Committee to consider and make recommendations on the further steps necessary to achieve the goal of a universal, effectively verifiable and legally-binding international agreement to ban totally the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.
Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, in particular the amended Protocol II, as well as all relevant existing proposals and future initiatives.

The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1997 session.
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1444
4 February 1997

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 JANUARY 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA
TRANSMITTING THE "FEDERAL LAW ON THE BAN OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES"
ADOPTED BY THE AUSTRIAN PARLIAMENT

I have the honour to transmit to you in the annex a working translation into English of the
"Federal Law on the Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines" recently adopted by the Austrian
Parliament.

Austria was a co-sponsor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45/S "An
international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines" adopted on 10 December 1996 and
has observed an export-moratorium for anti-personnel mines since October 1994. In the
course of the year 1995 Austria has destroyed completely its remaining stocks of anti-
personnel mines. With the above mentioned Federal Law, Austria has now taken a further
effective step on the national level in order to fulfil its solemn commitment to ban totally the
use, stockpiling, production and transfer anti-personnel landmines.

On the multilateral level, Austria is a staunch supporter of the efforts to complete as soon as
possible an effective, legally binding international agreement on a total ban of anti-personnel
landmines. In this context, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Austria has
already distributed through its embassies a first tentative draft of such a convention and has
invited comments thereon. As I have stated in my recent intervention in the Plenary of the
Conference on Disarmament, Austria now - as a further step - invites all interested States to an
expert meeting on the text of a convention on the total ban of anti-personnel mines. This
meeting is going to take place in Vienna from 12th to 14th February 1997 and will proceed on
the basis of the above mentioned first Austrian draft convention.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for this letter and its annex to
be distributed as an official CD document to all delegations participating in the work on the
Conference.

(Signed): Harald Kreid
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.97-60160
FEDERAL LAW ON THE BAN OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
(Working translation)

DEFINITIONS

ARTICLE 1

In the context of this Federal Law:
1. „Anti-personnel mine“ means a means of combat designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to detonate or explode by the presence, proximity or contact of persons,

2. „Anti-detection mechanism“ means a device designed to bring an anti-personnel mine to explosion or detonation by the use of a mine-detecting device.

PROHIBITIONS

ARTICLE 2

The production, acquisition, sale, procurement, import, export, transit, use and possession of anti-personnel mines as well as of anti-detection mechanisms shall be prohibited.

RESTRICTIONS

ARTICLE 3

1. Mines earmarked exclusively for training purposes within the Federal Army or the Mine Clearance Service or the Explosives Disposal Service are not subject to the prohibition set out in Article 2.

2. The import, possession and the stockpiling of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of immediate delaboration or other ways of destruction are not subject to the prohibition set out in Article 2.

DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING STOCKPILES

ARTICLE 4

Existing stockpiles of anti-personnel mines or anti-detection mechanisms prohibited under Article 2 shall be reported to the Federal Ministry of the Interior within one month and shall be destroyed by the said ministry not later than one year after the entry into force of this Federal Law upon reimbursement of costs.
Penalty

Article 5

Whoever, and even if only by negligence, contravenes the prohibition of Article 2 of this Federal Law, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to two years or a fine of up to 360 daily rates, if the offence is not subject to a more severe penalty under an other Federal Law.

Confiscation and Forfeiture

Article 6

1. Anti-personnel mines or anti-detection mechanisms as well as components thereof which are object of an act punishable under Article 5 shall be confiscated by court order.

2. Machines and facilities used in the production of items under the prohibition set out in Article 2 can be declared forfeited by the court. They shall be secured at the owner’s expense so that those items cannot be further used in contravention of the prohibition set out in Article 2.

3. Means used to transport items under the prohibition of Article 2 may be declared forfeited by the court.

4. Items under forfeiture according to paragraphs 2 and 3 shall become property of the Federation. Items confiscated under paragraph 1 shall become property of the Federation and must be reported to the Federal Ministry of the Interior for destruction in accordance with Article 4.

Execution

Article 7

Entrusted with the execution of this Federal Law are:

1. With respect to Article 3, paragraph 1 the Federal Minister of the Interior and the Federal Minister of Defence,

2. with respect to articles 5 and 6 the Federal Minister of Justice and

3. with respect to the other provisions the Federal Minister of the Interior.

Entry into Force

Article 8

This Federal Law enters into force on 1 January 1997.
1. The Conference on Disarmament decides, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to establish:

I. An Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 4 "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" with the mandate as described in CD/1121.

II. An Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 7 to consider means of promoting transparency in armaments.

2. The Conference also decides to appoint a special coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with issues under agenda item 1.

3. The Conference decides further to appoint a special coordinator to seek the views of its members within agenda item 6 on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the issues on which consensus could be achieved.

4. The special coordinators appointed under paragraphs 2 and 3 above shall present an interim report at the end of May and a final report not later than mid-June 1997 to the Conference.

I have the honour to attach, for circulation in an official document of the Conference, a press statement dated 20 February 1997 by the Minister of Defence concerning the policy of the South African Government on anti-personnel landmines and the message from President Mandela to the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines, Maputo, 25 to 28 February 1997.

(Signed): J.S. Selebi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.97-60770

QUOTE

Members of the media,

Thank you for your attendance here today.

Together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I have called this press conference to announce the policy position of the South African Government on anti-personnel landmines.

I am pleased to inform you that, on my recommendation and motivation, Cabinet decided, on the 19th of February 1997, to ban the use, development, production and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines - with immediate effect.

We thereby fully endorse the conviction of the International Committee of the Red Cross, that, and I quote:

"The limited military utility of anti-personnel mines is far outweighed by the appalling humanitarian consequences of their use in actual conflicts.

On this basis their prohibition and elimination should be pursued as a matter of utmost urgency by governments and the entire international community".

Ladies and Gentlemen, in adopting this position, the South African Government, through our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is reinforcing efforts to bring about a universal ban on these mines and their complete elimination.

We will resolutely pursue this objective, and do everything possible to encourage and influence governments and international institutions to adopt this position.

Our commitment in this respect is a matter of record since our accession to office.

In 1994 we announced a moratorium on the export of all land mines. This was followed, in 1996, by a complete ban on exports of all forms of land mines. And yesterday, the 19th of February 1997, this commitment was taken a step further when Cabinet decided on a total prohibition on the use, development, production and stockpiling of anti-personnel land mines - with immediate effect.

In terms of this decision, we will be preparing to destroy our stockpile of existing anti-personnel land mines, which amount to 160 000. We will be retaining a very limited and verifiable number of anti-personnel land mines, solely for training specific military
personnel in de-mining techniques and for research into assisting the de-mining process. All de-mining training and research will be carried out under the strictest government supervision and control.

I must stress, that until all countries have co-operated in eliminating all stockpiles of anti-personnel land mines, there is no guarantee that they may not be used. As long as the threat exists, our National Defence Force must be capable of dealing with the need to de-activate and clear this menace, and to neutralise it if we are confronted by it in an operational situation. It therefore follows that we must maintain the capability and skill required to perform that task.

Cabinet's decision reflects our determination to help rid the world of the problem of anti-personnel land mines. Each month these mines kill or maim some 2 000 victims around the world - the vast majority of whom are civilians. Their indiscriminate use has had a devastating effect - internationally, in Africa and in our region. In Angola, the number of amputations, resulting from anti-personnel mines, is, tragically, one of the highest in the world, and in Mozambique, thousands of these mines remain uncleared. The injuries from these mines impose an intolerable burden on civil society and a severe constraint on reconstruction and developmental needs.

A heavy responsibility lies on the more developed countries, capable of producing this weapon, to cease production, export and use.

This grave international problem can only be addressed by concerted international acting to restrict the availability and use of land mines, and to alleviate the suffering they cause.

We believe it is possible to confront the menace, and South Africa will do everything possible to assist in the eradication of anti-personnel land mines from the face of our globe.

On a practical level:

At the UN International Meeting on Mine Clearance, held in Geneva in 1995, South Africa pledged assistance to training programmes for the UN Stand-By Capacity for mine clearance - involving management of de-mining, mine lifting and mine awareness.

Regionally, we signed a Declaration of Intent with the Government of Mozambique in 1995, whereby both governments will co-operate in de-mining efforts.

And South Africa is assisting Angola through the training of de-mining personnel for the Angolan De-Mining Institute.

Furthermore, a South African company specialising in de-mining, is involved in de-mining activities in Angola in co-operation with the
United Nations.

In March 1996, we became a State Party to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols) - CCW - Which amongst other things, restricts the use of land mines.

In additional to the aforementioned measures, South Africa is a signatory to the Ottawa Declaration of October 1996 - working for a global ban on anti-personnel landmines.

And South Africa was one of the original co-sponsors of the December 1996 UN General Assembly Resolution - supported by 155 countries - on "An international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines".

The ban I have announced today is an integral part of our Government's overall commitment to the promotion of international peace and security.

With this announcement, we give our fullest support and endorsement of the Fourth International NGO Conference of Land Mines, which will be held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 25 – 28 February 1997.

I pledge that we will do everything possible to help rid the world of the menace of the anti-personnel land mine.

I thank you.

UNQUOTE
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NELSON MANDELA TO THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL NGO CONFERENCE ON LANDMINES, MAPUTO, 25 - 28 FEBRUARY 1997

QUOTE

The indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines has brought immense suffering to Africa. These terrible weapons are causing death and inhumane injuries to our people. They place severe constraints on reconstruction and development, particularly in rural areas. The legacy of millions of emplaced landmines in Southern Africa, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, have left areas uninhabitable and will pose significant challenges to the region's limited resources and great development needs.

This grave problem can only be addressed by concerted international action which deals with it in a comprehensive manner, and restricts the availability and use of landmines and alleviating the suffering they cause.

South Africa remains fully committed to the Ottawa Declaration we subscribed to in October 1996. In that context we would want to work with others to ensure the earliest possible conclusion of a legally-binding international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines.

South Africa will furthermore do everything possible to assist in the eradication of anti-personnel landmines. In this regard I give our fullest support and endorsement of the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines.

Nelson Mandela
President
Republic of South Africa

UNQUOTE
CHILE, FINLAND, POLAND

Proposal to appoint a
Special Coordinator on Anti-Personnel Landmines

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the question of anti-personnel landmines under agenda item 6.

2. The Special Coordinator shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of May 1997.
HUNGARY, JAPAN

Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a "Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines"

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 6 of its agenda to negotiate an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.
CONFERECE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1456
15 May 1997
Original: ENGLISH

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CANADA

Views on the Conference on Disarmament’s agenda and programme of work

Current Debate

With regard to the three issues currently the major focus for debate on Canada’s position is:

Nuclear Weapons

The CD must address nuclear disarmament, it should establish a mechanism for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more issues should be the subject of negotiation.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

The CD should establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, based on the Shannon Paper and the mandate therein.

Anti-Personnel Landmines

Canada does not object to the proposal by Chile, Finland and Poland to appoint a Special Coordinator on Anti-Personnel Landmines.

CD Agenda/Work Programme

In putting forward the above current positions, Canada maintains its views on the CD Agenda/Work Programme as set out in its overview paper of January 21, 1997:

GE.97-61174
Proposed Work Programme

1. Weapons of Mass Destruction/Nuclear Disarmament
   - Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices
   - Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

2. Conventional Disarmament
   - Transparency in armaments
   - Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers

3. Outer Space
   - Legally-binding Instrument to Prevent the Weaponization of Outer Space

4. Consideration and adoption of annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations
AUSTRALIA

Draft Decision

Without prejudice to its ongoing efforts to establish the Programme of Work for its 1997 session and in order to facilitate them, the Conference on Disarmament decides:

1. To appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the question of anti-personal landmines under agenda item 6.

2. The Special Coordinator shall take into consideration all relevant proposals, present and future.

3. The Special Coordinator shall present an early report to the Conference on Disarmament.
LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TRANSMITTING A SUMMARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
EXPERT MEETING ON POSSIBLE VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR A
CONVENTION TO BAN ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES, HELD IN KÖNIGSWINTER,
GERMANY, ON 24 AND 25 APRIL 1997

I have the honour to refer to the statement made by the German
delegation in the 762nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on
27 March 1997 informing the Conference on the International Expert Meeting on
possible verification measures for a convention to ban anti-personnel
landmines on 24 and 25 April 1997 in Königswinter, Germany. The German
Government welcomes the fruitful discussions during this expert meeting, in
which 120 States participated, as a valuable impetus to the broad
international discussion on the issue of the verification of a future
convention banning anti-personnel landmines, as well as on the convention
itself.

The German Government has announced its intention to forward the results
of these discussions to the participating States as well as to international
fora concerned with the mines problem. In consequence, I have the honour to
attach a summary of the discussions during this expert meeting and would be
very grateful if this summary could be issued as an official document of the
Conference on Disarmament and be distributed to delegations of all States
Members of the Conference and of non-member States participating in the work
of the Conference.

(Signed): Dr. Günther Seibert
Ambassador

GE.97-61242
International Expert Meeting on Possible Verification Measures for a Convention to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines
Königswinter, 24 and 25 April 1997
SUMMARY

In Resolution 51/45 S. which was supported by 156 states, the UN General Assembly called for an "effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines with a view to completing the negotiations as soon as possible". In the international debate aimed at such an agreement the question of its verification proved to be complex and difficult. It became clear that it was necessary to discuss this issue in greater detail.

On Germany's initiative the "International Expert Meeting on Possible Verification Measures for a Convention to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines", which was to discuss the components of a possible verification system without entering into negotiations, therefore took place in Königswinter on 24 and 25 April 1997. In its invitation, Germany had agreed to draw up a short summary of the discussion not binding on the participants.

Just under half of the 120 participating states took part in the exchange of views by presenting statements. Some states pointed out that silence on individual areas of the discussion does not imply consent. The expert meeting gave further impetus to the broad international discussion on the issue of the verification of a future convention banning APL, as well as of the convention itself. The starting-point for the exchange of views was an option paper on verification submitted by Germany which included tried and tested elements from arms-control treaties (information exchange, routine and challenge inspections). A number of states circulated position papers. In the main the exchange of views went as follows:

There was widespread agreement that, in view of the urgency of resolving the humanitarian problems caused by the irresponsible use of anti-personnel landmines, it is essential that an international convention on the comprehensive banning of anti-personnel landmines (use, production, stockpiling, export) be concluded as soon as possible. Two different approaches were put forward on the nature of the envisaged convention. While some delegations regarded the
convention primarily as an international humanitarian treaty. Others considered it to be mainly an arms control agreement. These differing basic approaches also marked the debate on verification.

The advocates of a humanitarian convention spoke in favour of the quickest possible conclusion of a binding international convention banning anti-personnel landmines. In their view, traditional verification systems, such as the ones designed for weapons of mass destruction, cannot be applied due to the special nature of the APL (small, easy to transport, weapons of defence rather than attack from a tactical point of view). Essentially verification had to be restricted to voluntary measures by states. This would mean limiting it to a loose network of transparency and co-operation measures, regular revision of the treaty, international co-operation, information exchanges, as well as systematic reporting. Violations of convention provisions should, in addition, be deterred by means of national penal provisions.

In contrast, a number of states held the view that, despite its humanitarian character, the envisaged convention banning anti-personnel landmines had to be regarded partly, if not largely, as an arms-control instrument. Although the military effectiveness of APL was questionable and utterly out of proportion with the humanitarian consequences of their use, relinquishing an entire category of weapons would still represent a disarmament measure. Transparency and confidence were most likely to develop if the observance of treaty provisions were to be made verifiable through a reliable and detailed verification system.

Numerous states spoke in favour of an efficient and cost-effective verification system which takes into account the special requirements of this category of weapons. Several participants named the following elements as possible components of a verification system, in some cases with reference to arrangements in other conventions (e.g. CWC, CCW):

- transparency through a comprehensive information exchange by way of a reporting system subject to time-limits and, as a prerequisite to this, an obligation to take effective legislative and administrative implementation measures;

- co-operation and consultation among the states parties to resolve substantive issues and disputes;

- prosecution of treaty violations as well as regular revision of the efficiency of the convention with the possibility of renegotiation:
- fact-finding on the ground in order to monitor the national measures taken within the framework of transparency and, where there is sufficient evidence, to follow up on treaty violations:

- inclusion of the United Nations in verification.

During the debate some support began to emerge for a middle course combining comprehensive co-operation and transparency measures with the possibility of effective fact-finding. Important areas of a future convention - production, export, use, destruction of stockpiles and the treatment of minefields - may require differentiated verification measures. Routine inspections were given little chance of realization in statements at the conference.

The representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross advocated a verification regime on a voluntary basis. The ICBL representatives argued in favour of a slim-line regime and referred to their proposals of December 1996 on formulating a verification regime. The representative of the United Nations emphasized that the Austrian draft treaty as well as various elements discussed at the conference assigned to the Secretary-General as depositary tasks which exceeded what has hitherto been the norm. The international community could, he said, provide for such an arrangement in a convention but would then have to equip the Secretary-General to fulfil the tasks assigned to him, not least financially.
LETTER DATED 22 MAY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING TWO PUBLICATIONS ENTITLED "SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY" AND "ANTI-PERSONNEL LAND MINES BAN: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY" 1/

I have attached two publications produced by the Canadian Government, which I hope will further advance our consideration of the issues before us: "Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Annotated Bibliography" and "Anti-Personnel Land Mines Ban: An Annotated Bibliography".

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for distribution of these two publications to all member and participating non-member state delegations, under cover of a CD number.

(Signed): Mark Moher
Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of these publications in English only has been made available to the members and non-members invited to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

GE.97-61319
GROUP OF 21

Proposal on the Programme of Work

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish:
   I. An Ad Hoc Committee for agenda item 1 "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".
   II. An Ad Hoc Committee for agenda item 3 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".
   III. An Ad Hoc Committee for agenda item 4 "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

2. The Conference decides to appoint a Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on agenda item 6 "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" with a special reference to the issue of anti-personnel landmines.

3. The Conference also decides to appoint a Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on agenda item 7 "Transparency in armaments".

4. The Conference decides further to appoint Special Coordinators to carry out consultations on the issues of its expansion and agenda as well as improved and effective functioning.

* * * * *

The Group of 21 continues to attach the highest priority to the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament under agenda item 1.

The Group of 21 has presented on 14 March 1996 a proposal for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, as contained in document CD/1388.

In this context, a specific proposal on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee will be presented in the near future.
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1464
17 June 1997
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF ITALY ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
ON THE POLICY ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES ISSUED ON 13 JUNE 1997

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a statement issued by
the Italian Government on 13 June 1997 on the Policy on Anti-personnel
Landmines.

I would be grateful if this text could be registered as an official
document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all member States
and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Giuseppe Baldoni Acqua
Ambassador
STATEMENT OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT 
ON THE POLICY ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES 
ISSUED ON 13 JUNE 1997

To integrate the measures already adopted on the ban of production and export of APLs and the initiation of their destruction, the Italian Government agreed on the opportunity to renounce to the operational use of anti-personnel landmines. The decision, which responds to the needs expressed by the internal and international public opinion, has been adopted in order to contribute to reaching a solid international understanding and a definitive solution to the problem caused by APLs.

To this end, consistently with the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly as well as with the objectives of the E.U., Italy will continue to actively operate in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and to follow the "Ottawa Process" so that - through the complementarity of the actions in the two fora - the International community be able to design a set of effective norms supported by the largest possible number of States.
AUSTRALIA

Draft Decision

Without prejudice to, and within the context of, its urgent ongoing efforts to establish a Programme of Work for its 1997 session and to set up mechanisms, as appropriate, for other agenda items of the Conference, and in order to facilitate these efforts, the Conference on Disarmament decides:

1. To appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations on a possible mandate on the question of anti-personnel landmines under agenda item 6.

2. The Special Coordinator shall take into consideration all relevant proposals and views, present and future.

3. The Special Coordinator shall present an early report to the Conference on Disarmament.
LETTER DATED 9 JULY 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, TRANSMITTING THE CLOSING DOCUMENT OF THE BRUSSELS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR A GLOBAL BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

The Office of the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit below the closing document of the Brussels International Conference for a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines.

This document contains the final Declaration of the Conference and the statement introducing it made by Mr. Erik Derycke, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium. Also annexed is the report made to Mr. Erik Derycke by Mr. André Mernier, Ambassador, Secretary-General of the Conference, after the first two days.

The Office of the Permanent Representative of Belgium requests the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament to make the necessary arrangements for these documents to be circulated as official documents of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.
DECLARATION FOR THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

The following States met in Brussels from 24 to 27 June 1997 to pursue an enduring solution to the urgent humanitarian crisis caused by anti-personnel landmines. They are convinced that this solution must include the early conclusion of a comprehensive ban on anti-personnel landmines.

They recall that United Nations General Assembly resolution 51/45 S supported by 156 States urged the vigorous pursuit of "an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines".

In that spirit they affirm that the essential elements of such an agreement should include:

- a comprehensive ban on the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines
- the destruction of stockpiled and removed anti-personnel landmines
- international cooperation and assistance in the field of mine clearance in affected countries.

The following States,

Encouraged by the work of the Brussels Conference,

Encouraged further by numerous national and regional initiatives and measures taken to eliminate anti-personnel landmines,

Encouraged by the attention given to this subject by the United Nations and by other forums,

Encouraged, finally, by the active support of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations,

Welcome the convening of a Diplomatic Conference by the Government of Norway in Oslo on 1 September 1997 to negotiate such an agreement;

Also welcome the important work done by the Government of Austria on the text of a draft agreement which contains the essential elements identified above and decide to forward it to the Oslo Diplomatic Conference in order to be considered together with other relevant proposals which may be put forward there;

Affirm their objective of concluding the negotiation and signing of such an agreement banning anti-personnel landmines before the end of 1997 in Ottawa;

Invite all other States to join them in their efforts towards such an agreement.
Annex 1

STATEMENT BY MR. ERIK DERYCKE, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

Your Excellencies,

Distinguished Heads of Delegations,

Distinguished Delegates,

We are now on the point of closing the work of the Brussels Conference. It was the Conference's intention that its debates should culminate in a political declaration, the text of which was circulated well before the Conference and was familiar to everybody.

I have pleasure in announcing that today 97 countries have acceded to this Declaration and thus given their support to the objectives of the Ottawa Process, indicating their desire to arrive at a treaty by the end of December 1997.

I would fail in my duties as President if I did not underline at this decisive moment of the Brussels Conference the considerable interest many times repeated by a large number of delegations in victim assistance. I consider as President of this Conference and as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium that this constitutes an essential element of the Ottawa Process.

The Declaration of the Brussels Conference is adopted.

The Declaration will be published, together with the statement I have just made introducing it and the list of countries that have associated themselves with it.

This Declaration, my statement and the list of countries that have associated themselves with the Declaration will be sent to you through the usual diplomatic channels.
Annex 2

LIST OF COUNTRIES ASSOCIATING THEMSELVES WITH THE POLICY DECLARATION OF THE BRUSSELS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR A GLOBAL BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

27 June, 9.30 a.m.

1. Angola
2. Antigua and Barbuda (CARICOM)
3. Austria
4. Bahamas (CARICOM)
5. Barbados (CARICOM)
6. Belgium
7. Belize (CARICOM)
8. Benin
9. Bolivia
10. Bosnia and Herzegovina
11. Botswana
12. Brazil
13. Burkina Faso
14. Cambodia
15. Cameroon
16. Canada
17. Cape Verde
18. Chad
19. Colombia
20. Costa Rica
21. Côte d'Ivoire
22. Croatia
23. Czech Republic
24. Denmark
25. Dominica (CARICOM)
26. Ecuador
27. El Salvador
28. Ethiopia
29. Fiji
30. France
31. Gabon
32. Germany
33. Ghana
34. Grenada (CARICOM)
35. Guatemala
36. Guinea
37. Guyana (CARICOM)
38. Haiti
39. Holy See
40. Honduras
41. Hungary
42. Ireland
43. Italy
44. Jamaica (CARICOM)
45. Jordan
46. Lesotho
47. Liechtenstein
48. Luxembourg
49. Malawi
50. Malaysia
51. Mali
52. Malta
53. Mauritania
54. Mexico
55. Monaco
56. Mozambique
57. Namibia
58. Netherlands
59. New Zealand
60. Nicaragua
61. Norway
62. Panama
63. Papua New Guinea
64. Paraguay
65. Peru
66. Philippines
67. Portugal
68. Qatar
69. Republic of the Congo
70. Republic of Moldova
71. Rwanda
72. Saint Kitts and Nevis (CARICOM)
73. Saint Lucia (CARICOM)
74. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (CARICOM)
75. San Marino
76. Senegal
77. Seychelles
78. Slovakia
79. Slovenia
80. South Africa
81. Spain
82. Sudan
83. Suriname (CARICOM)
84. Swaziland
85. Sweden
86. Switzerland
87. Tanzania
88. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
89. Togo
90. Trinidad and Tobago (CARICOM)
91. Turkmenistan
92. United Kingdom
93. Uruguay
94. Venezuela
95. Yemen
96. Zambia
97. Zimbabwe
Annex 2

Brussels International Conference for a Comprehensive Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines
(24-27 June 1997)

Report by Mr. Mernier, Ambassador, on the results of the work of the first part of the Conference

Your Excellency,

Distinguished Delegates,

At the end of the first part of the Brussels International Conference for a Comprehensive Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines, I have the honour to report to you on the work of the last two days.

With more than 150 States participating, the Brussels International Conference has shown, insofar as there was any need for it, the vitality and appeal of the Ottawa Process. At this stage in the proceedings, it seems we are ready to move on from the political phase to the negotiation phase.

The Brussels Conference constitutes an important step leading up to the Diplomatic Conference which will start in Oslo on 1 September next. We are very pleased to inform you that this morning more than 79 countries have already expressed their support for the Brussels Declaration and we wish to thank all those countries for having done so. May I stress that, having put the credibility level at 45, we are pleased with this magnificent result.

Our discussions of the past two days have provided a most valuable starting point for the Oslo Diplomatic Conference, together with the draft treaty prepared by Austria, the quality of which was recognized by all.

But the purpose of our meeting here in Brussels was not to engage in an actual drafting exercise, and I have to emphasize that a number of countries have reserved both their comments and detailed language proposals for the Oslo Conference.

Nevertheless, I shall attempt to sum up the principal points which came up during the past two days. As I mentioned yesterday, this summary does not pretend to be exhaustive. You will also understand that I cannot refer to any particular national point of view. In this spirit, no country will be named, no delegation will be quoted.

One very fundamental issue pertains to the nature of the future APL-treaty and its relationship to other instruments of international law. As several delegations phrased it, should we look upon the treaty as a humanitarian act or see it as a disarmament instrument?
The first part of our debates dealt with the general obligations under our treaty. Everyone recognized that they had been spelt out quite clearly in the relevant resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, resolution 51/45 S. None of the delegations that spoke on the subject questioned the absolute necessity of including in the treaty a ban on the use, production and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines and on trade in them. No exception was envisaged in this field, except perhaps for purposes of instruction. There then arose the question of the quantity of mines that each State would be allowed to have for troop training. A consensus seems to be within reach on distinguishing here between the number per type of mines from the number as such, it being well understood that deminers have to have available to them a maximum number of types of mines, with technical characteristics that can vary considerably. In the same spirit, it seems possible to agree on an exception with regard to the trade in mines, since in many cases it will be necessary to buy a limited number of new mines abroad, always for the purpose of training deminers. The core of the treaty was thus not called in question during the debate on general obligations.

The Brussels Conference then considered definitions and exceptions. As far as definitions were concerned, the Conference remembered that a number of definitions were available in Protocol II to the Inhuman Weapons Convention, which have moreover left their mark on the Austrian draft text.

Several delegations nevertheless pointed out that those definitions could not be taken over just as they stood and that in view of the radical nature of the treaty the Ottawa Process was aiming at, the definitions available in the amended Protocol II would need to be adapted. Certain delegations also noted that the definition of "anti-personnel landmine" itself had not been taken over in extenso and that that change was not without implications, implications which would have to be weighed and studied at the Oslo Conference.

Another problem of definition which occupied delegates' attention for quite some time related to minefields and mined areas. With your permission I shall return to this matter when I deal with the problem of the destruction of mines in this context.

The Conference also concerned itself with the problem of exceptions. Obviously, some exceptions have to be allowed for. You are already familiar with two of them, since it seems we can envisage without too much difficulty an exception to the ban on stockpiling and an exception to the ban on trade, so as to enable deminers to have the number and types of mines they need for training purposes.

Other exceptions that would affect the very core of the treaty could not be introduced into the text without profoundly altering the nature of the Ottawa Process. Use and production obviously cannot be the subject of exceptions. The same is true of stockpiling and trade with the exception I have just mentioned.
We then considered the destruction of stocks, and delegations were largely agreed that this was a corollary, both essential and symbolic, of the ban on stockpiling anti-personnel mines.

The deadlines for the destruction of stocks will have to be negotiated, however, since this process obviously poses budgetary and environmental problems that are far from negligible.

The scale of these problems inevitably imposes constraints, which will vary from one country to another, on the process of fixing the necessary deadlines for compliance with this obligation. The Conference has heard from a number of delegations representing countries that are already engaged in this operation. International, or at the very least regional, cooperation to destroy existing mine stocks under the best possible conditions seems to be an essential element in the solution of this question. Here again, it might be possible to permit anti-personnel mines to be taken across frontiers in order to be destroyed without regarding it as a real exception. That would not constitute, in the proper sense, trade in or transfer of anti-personnel mines under the terms of the definition of transfer given in Protocol II. This possibility will have to be studied before provision can be made for it in the treaty.

Another aspect of the destruction of anti-personnel mines that you asked us to study is that of mines already in place. The Conference recognized that this was one of the most complex problems that the Ottawa treaty would have to resolve. The distinction between mined areas and minefields as proposed in the amended Protocol II, while it is a useful guide, needs to be taken further and made more precise. Some delegations also pointed out that the need to deal with mines in place would have to be weighed against the cost. The cost to be considered is not just financial, although since the resources available are limited, choices will inevitably have to be made: the cost also has to take into account the dangers run by deminers compared with the expected benefits of demining.

Still, there is a large consensus that in the field and in the text there should be a distinction between existing minefields laid, fenced and monitored by regular armies and mined areas where mines are suspected to be present. In practice, however, this distinction is sometimes very difficult to make. So we must be ready to recognize that some cases constitute a grey area.

On this topic it is also clear that all mines removed from minefields or mined areas will have to be destroyed as quickly as possible if that destruction has not been realized in the minefield itself.

Obviously, the destruction of mines already in place is a more difficult subject than the destruction of stockpiled mines. It will be an important subject of negotiations during the Oslo Conference.

The next topic which was discussed by delegations was international cooperation and assistance. This was mentioned in the Brussels Conference Declaration as an essential non-negotiable element of the global ban on anti-personnel landmines. It was recognized that if the ban on use and
production combined with the destruction of stocks could secure a better future, the purpose of the Ottawa Process was also to solve the consequences of the legacy of the past. To do so, international cooperation has been recognized not only as essential but also as indispensable. This cooperation will have to be multifaceted: exchanges of technologies, exchanges of demining teams will have to be part of it, but this will not suffice. Various delegations have shared their regional or national experience with the Conference. I recall for example the experience presented by Central American countries. International cooperation could also take the form of joint efforts for destruction of stocks or exchange of geographical data about previously laid minefields.

The necessity and the difficulties of finding the financial resources were also stressed by many delegations. The international community will have to encourage its members to do more and to coordinate its efforts.

This concern is embodied in the draft text which has guided our work. It seems, however, that here again there is still considerable work to be done, because to deal with the unfortunate legacy of anti-personnel mines will demand substantial sacrifices on all sides. Aid to victims should be an integral part of this process. We had been able, not just through our discussions, but also through the showing of videos and our visit to the very interesting exhibition at the Musée de l'Armée, to get an idea of the extent of the tragedy and of the difficulty and the urgent necessity of finding solutions to it that are both humane and effective.

The debate also focused on confidence-building measures, and more generally on the implementation of the treaty. Several delegations stressed that we should be guided first and foremost by humanitarian concerns. Others felt that even if the humanitarian dimension remained in the forefront, the disarmament aspects could not be ignored. That could have important implications for confidence-building and transparency measures.

The Austrian text provides for an exchange of information among States parties on the measures taken by each of them in pursuance of the treaty. The usefulness of such exchanges was generally recognized. The same text also proposes that figures should be supplied. How many anti-personnel mines have we? Of what type? How far have the destruction programmes got? Obviously, publication of such information would help to build confidence among States parties.

But some people want to go further and, following the logic of disarmament treaties, would like a more comprehensive system which would permit effective monitoring of the implementation of the Ottawa treaty.

On this matter, there could thus be a difference of opinion, and a choice will have to be made on the extent to which we recognize the disarmament dimension in the future treaty.

We ended with a presentation of the Oslo Conference by the Norwegian delegation, which enlightened us all about the immediate future of the Ottawa Process. All the comments made over the past two days have in fact been put forward in that perspective and will therefore have been very useful.
The adoption of the Brussels Declaration tomorrow will be an essential element in the process. The Declaration mentions the main points in the treaty, fixes the date for its signature and transmits the Austrian draft to the Oslo Conference. In this Declaration, we shall thus have defined the objectives of the negotiations, the basis on which they are to be conducted and the date by which they are to reach a conclusion.

I would appeal for as many delegations as possible to associate themselves with this Declaration, which is truly the key to the final negotiations.

I thus conclude my report on the first two days of the Brussels Conference and have pleasure in giving the floor back to the Minister.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the report of the OAU Secretary-General on the Issue of Anti-Personnel Mines and International Efforts to Reach a Total Ban (Doc.CM/2009(LXVI) and the report on the first Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines held in Kempton Park, South Africa, from 19-21 May 1997.

I should be grateful if the enclosed documents are circulated as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): T J B Jokonya
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Council:

(a) TAKES NOTE of the Report.

(b) REAFFIRMS all its previous resolutions on the question of anti-personnel mines, especially resolutions CM/Res.1593 (LXII) and CM/Res.1628 (LXIII);

(c) ENDORSES the Plan of Action adopted by the First continental conference of African Mine Experts held in Kempton Park, South Africa, from 19 to 21 May 1997, and COMMENDS the OAU Secretary-General for this laudable initiative in that connection;

(d) RECOGNIZES the contribution of the establishment of sub-regional anti-personnel mines free-zones to the ultimate goal of achieving a total ban at the level of the African Continent;

(e) STRESSES the need that the problem of mines be addressed in a coordinated, multi-faceted and balanced manner banning comprehensively anti-personnel mines and intensifying efforts and actions with regard to mine-clearance and mine victim assistance especially in Africa;

(f) ADOPTS as a goal the elimination of anti-personnel mines in Africa and the establishment of Africa as an anti-personnel mines - Free Zone;

(g) URGES Member States to fully and actively participate in the Ottawa process, particularly the meetings scheduled for Brussels (24 - 27 June, 1997), Oslo (September 1997) and Ottawa at which a treaty for the total prohibition of anti-personnel mines is expected to be signed;

(h) CALLS ON all Member States to adhere as early as possible to the 1980 United Nations Convention on prohibition or restriction on the use of certain weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and its protocol II if they have not already done so, and APPEALS to all
Member States to adhere to the amended protocol II as well as the new Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons;

(i) **APPEALS** to the International Community to render to the affected African countries all necessary assistance to enable them to effectively carry out mine clearance and mine victim assistance operations, and facilitate implementation of the Kempton Park Plan of Action through increased mobilization of resources;

(j) **UNDERSCORES** the moral responsibility of the countries which masterminded the emplacement of mines in Africa during the Second World war and/or colonial conflicts and **URGES** the said countries to devote a part of their resources, in particular, a reasonable percentage of their military budget to mine clearance and assistance to mine victims in the affected African countries;

(k) **CALLS UPON** those countries responsible for infesting the African countries with mines to provide those affected countries with all necessary information on demining including data, technical assistance, assessment of surveys specially maps as well as the movement of illegal mine transfers;

(l) **REITERATES** the urgency and the need for inter-African cooperation in mine clearance and assistance to mine victims, and **EMPHASIZES** the primordial role to be played by the OAU in coordinating actions in those areas, as part of implementation of the plan of Action;

(m) **REQUESTS** the Secretary-General to monitor implementation of the present resolution as well as the Kempton Park Plan of Action, and submit a report thereon to the next ordinary session of the Council of Ministers.
PLAN OF ACTION OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE OF AFRICAN EXPERTS ON LANDMINES

The first Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines was held in Kempton Park, the Republic of South Africa, from 19 to 21 May 1997. The Conference, which was attended by 40 Member States of the OAU, UN specialised agencies, a wide spectrum of representatives of the donor community and Non-Governmental Organizations, adopted the following Plan of Action:

I. ON POLICY ON LANDMINES

The Conference discussed African policies on anti-personnel landmines, the momentum towards a global ban on anti-personnel landmines, legal aspects of humanitarian law pertaining to landmines, landmine free-zones with reference to the Organization of American States (OAS) and an African landmine-free-zone.

Within the framework of the implementation of the relevant Organization of African Unity (OAU) resolution, participants agreed:

1. To stress the need that the problem of landmines be addressed in a coordinated and multi-faceted manner banning comprehensively anti-personnel landmines and intensifying efforts with regard to mine-clearance and mine victim assistance.

2. To adopt as a goal the elimination of anti-personnel landmines in Africa and the establishment of Africa as an Anti-Personnel Landmine-Free-Zone.

3. All States should end all deployments of anti-personnel landmines and to establish national prohibitions such as those already adopted on the African continent on their use, production, stockpiling, transfer and their destruction.

4. Urged all States to participate actively in the Brussels Conference, 24-27 June 1997, the Oslo Conference in September 1997, which is integral to the process leading to the negotiation and signature of a legally binding international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines in Ottawa in December 1997.

5. For those States which are not yet Parties, to adhere to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), including the Protocol II on landmines (as amended on 3 May 1996); for current States party to this Convention to adhere to its amended Protocol II at the earliest possible date to ensure its earliest possible entry into force.

6. To promote the strongest possible resolution on the banning of anti-personnel landmines to be considered by Heads of State

II. ON MINE CLEARANCE

The Conference discussed at length mine clearance issues which included the building of national capacities for mine clearance, setting local priorities, standards and technologies and inter-African cooperation.

Noting the crucial link between the drive for the total ban of mines and mine clearance, the participants agreed as follows:

1. In building capacity for mine clearance there is a need to create national, subregional and regional coordinating and strategic planning bodies. Subregional organizations such as SADC, IGAD and others and also the OAU could play such a role. Further, national capacities for mine clearance should be simple, manageable and sustainable.

2. The challenge in demining is the development of institutions rather than mine clearance itself; full attention should, therefore, be devoted to this task.

3. Data bases should be established at the national, subregional and regional levels; which would create the necessary management information system on the extent of mine problems, on techniques of demining, on results of demining, the assessment of surveys and the movement of illegal mine transfers.

4. At present demining is a slow process - methods and technology must be created to increase the rate of demining; with regards to this, the need for the employment of integrated technology is of importance.

5. The task of mine clearance in Africa is so vast that the public sector and commercial enterprises should operate in parallel reinforcing each other's efforts. Further, the Armed Forces of African States should be allowed to play a proper role in demining.

6. There is a need to involve national authorities, at various levels in the building of national capacities.

7. In building capacities finance will be a critical constraint. Hence there is need to exert efforts to mobilize financial resources. But requests for financial assistance should be backed by appropriate project feasibility studies.

8. The aim of mine awareness should be to reduce mine risk through the adoption of sustainable safe behaviour, and to ensure the close involvement of the affected community and to
ensure that priorities in mine awareness programmes are set by the members of the community themselves; lessons learned and experiences gained must be institutionalized, and interactive communication must be adopted.

9. Efficient and effective demining efforts should be made to develop standards and guidelines for deminers and independent quality assurance and quality control established.

10. For successful demining inter-African cooperation is seen as a vital and a crucial element; such cooperation should cover such areas as political/diplomatic action, logistics, technical, financial, clearing operations, research and development as well as the transfer of technology.

III. ON LANDMINE SURVIVORS ASSISTANCE

The Conference discussed a wide range of issues relating to landmine survivors assistance. The following aspects, inter alia, were covered:

- Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration
- Training
- Resources: human, facilities, funds
- Development of (a) database(s)

Against the background of efforts to achieve a total ban on antipersonnel mines, and to clear Africa of existing landmines, the participants agreed as follows:

1. Governments in Africa, and the OAU, should address the plight of victims and survivors and take renewed cognizance of their problems with a view to meeting the health and social needs of all landmine survivors in Africa.

2. To be optimally effective in bringing more and higher quality assistance to landmine survivors in the long term, a structured flow and analysis of information about the entire mine problem in any given country was needed.

3. Priorities for the allocation of scarce resources amongst mine clearance projects, community mine awareness programmes, and the provision for the health and social needs of landmine survivors can only be set by cooperative and coordinated efforts on the part of:

- Local authorities and national governments
- The OAU and its specialised agencies, such as ARI
- The UN system and its agencies
- The NGO community
- The ICRC and National Red Crescent or Red Cross Societies.
4. To urge governments to adopt a policy aiming at the establishment of national Mine Information Systems.

5. To urge governments to include the active participation of landmine survivors in the formulation, the decision making process and the execution of national policy and legislation in respect of articles that affect them. Concomitantly, survivors should influence their governments' positions in the formulation of international humanitarian treaties.

6. To encourage communities and the health services of mine-infected countries to maintain and increase their readiness to deal with mine injuries long after armed conflict has ended, while building their social and institutional capacities to deal with an ever increasing number of disabled.

7. The relevant regional and national institutions to coordinate their efforts and to exchange information on their available medical facilities and capacities and to provide modes of accessing them through a central African clearing-house in order to improve and increase assistance to landmine survivors.

8. To increase support to all training centres and institutes for the combined or joint use of all medical, social, psychological and other relevant measures and to organise regular regional and continental training sessions for civilian and/or military health workers on the treatment and rehabilitation of the mine-injured.

9. In order to meet the psychological and social needs of mine survivors, Governments should quantify the numbers of survivors and encourage local NGOs or National Red Cross/Red Crescent societies to initiate appropriate programmes, with the support of international partners, to increase access to medical care and rehabilitation for all victims and survivors in countries at war or affected by landmines in the post-conflictual period.

10. Governments should establish national Support Funds for landmine survivors and international donors should contribute to these Funds.

IV. ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND FINANCE

On international cooperation and finance, the Conference:

1. Reiterated the appeal of the OAU to the International Community, International financial agencies, and the private sector working in the military field to provide African countries affected by mines with all the necessary assistance for the demining of their countries. As an essential component of the efforts towards the elimination of mines,
this assistance should comprise financial and technical components as well as the training of deminers.

2. Underscored the moral responsibility of the powers which laid the mines during the Second World War and independence wars, and wished that these powers should devote a reasonable percentage of their military budget to mine clearance in the concerned African countries.

3. Underlined the need for international cooperation, including close South South cooperation, in order to support effort towards demining and assistance to victims with a view to accelerating the realisation of the objectives of total elimination of mines.

4. Requested the General Secretariat of the OAU, bearing in mind the experience of other International Organisations, to establish a mechanism to enhance the mobilisation of International Community so as to assist the African countries affected by anti-personnel landmines.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations Office in Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to inform the latter of the decision of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 6 August 1997, concerning the prohibition of export of anti-personnel landmines, including re-export and transit.

Kazakhstan shares the grave concern of many within the international community over the long-term and pernicious effects of the widespread use of anti-personnel mines.

The need to mobilize the international community to address this issue is widely recognized and Kazakhstan has consistently supported the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly calling for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines.

The Office of the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan would be grateful if the Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning this decision could be registered as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed for information to all member and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.
Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is authorized to state that by a resolution dated 6 August 1997 the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan has imposed a ban on the export of anti-personnel landmines, including re-export and transit.

Kazakhstan shares the growing concern of the international community at the huge losses caused among the civilian population through the use of anti-personnel mines. In over 70 different countries, 110 million mines are still maiming and killing the civilian population every day. That is why anti-personnel mines have been dubbed "delayed-action weapons of mass destruction".

This serious problem, which is worldwide in scope, can only find a solution through joint international action to limit the use of anti-personnel mines and access to them, and in due course to forbid their use.

The unilateral moratorium introduced by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan provides support for the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and is an expression of our country's commitment to the cause of strengthening international peace and security.

Almaty, 11 August 1997
1. We express our recognition and support to the objectives of humanitarian nature pursued by the "Ottawa process", which encompasses the concern of the international community for eliminating anti-personnel landmines, thus reducing the great number of innocent people who fall every year a victim of this type of weapons.

2. We think that the Convention which, as an outcome of this process, will be adopted by the Oslo Conference, would contribute to the achievement of this noble objective.

3. At the same time we are convinced that the subject of anti-personnel landmines includes important aspects which can best be addressed by the specialized negotiating forum of the Conference on Disarmament.

   We believe that the Conference on Disarmament through the consideration and negotiation of agreements complementary to, consistent with and mutually supportive of the one to be concluded in Ottawa, can make a significant contribution to reaching the goals of the United Nations on this matter.

   We agree that achieving universal support for such a goal should be a paramount objective, the attainment of which is possible through a negotiating process in which due consideration can be given to national security concerns of involved parties.

4. It was with this in mind that we made a proposal to the Conference, on 27 March 1997, that led to the appointment of a Special Coordinator to hold consultations or a possible mandate for negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on the question of anti-personnel landmines. We commend him for his diligent work so far. Given the short period which he has had available for his consultations, and the need to take account of work proceeding on this issue outside the Conference on Disarmament, it is clear that he will not be in a position to present his final recommendations to the Conference before the end of this year’s session. We would, therefore, strongly support the continuation of his consultations during the intersessional period and the presentation of a final report at the start of the 1998 session of the Conference on Disarmament.
MEXICO

Statement on the question of consultations by the Special Coordinator on anti-personnel landmines in the Conference on Disarmament.

The delegation of Mexico wishes to state that in the opinion of the Mexican Government, the consultations by the Special Coordinator on anti-personnel landmines constitute a procedural matter and do not form part of the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction" which was negotiated and adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines held in Oslo 1-18 September 1997.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament to all member and participating non-member state delegations.

(Signed) Bjørn Skogmo
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

1/ Since the official languages of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference were English, French and Spanish, the Arabic, Chinese and Russian versions of this document will be available at a later stage.

GR.97-64594
CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Preamble

The States Parties,

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants.

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1
General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:

a) To use anti-personnel mines;

b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;

c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
Article 2
Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.
Article 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996. annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:

   a) The duration of the proposed extension;

   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:

      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;

      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
(iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;

c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and

c') Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6
International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem:
b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;

c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

e) Assistance to mine victims;

f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

**Article 7**

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4:
h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and

i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

**Article 8**

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by
all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the
jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;

b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or

c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-
finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

Article 9
National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.
Article 10
Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

Article 11
Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:

   a) The operation and status of this Convention:

   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention:

   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6:
d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;

e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and

f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12
Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review
Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;

b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;

c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and

d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13
Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to
consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.
Article 14
Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

Article 15
Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.

3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

**Article 17**

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

**Article 18**

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.
Article 19
Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 20
Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.
Article 21
Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22
Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT


I have the honour to forward herewith the Press Release issued by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 November 1997 concerning the decision by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to attend the Anti-Personnel Mines Treaty Signing Conference in Ottawa, Canada, on 2-4 December 1997 and sign the "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

I would be grateful if this Press Release could be registered as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed for information to all member and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Agus Tarimdzi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.97-65065
PRESS RELEASE

No. 60/PR.XI/97


The Convention bans states party to use, stockpile, produce and transfer anti-personnel landmines. Under this Convention, states party undertake to destroy all of its stocks except a number of anti-personnel landmines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine techniques.

The decision to sign the Convention is a testimony of the commitment of the Government of Indonesia to the main objective of the Convention namely to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel landmines, that kill and maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent civilians. The Government of Indonesia also fully supports the principle that the use of anti-personnel landmines obstructs national development, particularly economic development, and inhibits the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons. The use of anti-personnel landmines also creates other severe consequences for years, even after the end of armed conflict.

Jakarta, November 17, 1997

I have the honour to inform you that in order to contribute to international efforts aimed at achieving the goal of the elimination of anti-personnel mines, the President of the Republic of Belarus, A.S. Lukashenko, has issued decree No. 628 of 4 December 1997 extending to the end of 1999 the moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines which the Republic of Belarus has been observing since August 1995.

I would be grateful if you would register this letter as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulate it for the information of all delegations taking part in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): S. Agurtsou
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Republic of Belarus

GE.98-60102 (E)
United States of America

Statement from the President of the United States
Upon the Occasion of the Opening Plenary of the 1998 Session
of the Conference on Disarmament

As you resume your critical efforts to strengthen global security, I pledge the
full support of the United States Delegation in taking the next steps in the nuclear
disarmament process and banning anti-personnel landmines from the face of the
earth. No issues are more important today to this body’s work than a cutoff of
fissile material production for nuclear explosives and a worldwide ban on the export
of anti-personnel landmines. If the Conference can promptly conclude these
accords, complementing deep bilateral reductions in nuclear arms and the Ottawa
Convention, we will take important steps on the road to a world that is free of
nuclear weapons and safe for children to tread. I am confident the Conference on
Disarmament can meet the challenge.

GE.98-60347
LETTER DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1998 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF EGYPT TRANSMITTING
THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION EB101.R23 ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION ON 27 JANUARY 1998, ON THE ISSUE OF "CONCERTED
PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES"

Please find enclosed herewith Resolution EB101.R23 adopted by the
Executive Board of the World Health Organization on 27 January 1998, on the
issue of "Concerted Public Health Action on Anti-Personnel Mines".

I would be grateful if you would issue this resolution as an official
document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Mounir Zahran
Permanent Representative

GE.98-60431
Concerted public health action on anti-personnel mines

The Executive Board,

Agreeing with the priority areas defined in the information document on prevention of violence with particular reference to landmines,

1. REQUESTS the Director-General to submit to the Fifty-first World Health Assembly a plan of action for a concerted public health response to anti-personnel mines;

2. RECOMMENDS to the Fifty-first World Health Assembly the adoption of the following resolution:

The Fifty-first World Health Assembly,

Noting with great concern the dramatic consequences of anti-personnel-mine injuries which particularly affect civilian populations, and are uniquely tragic, so that they deserve special attention;

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996, the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997, and noting the progress made by the international community towards a global ban on anti-personnel mines, as well as the relevant decisions and initiatives taken in other forums;

Recalling Article 6 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, adopted in Oslo on 18 September 1997, and opened for signature on 3 December 1997, which provides that assistance for the care and rehabilitation of mine victims and for mine awareness programmes may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions;

Recalling operative paragraph C.2 of resolution EB95.R17 on emergency and humanitarian action, which requests the Director-General "to advocate the protection of non-combatants and the setting-up of effective treatment and rehabilitation programmes for the victims of anti-personnel landmines, as well as the systematic management of delayed health effects of mental and physical injuries in situations of collective violence";

Recognizing the serious consequences for health caused by anti-personnel mines as they, inter alia, limit population mobility, prevent access to arable land, resulting in malnutrition, hamper access to health

1 Document EB101/INF.DOC/6.
services, contribute to the spread of communicable diseases like poliomyelitis and hinder their eradication, and, lastly, generate significant psychosocial disorders.

Recognizing that a total ban on anti-personnel mines will be an important contribution to global public health;

Welcoming the participation of over 120 Member States in the Ottawa Treaty Signing Ceremony from 3 to 5 December 1997;

Recognizing that WHO should contribute to coordinated activities of the United Nations system against anti-personnel mines by developing public health programmes for anti-personnel-mine injury prevention and control,

1. DECLARES that damage caused by the use of anti-personnel mines is a public health problem;

2. URGES all Member States to ratify the Convention as soon as possible;

3. URGES governments of affected States to incorporate anti-personnel-mine injury prevention and assistance to victims, including treatment and rehabilitation, as a priority in national health plans;

4. URGES Member States to give due attention to the public health aspects of the Convention and provide the necessary resources to support implementation of the WHO plan of action referred to below, bearing in mind the need for an integrated and sustainable approach;

5. URGES governments that have planted mines in the territories of other countries to provide the latter with the required maps and identification of the minefields they planted and to cooperate in minefield clearance in the countries concerned so as to avoid further injuries and deaths of civilians;

6. REQUESTS the Director-General, within the limits of available regular and extrabudgetary resources and in close cooperation with governments, appropriate organizations of the United Nations system and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations:

   (1) to strengthen the capacity of affected States for the planning and execution of programmes for:

   (a) better assessment of the effects of anti-personnel-mine injuries on health through the establishment or reinforcement of surveillance systems;

   (b) the promotion of mine awareness and prevention programmes through health education, in cooperation with interested parties;

   (c) strengthening and improvement of emergency and post-emergency management of anti-personnel-mine injuries, including treatment and rehabilitation, with special attention to psychosocial rehabilitation and within the context of integrated health service delivery;

   (2) to support policy and programme planning by establishing, with other interested parties and as part of an integrated United Nations database, a clearing-house for information on public health aspects of the use of mines.

Sixteenth meeting, 27 January 1998
EB101/SR/16
Draft decision

With reference to United Nations General Assembly resolution 52/38H which invites the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts on the issue of anti-personnel landmines, and without prejudice to, and within the context of, its urgent ongoing efforts to establish a Programme of Work for its 1998 session and to set up mechanisms, as appropriate, for other agenda items of the Conference, and in order to facilitate these efforts, the Conference on Disarmament decides:

1. To re-appoint the Special Coordinator to continue his consultations on a possible mandate on the question of anti-personnel landmines under agenda item 6.

2. The Special Coordinator shall take into consideration all relevant proposals and views, present and future.

3. The Special Coordinator shall present an early report to the Conference on Disarmament.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Alfred Nzo, today announced that South Africa will assist Mozambique in a demining project which will provide vital impetus to the reconstruction and development of the Massingir Dam region in Gaza Province. It has been agreed with the Mozambican National Demining Commission, (CND), that the South African company Mechem, which is already engaged in the demining of the Maputo Province in its "Terra Limpa" (cleaning of the earth) project, will be utilised for this purpose. Elaborating on this decision, Minister Nzo said:

"The African Development Bank has committed US $80 million toward the rehabilitation and upgrading of this key area in Southern Mozambique. South Africa has committed itself to providing the necessary assistance in the demining of the Massingir airstrip and strategic access routes which are of critical importance to the Mozambican government's macro economic development strategy".

Commenting further on South Africa's role in actively assisting Mozambique in its own reconstruction and development strategies, Minister Nzo pointed out that "Terra Limpa" (cleaning of the earth) has been a cost-effective and successful bilateral project, which includes the clearing of 163 ha of land and destroying 5000 mines, thus unlocking the agricultural potential of the Currumane Dam region for man and animal. Minister Nzo confirmed that South Africa and the Mozambican Demining Commission had also agreed to jointly address the critical need for the funding of a comprehensive technical survey of the national landmine problem in Mozambique. This included possible South African assistance to landmine victims, the secondment of personnel to the Mozambican Demining Commission (CND) and the training of ten Mozambicans in advanced demining management. This training programme will assist Mozambique to significantly improve its indigenous demining capacity. The eight week training course will commence on 23 February 1998, at Paardefontein outside Pretoria, at the Mechem International Demining and Canine Training Academy.
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1514
26 May 1996

Original: ARABIC, CHINESE, ENGLISH, FRENCH, RUSSIAN and SPANISH

LETTER DATED 22 MAY 1998 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF EGYPT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION WHA51.8, ADOPTED BY THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY ON 16 MAY 1998, ON THE ISSUE OF "CONCERTED PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES"


I would be grateful if you would circulate this resolution as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Mounir Zahran
Permanent Representative

GE.98-61756
Concerted public health action on anti-personnel mines

The Fifty-first World Health Assembly,

Noting with great concern the dramatic consequences of injuries caused by anti-personnel mines, which particularly affect civilian populations and are uniquely tragic, so that they deserve special attention;

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996, the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997, and noting the progress made by the international community towards a global ban on anti-personnel mines, as well as the relevant decisions and initiatives taken in other forums;

Recalling Article 6 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, adopted in Oslo on 18 September 1997, and opened for signature on 3 December 1997, which provides that assistance for the care and rehabilitation of mine victims and for mine awareness programmes may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions;

Recalling operative paragraph C.2 of resolution EB95.R17 on emergency and humanitarian action, which requests the Director-General "to advocate the protection of non-combatants and the setting-up of effective treatment and rehabilitation programmes for the victims of anti-personnel landmines, as well as the systematic management of delayed health effects of mental and physical injuries in situations of collective violence";

Recalling the serious consequences for health caused by anti-personnel mines as they, inter alia, limit population mobility, prevent access to arable land, resulting in malnutrition, hamper access to health services, contribute to the spread of communicable diseases like poliomyelitis and hinder their eradication, and, lastly, generate significant psychosocial disorders;

Recognizing that a total ban on anti-personnel mines will be an important contribution to global public health;

Welcoming the participation of over 120 Member States in the Ottawa Treaty Signing Ceremony from 3 to 5 December 1997;

Recognizing that WHO should contribute to coordinated activities of the United Nations system against anti-personnel mines by developing public health programmes for anti-personnel-mine injury prevention and control,
1. DECLARES that damage caused by the use of anti-personnel mines is a public health problem;

2. URGES all Member States to sign and ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction as soon as possible;

3. URGES governments of affected States to incorporate anti-personnel-mine injury prevention and assistance to victims, including treatment and rehabilitation, as a priority in national health plans;

4. URGES Member States to give due attention to the public health aspects of the Convention and provide the necessary resources to support implementation of the WHO plan of action on anti-personnel mines, bearing in mind the need for an integrated and sustainable approach;

5. URGES governments that have planted mines in the territories of other countries to provide the latter with the required maps and identification of the minefields they planted and to cooperate in minefield clearance in the countries concerned so as to avoid further injuries and deaths of civilians;

6. REQUESTS the Director-General, within the limits of available regular and extrabudgetary resources and in close cooperation with governments, appropriate organizations of the United Nations system and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations:

   (1) to strengthen the capacity of affected States for the planning and execution of programmes for:

      (a) better assessment of the effects of anti-personnel-mine injuries on health through the establishment or reinforcement of surveillance systems;

      (b) the promotion of mine awareness and prevention programmes through health education, in cooperation with interested parties;

      (c) strengthening and improvement of emergency and post-emergency management of anti-personnel-mine injuries, including treatment and rehabilitation, with special attention to psychosocial rehabilitation and within the context of integrated health service delivery;

   (2) to support policy and programme planning by establishing, with other interested parties and as part of an integrated database for the United Nations system, a clearing-house for information on public health aspects of the use of mines.

Tenth plenary meeting, 16 May 1998
A51/VR/10
MEDIA STATEMENT ON THE DEPOSITING OF SOUTH AFRICA'S INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND THEIR DESTRUCTION


South Africa signed the Convention on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa and 124 States, 38 of which are from Africa, have signed the Convention thus far. The Convention will enter into force after 40 ratifications. To date 21 States have ratified the Convention.

On 18 September 1997, the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines adopted the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. In terms of the Convention State Parties will be obligated not only to ban the use of anti-personnel mines but also to ensure their destruction. With the final phase of the destruction of its stockpiled anti-personnel mines in October 1997, South Africa fulfilled its obligation in terms of this Convention.

South Africa is committed to the earliest possible entry into force of the Convention and will be promoting the universality of the Convention as the international norm in banning such mines. South Africa will do its utmost to contribute to the removal of landmines, especially in the region, and provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and the social and economic interaction, of mine victims.

ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PRETORIA
29 JUNE 1998

GE.98-62910
MEDIA STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA'S DECLARATION OF CONSENT TO
BE BOUNDED TO PROTOCOL II, AS AMENDED, AND PROTOCOL IV OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF
CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE
EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS (CCW)

South Africa declared its Consent to be bound to Protocol II, as
amended, and Protocol IV of the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate
Effects, commonly known as the CCW. This declaration was deposited
at the Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations in New
York on 26 June 1998.

South Africa acceded to this Convention and its Protocols I, II
and III, on 13 September 1995. The Convention, which was concluded
in 1980, was opened for signature by all Member States of the
United Nations for a period of twelve months from 10 April 1981.
The Convention came into force on 2 December 1983 and currently has
been ratified by 70 States.

The objective of the Convention is to prohibit the use of the
above-mentioned weapons which have indiscriminately caused death
and injury to millions of people world-wide including innocent
civilians.

The Convention includes the Treaty and four Protocols entitled
respectively:

- Protocol on Non-detectable Fragments (I)
- Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Mines,
  Booby-traps and Other Devices (II)
- Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of
  Incendiary Weapons (III)
- Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (IV)

Protocol II is the most substantive of the four Protocols to the
Convention and deals with mines, booby-traps and other devices
which have been used indiscriminately in a large number of recent
conflicts, particularly internal conflicts. It is for this reason
that State Parties decided to convene a Review Conference in 1995
to amend the Protocol and render its provisions more restrictive
as well as consider the adoption of a new Protocol IV on Blinding
Laser Weapons. The new Protocol IV was adopted on 13 October 1995
and the amended Protocol II was adopted on 3 May 1996.

The scope of Protocol II, as amended, has been extended to include
conflicts of a non-international character, a significant
improvement given that most landmines are used in internal
conflicts. In addition the general humanitarian restrictions are
stronger, requiring greater discrimination between civilian and
military objectives requiring advance warning of mines, booby-traps and other devices.

The new Protocol IV places a prohibition on the use of such blinding laser weapons which are designed to cause blindness.

This declaration emphasises the South African Government's commitment to promote international peace and security, to limit and alleviate the suffering which is concomitant to the scourges of war and armed conflict and its responsibility to implement arms control policies as a vehicle to this end.

ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PRETORIA
29 JUNE 1998


I kindly request you to give the necessary instructions to circulate the said resolution as a document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Mounir Zahran
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
1998/30. Injurious effects of anti-personnel landmines

The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,

Aware that anti-personnel landmines inflict harm on human beings and in the process cause grave violations of human rights, in particular the right to life,

Recalling its resolutions 1995/24 of 24 August 1995, 1996/15 of 23 August 1996 and 1997/33 of 23 August 1998 in which it declared itself in favour of a total ban of the production, marketing and use of these weapons,

Stressing the importance of assisting the victims of such weapons as well as ensuring that those which have been deployed are completely destroyed,

Stressing also the importance for the Sub-Commission to follow up this issue in order to guarantee the full respect and implementation of all relevant legal instruments,

Taking note with satisfaction of the establishment of zones free of anti-personnel landmines in the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) and in Bolivia and Chile,

Welcoming the award of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines,

Welcoming also the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction in December 1997 and its signature by almost one hundred and thirty countries, and recalling that the Convention is to enter into force after forty countries have ratified it,

Noting with satisfaction that thirty-two countries have already ratified the Convention,

Regretting the new deployment of landmines in zones of armed conflict despite all warnings against their deployment and knowledge of the horror they cause to their innocent victims, especially children and other vulnerable groups,

Bearing in mind that landmines cause death, maiming and psychological damage to their victims, are a deterrent to development and harm the environment,

Underlining the continuous threat that old and abandoned landmines pose to human lives as well as their detrimental effects for development efforts,

Stressing the urgency for mine clearance in the affected zones in order that civilians in such zones can fully enjoy their human rights,

Regretting the lack of sufficient financial resources to increase mine clearance and medical assistance for victims of anti-personnel landmines,
1. **Reaffirms its support** for a total ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of landmines, as well as the destruction of the existing mines, as a means to protect basic human rights and in particular the right to life;

2. **Urges** States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and all the Protocols thereto, including Protocol II on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996;

3. **Strongly urges** all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction adopted in Ottawa in December 1997;

4. **Urges** all States to modify their legislation where necessary in accordance with the wording of the Ottawa Convention, in full respect of its articles and spirit, including the clause prohibiting any reservations to the Convention;

5. **Urges** all countries responsible for the laying of anti-personnel landmines in foreign territories to assume full responsibility for the necessary mine-clearance operations and to cooperate with the host countries for this purpose in every possible way, in particular developing countries;

6. **Underlines** the importance for non-State actors also to renounce the use of anti-personnel landmines;

7. **Encourages** Member States to continue the process of establishing regional and subregional zones free of anti-personnel landmines;

8. **Reiterates its request** to Governments and the international community to pursue an overall policy of prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration of the victims of landmines as well as to multiply their efforts in mine-clearance programmes in the affected zones and their aid to victims of anti-personnel landmines;

9. **Again encourages** Governments, organizations and individuals that can do so to respond favourably to the request for voluntary contributions to the United Nations mine-clearance programme, or to increase existing contributions;
10. **Requests** the Secretary-General to reiterate to all Governments, in particular those of States which in the past have laid anti-personnel landmines in or sold them to other States, the Sub-Commission's appeal for contributions to the mine-clearance programme and the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance established in 1994;

11. **Decides** to consider this question at its fifty-first session under the same agenda item and to establish the necessary measures to ensure the follow-up and implementation of international humanitarian law and treaties in order that everyone may fully enjoy all their human rights.

35th meeting
26 August 1998

[Adopted without a vote. See chap. XIV.]

I have the honour to communicate to you the text of a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey issued on 15 October 1998, concerning the extension for another three years of the comprehensive moratorium on all anti-personnel landmine exports and transfers introduced by Turkey in 1996.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Murat Sungar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TURKEY

An integral part of efforts aimed at preventing proliferation of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) are the resolutions since 1993 of the United Nations General Assembly calling on member States to implement a moratorium on the export of landmines. In light of these resolutions, Turkey, who has in fact been implementing a de facto moratorium by not exporting any APLs in recent years, declared on 17 January 1996 on a unilateral basis a comprehensive moratorium on all anti-personnel landmine exports and transfers for a renewable term of three years. In view of the ratification of the Ottawa Convention by forty states and its entry into force as of March 1, 1999, Turkey, as a renewed expression of her determination to contribute to the ongoing efforts of the international community aimed at preventing the casualties caused by APLs and her commitment to the humanitarian objectives of the relevant international instruments in this field, decided to extend this moratorium for another three years commencing from its expiry.

Since the initial stages Turkey has been giving support and making contributions to the efforts undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to achieving a global transfer ban on APLs. Furthermore, Turkey has also initiated contacts with some of her neighbours to establish bilateral regimes for keeping the common borders free from APLs and preventing their use in border areas in the future.

On the other hand, in spite of the sensitivity of the international community and the positive steps taken on this issue, it is regrettable to see the ongoing use of APLs in an indiscriminative manner by various terrorist organizations targeting everyone, including women and children. We believe that our decision to extend the existing moratorium will contribute significantly to the efforts towards a global ban on APLs.

Ankara, 15 October 1998
Working paper concerning CD action on an APL transfer ban

The Conference on Disarmament has a clear mandate to address conventional disarmament issues. As part of this mandate, we believe the CD has a role to play in strengthening the existing international regime against anti-personnel landmines. This would involve the negotiation of a ban on the transfer of APLs, as a complement to existing international agreements on APLs. There is an expectation that the CD will undertake this work, as evidenced by the strong support accorded to UN General Assembly Resolution 52/38H, which invites the CD to intensify its efforts on APLs.

It is with great pleasure that we note the entry into force of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (the CCW), and the imminent entry into force of the Ottawa Convention. These instruments represent major achievements. However, many major historical users, producers and exporters of APL's, who are also members of the CD, are not for the moment in a position to accede to the Ottawa Convention or the CCW. An APL transfer ban negotiated by the entire CD membership would therefore bring these countries at least some of the way towards the goal of a total APL ban, and in due course encourage increased participation in the existing international instruments. It would moreover play an important role in stemming the supply of APL's by significantly reducing the availability of these weapons which continue to have tragic humanitarian consequences in many regions of the world. The task of implementing a global regime against land-mines would be enhanced if we pursued a transfers ban within the CD.
We believe negotiating a transfer ban in the CD would have a number of compelling advantages. It would, from the beginning cover all types of anti-personnel land-mines. Such negotiations would also involve, from the outset, the relevant States not yet party to the Ottawa Convention or the CCW. These negotiations would, we believe, represent another irreversible step forward in the universalisation of the global fight against land-mines. A further advantage of the CD negotiating a transfer ban is that it has the capacity to get down to work on this issue immediately and achieve an expeditious completion of the negotiations. According to the proposals currently before the Conference a consensus exists in favour of the re-appointment of a CD Special Coordinator on APL’s. On this basis the CD should move quickly to capitalize on the consensus and re-appoint a Special Coordinator to carry forward the work on this important issue, with a view to the early establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee, given the broad support demonstrated within the CD for that course of action.
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1582

30 March 1999

Original: ENGLISH


We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Joint Statement issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria H.E. Ms. Nadezhda Mihailova and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey H.E. Mr. Ismail Cem on the agreement signed in Sofia on 22 March 1999, on non-use of anti-personnel landmines and their removal from or destruction in the areas adjacent to our common border.

We would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Petko Draganov (Signed) Murat Sungar
Ambassador Permanent Representative
Permanent Representative

GE.99-61123
JOINT STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY H.E. MR. ISMAIL CEM AND THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
H.E. MS. NADEZHDA MIHAIOLOVA

On the occasion of the visit of H.E. Süleyman Demirel, President of the Republic of Turkey to Bulgaria, at the invitation of H.E. Petar Stoyanov, President of the Republic of Bulgaria, an agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria on non-use of anti-personnel mines and their removal from or destruction in the areas adjacent to their common border is signed in Sofia, on 22 March 1999, by H.E. Ismail Cem, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey and H.E. Nadezhda Mihailova, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria.

According to the Agreement, the two countries undertake not to use under any circumstances anti-personnel mines and to destroy or remove all stocked or emplaced anti-personnel mines from the area of application as defined in the Agreement. The Agreement also envisages a verification regime.

Aware of the human sufferings and casualties caused by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of the anti-personnel mines, by signing this Agreement the two countries have proved their determination to contribute to the ongoing efforts of the international community aimed at the total elimination of this inhuman weapon.

This Agreement is an expression of the achieved quality of the relations between the two countries and underline the common will to further strengthen the existing friendly relations between them and contribute to stability, security and transparency in the region.
NOTE VERBALE DATED 3 MAY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DECREE ISSUED ON 23 MARCH 1999 BY THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE ON THE EXTENSION OF THE MORATORIUM ON THE EXPORT OF ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honor to request the distribution as an official document of the Conference of the attached text of a decree issued on 22 March 1999 by the Cabinet of Ministers (Government) of Ukraine on the extension of the moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines.
DECREE OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF UKRAINE

No. 426 dated 22 March 1999

Kyiv

On the extension of the moratorium on the export by Ukraine of anti-personnel landmines

In support of United Nations General Assembly resolution 52/38H dated 9 December 1997, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decided to extend for four years the moratorium on the export by Ukraine of all types of anti-personnel landmines, established by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 686 dated 27 August 1995.

Prime-Minister of Ukraine

V. Pustovoitenko

I have the honour to transmit to you the Final Report of the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, held in Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

I would be grateful if the attention of the member and participating non-member delegations of the Conference on Disarmament be drawn to this document ∆/.

(Signed) Bjørn Skogmo
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

∆/ The Final Report is contained in document APLC/MSP.1/1999/1, dated 20 May 1999, which has already been distributed to all United Nations Member States and Observers.

GE.99-63434
LETTER DATED 14 MARCH 1999 FROM THE CHARGE D’AFFAIRES, DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELARUS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING AND MINE STOCKPILE ELIMINATION, WHICH WAS HELD IN MINSK ON 6 AND 7 MARCH 2000

I have the honour to transmit to you information about the International Workshop on Humanitarian De-mining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, which was held in Minsk on 6 and 7 March 2000.

I would be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to ensure that the attached information is distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament to all delegations of the member States and observers in the Conference.

(Signed) Syargei Mikhnevich
Chargé d’affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

GE.00-60732
On March 6-7, 2000, the International Workshop on Humanitarian De-mining and Mine Stockpile Elimination was held in Minsk, Belarus. Delegates from Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United States of America, International Committee of the Red Cross and the Secretariat of the United Nations participate in workshop. Broad-ranging and result-oriented discussions were aimed at accurately defining the scope of the landmine problem, developing possible solutions and identifying international resources that could be made available to assist the Republic of Belarus in its de-mining and mine stockpile elimination activities.

On the basis of the data, provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, workshop participants received clear evidence that:

- having been a mine-affected country during two world wars, the Republic of Belarus fully shares all mine-related humanitarian concerns of international community;
- the Republic of Belarus supports the goal of prohibiting use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines;
- the Republic of Belarus does not produce anti-personnel mines;
- in 1995 the Republic of Belarus signed a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines which now enjoys a de-facto international recognition; it has been extended by Belarus to the end of 2002;
- the Republic of Belarus still suffers the consequences of World War II; a lot of unexploded ordinances, including anti-personnel mines, still kill and maim civilian population;
- the Republic of Belarus faces a severe problem of eliminating a huge stockpile of anti-personnel landmines left in the country after the break-up of the Soviet Union;
- the Republic of Belarus requests international assistance to conduct further demining and stockpile elimination. Assistance is required to meet the high costs involved and the lack of financial resources and relevant technologies;
- Because of financial problems the Republic of Belarus is not ready at present to join the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction but resolves to consider to join at some time in the future;
- the Republic of Belarus will consider becoming a Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction after de-mining and stockpile elimination activities with international financial and technological assistance has been provided;
- the Republic of Belarus is ready to begin de-mining and stockpile elimination cooperation with any interested party and welcomes any related proposals and initiatives.

The Republic of Belarus appeals to the international community, including governments, international agencies and non-governmental organizations, to assist the Republic of Belarus in its de-mining and stockpile elimination activities. The Republic of Belarus welcomes related technical, technological and financial assistance as well as assistance to victims and in establishing and implementing mine awareness programs.

Workshop participants express an opinion that the framework of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction creates the most favorable circumstances for States Parties to receive financial and technical assistance from international community.

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I have the honour to transmit enclosed herewith the text of a statement made on January 11, 2001 by the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Defence at a meeting with Military and Defence Attachés.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all Member States and observer States of the CD.

(Signed): Petko Draganov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Bulgaria
to the Conference on Disarmament
STATEMENT

By Deputy Minister of Defence at a meeting with Military and Defence Attachés
Sofia, 11 January 2001

In accordance with its consistent policy of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, Republic of Bulgaria ratified on July 29, 1998 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their destruction (Ottawa Convention). On September 16, 1999 a National Program for the Implementation of the Convention was adopted by the Bulgarian Government. It comprises all details concerning the destruction of the stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, the demining of the minefields and the financing of these activities. An Inter-agency working group under the chairmanship of a Deputy Minister of Defence was established to control the implementation of the Program.

The National Program was successfully implemented. Let me mention the most significant achievements in this respect:

- by October 30, 1999 all minefields on the territory of Bulgaria have been cleared and antipersonnel mines have been destroyed. During the period 1997-1999, 68 antipersonnel minefields were cleared and 13 926 antipersonnel mines, type PSM-1 have been destroyed on the spot. A total of 13 364 acres were set mine-free.

- by the end of 1999 the Ministry of Defence handed-over all its stockpiled antipersonnel mines to DUNARIT Company and TEREM Company. It is my pleasure to announce today that by December 20, 2000 a total of 881 970 antipersonnel mines were destroyed by these companies and Bulgaria became a 100% antipersonnel mine-free country.

Bulgaria has assumed a firm commitment both at national and international levels to combat the landmines threat and is ready to provide full support and assistance to all relevant efforts aiming at the complete and universal abolition of antipersonnel mines. In this context Bulgaria reiterates its readiness to provide experts to participate in the global destruction of antipersonnel mines. The specialized enterprises, which have the capacity and an original technology, are ready to participate in such operations.
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1639
7 February 2001

Original: ENGLISH


We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the joint statement made by the Republic of Turkey and Georgia on the agreement signed on 29 January 2001 in Ankara, concerning the establishment of a bilateral regime for keeping their common border free from anti-personnel mines and preventing their use for border protection purposes in the future.

We would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Murat SUNGAR
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Turkey

(Signed): Amiran KAVADZE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Georgia

GE.01-60365
JOINT STATEMENT BY REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND GEORGIA
Ankara, 29 January 2001

On the occasion of the visit of H.E. Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia, to Turkey, at the invitation of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, President of the Republic of Turkey, an agreement between the Republic of Turkey and Georgia, on establishing a bilateral regime for keeping their common border free from anti-personnel mines and preventing their use for border guard purposes in the future, is signed in Ankara on 29 January 2001 by H.E. Mr. Ismail Cem, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey and H.E. Mr. Irakli Menagarishvili, the Foreign Minister of Georgia.

According to this Agreement, the two countries undertake to clear the designated area starting from their common border from anti-personnel mines and to prevent their use for border guard purposes in the future as well. The agreement also envisages a verification regime.

Aware of the human sufferings and casualties caused by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines, the two countries, by signing this Agreement, have proved their determination to contribute to the ongoing efforts of the international community aimed at the total elimination of this inhuman weapon.

This Agreement constitutes the latest expression of the achieved quality of the relations between the two neighbouring countries and underlines their common will to further strengthen the existing exemplary relations between them and to contribute to stability, security and transparency in the region.
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1643
27 April 2001

Original: ENGLISH


I have the honor to transmit enclosed herewith the Declaration of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, released on April 12, 2001 by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman’s Office.

I would be grateful if this Declaration be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and be distributed to all Member States and Observer States of the CD.

(Signed): Petko Draganov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Bulgaria
to the Conference on Disarmament

GE.01-61448
Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

released on 12 April 2001 by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Office.

The Republic of Bulgaria welcomes the joint statement of the foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece made on April 6 in Ankara regarding the intention to concurrently start the procedures to become parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the so-called Ottawa Convention). As one of the first countries to join the Convention, Bulgaria appreciates the decision of the two friendly neighbour states and considers it as a substantial contribution to and integral part of the efforts of the international community to completely eliminate these inhumane and indiscriminate weapons.

The agreement between Greece and Turkey constitutes an important step in promoting the Ottawa Convention norms throughout the region and turning Southeastern Europe into an APM-free zone, which is one of Bulgaria's priorities in its regional security policy.

Bulgaria complied fully and earlier than the established deadline with its obligations under the Convention by removing all mine-fields and destroying all APMs stockpiled on its territory. The Bulgarian regional initiatives are in the spirit of the Ottawa Convention. The steps that Bulgaria undertook jointly with its neighbours, the conclusion of the Agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey on non-use of anti-personnel mines and their removal from or destruction in the areas adjacent to their common border, signed in March 1999, as well as Bulgaria's proposal of October 1998 to the Southeastern European states to assume a political commitment not to use anti-personnel mines and not to deploy them in areas, adjacent to their common borders, contribute to transforming SEE into APM-free zone.

We strongly believe that the enhancement of regional cooperation in this area, as well as the transformation of SEE into an APM-free zone brings significantly about strengthening the confidence, security and good-neighbourly relations in our region. We remain committed to continue working with all our neighbours for the achievement of this goal.

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on 15 March 2002 on the indefinite extension of the comprehensive moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel land mines.

I would be grateful if the press release could be issued and circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed:) Murat SUNGAR
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.02-60999
INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE MORATORIUM ON THE
EXPORT AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL LAND MINES

In view of the human sufferings and casualties caused by anti-personnel land mines, the international community has long been endeavoring to take effective measures in order to prevent their use. The resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling on Member States to implement a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines constituted an important part of these efforts since 1993. In light of these resolutions, Turkey unilaterally declared on 17 January 1996 a comprehensive moratorium on all anti-personnel land mine exports and transfers for a renewable term of three years.

Moratoriums on the export of anti-personnel land mines were superseded on 1 March 1999 by the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention, which provides for the total prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of the said mines as well as their destruction. The security situation around Turkey precluded her from signing the Ottawa Convention at the time of its conclusion. Nevertheless, as an expression of her commitment to the humanitarian objectives of the Convention, Turkey extended her national moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel land mines on 17 January 1999 for another three years. Turkey also concluded agreements with Bulgaria in March 1999 and with Georgia in January 2001, with a view to establishing regimes for keeping the common borders free from these mines.

After careful consideration, Turkey has now decided to accede to the Ottawa Convention. Moreover, Turkey and Greece have agreed to concurrently start the procedures that will make both countries parties to the Ottawa Convention. Turkey has come to the stage of submitting the Convention to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for finalization of the accession procedures.

In the meantime, the duration of Turkey’s national moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel land mines expired in January 2002. Turkey has decided to extend once again her moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel land mines, this time indefinitely, as an expression of her sincere commitment to becoming party to the Ottawa Convention.

15 March 2002
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


PRESIDENTIAL ACTION

1. The United States is committed to eliminating the humanitarian risks posed by landmines.

2. The indiscriminate use of persistent landmines is a serious humanitarian problem around the world. Persistent landmines are those munitions that remain lethal indefinitely, affecting civilians long after military action is over.

3. At the same time, the military capabilities provided by landmines remain necessary for the United States military to protect our forces and save lives.

4. To address the humanitarian problem caused by the indiscriminate use of persistent landmines, the President has announced a bold, comprehensive policy on the use of landmines that, unlike any previous landmine policy, covers all persistent landmines, both anti-personnel AND anti-vehicle.

5. No country does more than the United States to support humanitarian mine action, including landmine clearance, mine risk education, and victim assistance. The United States has provided nearly $800 million to 46 countries since 1993 to clear landmines and help civilians.

6. Funding for the State Department's portion of the United States Humanitarian Mine Action Program will be increased by an additional 50 percent over FY03 baseline levels to $70 million a year, significantly more than any other single country.

THE NEW POLICY

7. The United States has committed to eliminate persistent landmines of all types from its arsenal.

8. The United States will continue to develop non-persistent anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines. As with the current United States inventory of non-persistent landmines, these mines will continue to meet or exceed international standards for self-destruction and self-deactivation.
This ensures that, after they are no longer needed for the battlefield, these landmines will detonate or turn themselves off, eliminating the threat to civilians.

9. The United States will continue to research and develop enhancements to the current technology of self-destructing/self deactivating landmines to develop and preserve military capabilities that address our transformational goals. The United States will seek a worldwide ban on the sale or export of all persistent landmines to prevent the spread of technology that kills and maims civilians. Within one year, the United States will no longer have any non-detectable mine of any type in its arsenal.

10. Today, persistent anti-personnel landmines are ONLY stockpiled for use by the United States in fulfillment of our treaty obligations to the Republic of Korea. Between now and the end of 2010, persistent anti-vehicle mines can only be employed outside the Republic of Korea when authorized by the President. After 2010, the United States will not employ either of these types of landmines.

11. Within two years, the United States will begin the destruction of those persistent landmines that are not needed for the protection of Korea. Funding for the State Department's portion of the United States Humanitarian Mine Action Program will be increased by an additional 50 percent over FY 03 baseline levels to $70 million a year, significantly more than any other single country.

BACKGROUND

12. The Ottawa Convention entered into force in 1999. Parties to the Treaty commit not to use, produce, or transfer anti-personnel landmines. They further commit to destroy all of their stockpiled anti-personnel landmines, except those for demining training, within four years of joining the Treaty.

13. The Ottawa Convention does not restrict the entire class of more powerful anti-vehicle landmines and commits its adherents to the costly and unnecessary act of clearing every last mine in order to achieve a "mine-free" status.

14. The humanitarian harm caused by anti-vehicle landmines is significant. Anti-vehicle mines prevent refugees from traveling home, food aid from reaching the needy, and the free exchange of goods vital for economic prosperity, as well as causing injury or death to the occupants of vehicles. (A recent report from Angola suggests that up to 70 percent of that country's roads are blocked by persistent anti-vehicle mines.)

15. The United States will not join the Ottawa Convention because its terms would have required us to give up a needed military capability. However, this new policy dramatically reduces the danger posed to civilians from unexploded landmines - both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle - left behind after military conflicts. President Bush has charted a new course by addressing the entire threat to innocent civilians from the lingering nature of persistent landmines -- both anti-personnel AND anti-vehicle.
16. Self-destructing/self-deactivating landmines have been rigorously tested and have never failed to destroy themselves or become inert within a set time. Furthermore, all are battery operated. In the event that a self-destructing/self-deactivating mine malfunctions, the battery will die at a set period of time (90 days for example) and render the mine inert.

17. Landmines still have a valid and essential role protecting United States forces in military operations. Landmines enable a commander to shape the battlefield to his advantage. They deny the enemy freedom to maneuver; enhance effectiveness of other weapons (such as small arms, artillery or combat aircraft); allow us to fight with fewer forces against a larger enemy force; and protect our forces, saving the lives of our men and women in uniform and of those civilians they defend. No other weapon currently exists that provides all the capabilities provided by landmines.

18. The United States was one of the first countries to support humanitarian demining efforts back in 1988 when it funded the first such programs in Afghanistan. Since that time, the United States has consistently been one of the world's strongest supporters of humanitarian mine action, providing nearly $800 million to 46 countries since 1993 when the United States Humanitarian Mine Action Program was formally established.

19. United States efforts include support for mine clearance operations, mine risk education, survivors assistance, research and development, training and a public-private partnership program.

20. The United States Department of Defense trains countries in the procedures of landmine clearance, mine risk education, and victim assistance, as well as in the development of leadership and organizational skills necessary to sustain these programs after the departure of United States military trainers. In addition, a DOD research and development program creates new technologies to facilitate landmine clearance.