Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

- I will focus my intervention on the nuclear challenges we are facing. In addition to that, Germany has submitted statements on other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons in writing.

- In that context, just let me draw your attention to the very substantial consensus recommendations recently agreed in the UN GGE on conventional ammunition under German chairmanship, in particular regarding steps to address the safety and security challenges arising from conventional ammunition in a comprehensive manner. We believe the UN should build on that success and use the positive momentum to elaborate a new global framework addressing existing gaps in through-life ammunition management, including international cooperation and assistance. In the regular resolution on ammunition we will thus suggest establishing an Open Ended Working Group starting in 2022 and we count on broadest possible support.

- Let me now turn to the nuclear challenges.

Excellencies, colleagues,

- In challenging times we are heading towards the 10th Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and I should like to start by thanking Ambassador Zlauvinen for his outstanding stewardship to make this happen.

- In the face of power shifts, growing tensions and arms race dynamics the NPT remains the bedrock for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

- This treaty is a success story of multilateralism and we should not shy away from honoring its tremendous achievements: in curbing proliferation risks; spreading the benefits of nuclear technology; and in bringing down nuclear arsenals from cold-war levels.
But the NPT is a living treaty and it must stand the test of time – over and over again. Proliferation challenges and disarmament commitments require us to remain fully engaged.

Regarding Iran, the full implementation of all provisions contained in UNSCR 2231 and both its annexes is essential. Germany remains committed to the revitalization and full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by all sides. We ask Iran to turn words into action and return to the negotiation table. Time is on no one’s side.

We remain deeply concerned by the overall trajectory of the Iranian nuclear program marked by systematic JCPOA violations, activities lacking plausible civilian justifications, reduced transparency and insufficient cooperation with the IAEA. We urge Iran to reverse course and to return to full compliance with its political commitments and legal obligations in the nuclear field.

Looking at North Korea, the development over the last years is sobering. The continuous development of its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missiles arsenal has become a major challenge to global non-proliferation efforts and it must be met with unity and resolve.

We fully support the US and South Korean efforts to establish dialogue and negotiations with North Korea. We urge the DPRK to positively react to these initiatives. Only by embarking on a path towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization can North Korea regain the trust of the international community, expect sanctions relief and lay the ground for a sustainable peace in the region.

Mr Chair, the IAEA safeguards system is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements along with the Additional Protocol constitute the current IAEA verification standard and we strongly support its universalisation. We must ensure that the safeguards system and our non-proliferation efforts at large live up to the proliferation challenges as they evolve.

Excellencies, colleagues,

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin. We know that limited progress on nuclear disarmament has burdened the NPT community since the adoption of the 2010 Action Plan.

Against his background, the extension of the New START Treaty for additional five years was an important step. The limits on the strategic arsenals
of the two biggest nuclear powers and the transparency provided by the verification regime substantially contribute to global security. With their decision to extend New START the US and Russia renewed momentum for arms control and disarmament and inspired hope for more steps to come.

- In that light, we welcome the two Presidents’ joint reaffirmation from 16 June 2021 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and we welcome the Strategic Stability Dialogue now established, seeking to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures. Germany strongly supports US-Russian strategic talks leading to broader arms control arrangements, addressing all nuclear weapons and facilitating further reductions in the future.

- We hope that the impetus provided by the US and Russia will have a spillover on China, too, and will also stimulate tangible results within the P5 dialogue. There is a lot all Nuclear Weapon States can do together to meet their shared responsibility.

- That is why the Stockholm Initiative, last year in Berlin, presented a roadmap with more than 20 practical steps to further advance nuclear disarmament: Maximum transparency on arsenals; stronger negative security assurances; broader arms control negotiations are all Stepping Stones towards the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

- We invite all NPT States to lend their support to these proposals and call on Nuclear-Weapons States to jointly take the steps necessary for their implementation.

- Now is the time to reduce nuclear risks. The Stockholm Initiative has substantiated its views on how nuclear risk reduction can be operationalized as a matter of urgency. To facilitate nuclear disarmament — not to replace it.

Mr Chair,

- 25 years after the CTBT was opened for signature, the treaty has yet to enter into force. We renew our call on all states that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT — in particular those listed under Annex II — to show leadership and do so without delay. Ending nuclear testing is both a humanitarian imperative and a rational choice for international security.

- On FMCT we have been biding time for far too long. It is high time to start negotiations. Differences on certain aspects must no longer serve as a pretext not to move forward. We welcome that the P5 have put FMCT on their agenda but what we need to see are courageous steps. That is why Germany is a
main sponsor of the resolution calling on all states to actively contribute to facilitating negotiations now.

- Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States can very effectively work together. Nuclear disarmament verification is a case in point. Developing robust and proliferation-proof verification procedures is a prerequisite for a nuclear-weapons free world. To that end, Germany and France are currently preparing another practical exercise following the successful NuDiVe exercise in 2019. We look forward to broad attendance and to complementing our practical engagement by more conceptual work in the GGE next year.

Excellencies, colleagues,

- The NPT Review Conference is a chance to be seized. Together, we must be clear that the commitments we have made in the past are firm in all the three pillars. We need to see more progress in their implementation and renew the common vision of the NPT and its future.

- All of this is possible.

- Like the Stockholm Initiative the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative brings together perspectives from different regions and backgrounds. The NPDI has made recommendations to strengthen the NPDI in all its aspects.

- In that spirit – by showing respect for different priorities on the basis of a shared and comprehensive understanding of the treaty – can we further advance the goals of the NPT.

Thank you.