Mr Chair,

The delegation of Brazil wishes to thank you for convening yesterday’s panel, which, besides addressing current and future threats by States to space systems, managed to shed some light into the perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean region in the current debate.

To add to this afternoon’s exchange of ideas, I am glad to refer to Brazil’s national contribution to the UNSG’s report, document A/76/77, which touched on existing and potential threats to space systems; as well as on responsible, irresponsible, and threatening behaviors in Outer Space.

As far as existing and potential threats to space systems are concerned, I will list a few, in a non-exhaustive fashion:

- the development and proliferation of new anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems, either terrestrial or co-orbital;
- conducting manoeuvres or proximity operations without previous warning;

- rendezvous activities among satellites in space, raising suspicions about the existence of espionage or data collection missions, creating an environment of mistrust and the possible adoption of response measures by States that claim to have had their satellites observed without prior notification,

- failure to register satellites and absence of information and the use of spatial objects with low-visibility characteristics (or with “stealth” technology);

- taking control of space objects, intercepting information or taking measures that put other satellites at risk;

- cyber operations against space capabilities (in orbit or on land), that pose a threat to critical infrastructures both for military and civilian purposes.

When it comes to responsible, irresponsible and threatening behaviour in Outer Space, Brazil is fully committed to the confidence-building and transparency measures (TCBMs) established by the 2013 GGE Report (A / 68/189). Brazil also favours the discussion on the subject in such a way as to make space activities, both in orbit and on Earth, more transparent and to improve communications between technicians, operators and authorities concerned.
Mr. Chairman,

Pre-launch notifications; registration of space objects; exchange of information about the intentions of a particular operation as well as the improvement of space situational awareness (SSA) are measures consensually recognized as responsible, in line with the report of the 2013 GGE, endorsed by AGNU by consensus, through resolution A / RES / 68/50.

In this sense, Brazil considers the following behaviours as responsible:

• Registering satellite objects, as recommended by the Registration Convention;

• Prior or timely communicating manoeuvres with space objects, aimed at avoiding damage or interference to space devices in other States;

• Maximizing the use of de-orbiting devices in satellites or the removal of parts or components of space vehicles, at the end of the life cycle of each space element, reducing the amount of space debris;

• Sharing information on the monitoring of objects in space, in order to feed international databases and to enable broad spatial situational awareness;

• Submitting international notifications on the possibility of collisions involving uncontrolled space objects or de-orbit withdrawals;

• Establishing an international commitment aimed at banning tests with anti-satellite weapons (ASAT weapons);

• Observing the principles and precepts of the Outer Space Treaty, the Astronaut Agreement, the Liability Convention and in the Registration Convention;

• Observing the 21 guidelines on Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTS Guidelines) established by COPUOS and adopted by consensus by the UNGA.

This list above is of a non-exhaustive nature.

Mr. Chairman,

The lack of transparent behaviour regarding States’ capabilities, as well as the conducting of space operations (by either States or companies) without proper notification, creates an environment marked by opacity, in which misinterpretation can lead to inappropriate responses and conflict escalation.
In Brazil’s perception, the following behaviours are considered irresponsible:

• **Conducting tests of satellite destruction capabilities (use of anti-satellite weapons);**

• **Performing electronic attacks (jamming and spoofing) or cyberattacks on space systems;**
  
  • Refraining from carrying out anti-collision maneuvers between satellites or not communicating to other States about potential collisions involving satellites, mainly under their international registration;

• **Not "de-orbiting" space systems at the end of their life cycle;**

• Employing nuclear reactors in Earth's orbit in disagreement with the guidelines and principles recommended by the Technical and Scientific Subcommittee of COPUOS.

In addition to irresponsible behaviours, there are a number of behaviours that can be characterized as threatening, such as those mentioned in the following non-exhaustive list:

• Developing direct ascent or coorbital anti-satellite weapons;

• **Executing proximity maneuvers between satellites without prior communication and understanding between the States of registration of space objects;**

  • Developing satellites equipped with armaments, sensors for electronic or cyber attacks.

• **Using anti-satellite capabilities to carry out any destruction of satellites in orbit, resulting in intentional creation of space debris.**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.