

National Measures to Address Dual Use Research in the United States

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Working Together is Essential

National Governments









Importance of Life Sciences Research

- Life Sciences Research Supports:
 - Biotechnology and Public Health Advances
 - Improvements in Agriculture
 - Safety and Quality of Food Supply
 - Environmental Quality
 - Strong National Security and Economy




United States Government Definitions

- Dual use research (DUR): research conducted for legitimate purposes that generates knowledge, information, technologies, and/or products that can be utilized both for benevolent and harmful purposes.
- Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC): research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be <u>directly misapplied</u> to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, material, or national security.



Dual Use Research of Concern



Purpose of DURC Policies

- Aim to preserve the benefits of life sciences research while minimizing the risk of misuse of the knowledge, information, products, or technologies provided by such research
- Complement existing regulations and policies governing the safe and secure use of pathogens and toxins



Caution: Contents may be Hot

Dual Use Research of Concern

- USG Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (March 29, 2012)
- HHS Framework for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Research (February 21, 2013)
- USG Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (September 24, 2014)
- USG Gain-of-Function Policy (under development)

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Research Subject to the Policies: 15 Agents

- Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic)
- Bacillus anthracis
- Botulinum neurotoxin (any quantity)
- Burkolderia mallei
- Burkholderia pseudomallei
- Ebola virus
- Foot-and-mouth disease virus
- Francisella tularensis
- Marburg virus
- Reconstructed 1918 influenza virus
- Rinderpest virus
- Toxin-producing strains of *Clostridium botulinum*
- Variola major virus
- Yersinia pestis



Research Subject to the Policies: 7 Experimental Effects

- Enhances the harmful consequences of the agent or toxin
- Disrupts immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization against the agent or toxin without clinical and/or agricultural justification
- Confers to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically and/or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitates their ability to evade detection methodologies
- Increases the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate the agent or toxin
- Alters the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin
- Enhances the susceptibility of a host population to the agent or toxin
- Generates or reconstitutes an eradicated or extinct agent or toxin listed in the policy



Research Subject to the Policies: Determination



• If the research with any of the 15 agents involves any of the 7 experimental effects, conduct a risk assessment to determine if it meets the definition of DURC:

 Research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be <u>directly misapplied</u> to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, material, or national security.



Re-assessing Gain-of-Function Research

- Recent laboratory incidents prompted a reassessment of the risk/benefit calculus that underpins funding for certain types of gain-of-function studies
- Recent calls from multiple stakeholders for science-based deliberation
 - Cambridge Working Group
 - Scientists for Science
 - European and other efforts
- Highest concern for respiratory pathogens with pandemic potential (MERS, SARS, and influenza)



Gain-of-Function Research Deliberative Process

- On October 17[,] 2014, the U.S. Government announced the launch of a deliberative process to assess the potential risks and benefits associated with gainof-function studies.
- During the deliberative process, the U.S. Government instituted a pause on funding for certain kinds of gain-of-function experiments involving influenza, SARS, and MERS viruses.



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Key Voices in the U.S. Gain-of-Function Deliberative Process

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)


- Draft a set of recommendations on a conceptual approach to the evaluation of proposed gain of function studies that will be reviewed by the broader life sciences community
- Serve as the official federal advisory body for providing advice on oversight of this area of research to the HHS Secretary

United States National Academies of Science

- Convene two public conferences to facilitate broad discussion of the issues associated with gain of function research, to include discussion of the NSABB draft recommendations.
- Provide summary of public discussions and feedback on the forthcoming NSABB draft recommendations



Estimated Timeline





Available at: <u>www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse</u>

Questions about implementing the Policy may be sent to <u>DURC@ostp.gov</u>





Thank you



Particular States