


Permanent Mission
of the Federal Republic of Germany
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General Statement
General Debate of the First Committee
of the 76th UN General Assembly

**Delivered by Thomas Göbel, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of
Germany to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva**

Mr. Chair,

- Germany fully aligns itself with the statement by the EU.

Excellencies, colleagues,

- We are going through uncertain times. Political shifts and technological advance are transforming the landscape. In such times, more than ever, arms control is an indispensable tool to manage and reduce tension.
- At the Conference on Disarmament this year, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has outlined three major tasks.

Task one: New progress on nuclear disarmament.

- We are heading towards the 10th Review Conference of the **Non-Proliferation Treaty**. The NPT remains the irreplaceable framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We commend Ambassador Zlaevinen and the NPT Bureau for their tireless efforts to prepare for a full-fledged and fruitful conference early next year.
- The NPT is a living treaty. Success can only mean progress on all three pillars of the NPT. And in particular we must show: **Article VI matters** – in practical and in normative terms.

- That is why the **Stockholm Initiative**, last year in Berlin, presented a roadmap with more than 20 meaningful steps to advance nuclear disarmament. We invite all NPT States to lend their support to these proposals and we call on Nuclear-Weapons States to take the steps necessary for their implementation.
- The extension of the **New START Treaty** was an important first step. Further steps need to follow. We welcome the two Presidents' joint reaffirmation that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and we support US-Russian strategic talks leading to broader arms control arrangements in the future.
- 25 years ago the **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** was opened for signature. Its entry into force is long overdue. We renew our call on all States that have not signed and ratified the CTBT to show leadership and do so – now.
- Mr. Chair, Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States can very effectively work together. **Nuclear disarmament verification** is a case in point. Sound procedures here are a prerequisite for a world free of nuclear weapons. Germany and France are preparing the next exercise simulating the dismantlement of a nuclear warhead for 2022 and we encourage broad attendance.

Task two: United efforts to counter proliferation and end impunity.

- Germany remains fully committed to the implementation of UNSCR 2231 and of the **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action**. We strongly urge Iran to stop and reverse all activities inconsistent with the JCPOA. Germany calls upon Iran to return to the negotiation table now and to contribute actively to a successful conclusion of the so-called Vienna talks. We urge Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA, reapply the IAEA's Additional Protocol and seek its early ratification. We reiterate our strong call on Iran to refrain from ballistic missile activities inconsistent with UNSCR 2231. We strongly urge Iran to cease transfers of missiles and missile technology to states and non-state actors in the region.
- Mr Chair, **North Korea's** continuous development of its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missiles arsenal has become a major challenge to global non-proliferation efforts. The latest missiles tests, again, are blatant violations of UN Security Council resolutions and must be met with unity and resolve. We urge the DPRK to positively react to US and South Korean efforts to establish dialogue and negotiations and finally embark on a path towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.
- Mr Chair, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin. We call upon all states to contribute to the **universalization of**

the IAEA's Additional Protocol, and welcome the application of the Amended Small Quantities Protocol as appropriate.

Excellencies, colleagues,

- The global ban of the **use of chemical weapons** has been challenged repeatedly in recent years. The use of such weapons constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. The efforts by the OPCW including by the OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team contribute significantly to fighting impunity. Syria must not be allowed to dodge its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- We are equally concerned by the repeated use of particularly dangerous and internationally banned nerve agents in the cases of Mr Skripal and Mr Navalny. The use of such nerve agents has been confirmed by the OPCW as well as by independent national laboratories. The Russian Federation, on whose territory the attack on Mr Navalny took place more than one year ago, has not provided any explanations on the attack, nor have we learned of any internal investigation of that case. We continue to call on Russia to launch such an investigation, to answer all outstanding questions in full transparency and without further delay and to fully cooperate with the OPCW. We reject all attempts by Russia and Syria to question the professional expertise, objectivity, impartiality and independence of the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

Mr. Chair,

- The COVID-19 pandemic has raised awareness for **biological threats** and underlined the need for international cooperation in addressing them. Given the rapid scientific progress in that area and the emergence of new threats, the international community must renew its efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In this context, a key deliverable for the upcoming 5th Review Conference should be the establishment of a **Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum** within the framework of the BTWC.

Task three: Develop arms control to meet technological and other challenges

- Germany is strongly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the preservation of a **safe, secure and sustainable space environment**. The growing threats posed by counter-space capabilities are a particular concern. We must increase transparency and predictability of space activities, build trust and confidence between States and reduce the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Our goal remains a shared

understanding of threats and security risks related to outer space and an actual agreement on and implementation of rules of responsible behaviour. We encourage all States to support the submitted resolution aimed at carrying this important process forward.

- Considering the impact of new technologies on peace and security remains of key importance for the future of arms control. The discussion can build upon the results of Federal Foreign Minister Maas's initiative "**Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control**" that held two successful international conferences and a series of workshops.
- The Covid-19 pandemic has underlined the world's dependency on **information and communication technologies**. As malicious activities in the use of ICTs, such as cyber-attacks and cybercrime, have increased in scope and scale over the last years, effective international coordination for an open, secure, stable, peaceful and accessible internet is of the highest priority.
- In this regard, the final reports of the UN Group of Governmental Experts and the UN Open-Ended Working Group build a strong normative **acquis** for **responsible state behavior in cyberspace**. As a co-sponsor of the proposed UN Programme of Action on advancing responsible State behavior Germany supports concrete implementation of existing non-binding, voluntary norms and confidence-building measures.

Mr. Chair,

- Germany remains comprehensively engaged. We continue to strongly support the work in the framework of the **Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons** towards a normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of **Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems**. We hope for further convergence and a substantial outcome to be presented to at the CCW Review Conference in mid-December.
- We continue to put high priority on the effective control of **Small Arms and Light Weapons**. Last year, Germany funded support for SALW-related projects with 19 Mio. EUR and we continue funding in the same order of magnitude. We see regional roadmaps as effective tools to reign in the uncontrolled flow of SALW.
- Faced with devastating humanitarian impact on civilians that the use of **explosive weapons** with wide area effects can have **in populated areas**, Germany continues to supports the Irish-led process for a meaningful and inclusive political declaration. We remain staunch supporters of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention against Cluster Munitions. Last year, Germany provided almost 50 Mio. EUR for Mine Action and Victim Assistance, remaining one of the largest donors in this area.

- We would also like to draw your attention to the outright success achieved by the **UN GGE on conventional ammunition under German chairmanship**. We think it is vital to follow-up on these recommendations and we suggest establishing an Open Ended Working Group in 2022 to elaborate a new global framework addressing existing gaps in through-life for ammunition management.
- Mr Chair, the **7th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty** has successfully taken place recently, despite ongoing Covid restrictions. That was a positive signal and Germany calls upon States, that have not yet done so, to ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty.
- The **German Presidency of the ATT**, during the CSP8-cycle, will keep the focus on the goal of universalization and review both the achievements and shortcomings in implementing the ATT. Beyond that, we will work on “post-shipment controls” and “on-site verifications” as we believe that these are effective tools and confidence-building measures to fight illicit trade in conventional arms and to prevent their diversion.

Excellencies, colleagues,

- There is a lot to do and in some respect we are standing at a critical juncture. Our analysis and approaches might differ today. But tomorrow, we will share the same consequence should we not live up to the task ahead: to advance disarmament commitments, strengthen non-proliferation efforts and build arms control for tomorrow.

Thank you very much.