

**Statement by
Chargé d'affaires ad interim the Republic of Indonesia
H.E. Ambassador Grata Endah Werdaningtyas
at the Conference on Disarmament
Geneva, 8 June 2020**

Thank you, Mr. President for giving me the floor.

Excellencies and Colleagues.

Let me begin by expressing our appreciation to Cameroon's presidency... for convening the thematic debates on the Agenda Item 4: Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapons States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear-Weapons (NSA)...

An issue to which Indonesia attaches very much great importance.

Indonesia associates itself with the statement delivered by Kenya on behalf of the Group of 21, and wishes to convey a few remarks in its national capacity.

Mr. President,

Negative security assurances is an important issue in the multilateral process to reduce nuclear weapons towards a global zero.

Unfortunately, despite constant calls by a number of non-nuclear weapon states for over decades, no international legally-binding treaty or resolution containing negative security assurances is in place.

A legally binding NSAs is a very reasonable appeal... to offer a sense of security for the states... who have been religiously committed to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons... and to place all of their nuclear facilities under international safeguards... fulfilling their part of the so called, Grand Bargain.

I thank the briefers for taking us through some important timeline on development of this issue

The 1978 Final Document of SSOD asked the nuclear weapon states to “pursue efforts to conclude appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”

The final document of the 2010 Review Conference again called for immediate discussion on international arrangements on negative security assurances in the CD; as well as respect toward existing commitments.

Every year, the General Assembly have been urging the nuclear-weapons states to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The CD itself has been discussing this topic annually, including under the framework of ad hoc committee from 1983 to 1994 and the latest one in the format of Subsidiary Body in 2018.

Through decades we also see the development of various concept and initiatives that have been proposed to provide a way to move forward, regrettably most of them have yet to met the basic security guarantee needed by the NNWS

It is worth to note that in principle, there is no objection to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

We do recognize that there are still divergent views with regard common approach acceptable to all, for example on the scope, nature, form of this future arrangements.

But, as many delegates underscored during these past weeks, this convergence views on specific issues could be addressed during the negotiation, without having to stop us to commence the negotiation, to find the point of convergence, that we believe is possible so long as we are willing to.

Mr. President,

Indonesia does note the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States. We fully aware that the five NPT NWS have made various pledges

regarding NSAs, including the unilateral assurances contained in UN Security Council resolution 255 and 984.

Indonesia too recognizes that there have been Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone established covering more than 100 countries, including Southeast Asia region.

However, these do not provide adequate assurances to the legitimate right of non-nuclear weapon states, as they are either non-binding, limited in scope, or subject to conditions. In case of the Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone, most of the NSA protocols have not been ratified by the all the NWS.

Therefore, it is prudence for non-nuclear weapon states to keep urging for an early agreement on an effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances.

In this regard, I would to take this opportunity to appeal to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to:

- work actively and genuinely towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on elements that could be included in an international legally binding instrument on NSA, and
- to commence the negotiation and find common ground and overcome the difficulties, during the negotiation;

The commencement of NSA negotiation could be built upon previous discussions, documents, and all relevant views and proposals in the past and present, which we believe could serve as potential building blocks.

Relevant UN Security Council resolutions and additional protocols of NWFZs could certainly be another valuable basis.

Mr. President,

As we consistently pointed out, nuclear disarmament would always be our highest priority. But pending to this achievement, the commencement of negotiation of Negative Security Assurances could be seen as a long-overdue compensation or incentive for the states who have been very faithful to their obligation under the NPT.

As much as some of you put great attention to certain topics under other agenda item of CD, it is only fair and appropriate for the CD to also consider concrete arrangement that provides for a simultaneous negotiation on NSAs.

With that, we can prove that the interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states are addressed equally and appropriately... in this august forum.

I thank you.